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Abstract 
This thesis comprises three empirical chapters that examine the on-going issues in fiscal policy 
debates in Sierra Leone. The first empirical chapter, Chapter Two, assesses the sustainability of 
public finance in Sierra Leone. We examined sustainability by employing unit root tests on primary 
balance, cointegration between government revenues and expenditures, and finally, the fiscal 
reaction function showing the relationship between lagged debt ratio and primary balance ratio. A 
battery of unit rest tests was performed on primary balance ratio and the results confirm 
sustainability. Likewise, different tests for cointegration between government revenues and 
expenditures were applied and the results show that fiscal policy over the years is weakly 
sustainable. Controlling for endogenous structural breaks, the results show that the sustainability 
became weaker post 1984.  Finally, we estimated a policy rule that further confirms that fiscal 
policy in Sierra Leone under the review period was sustainable.  
Chapter Three examines the short-run effects of fiscal policy shocks on key macroeconomic 
variables within the framework of structural vector autoregression. The key results show that 
output and private consumption are persistently crowded-in by positive innovation in government 
spending. Government spending moderately increases private investment and government 
revenue. Shocks to government revenue temporarily reduce output and investment. Both spending 
and tax shocks are inflationary and interest rate rise to spending increases in the short term. 
Additionally, government investment expenditure strongly stimulates the economy in contrast to 
government consumption expenditure.  
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Chapter Four investigates the existence of optimal taxation in Sierra Leone. ‘Optimality’ here 
means if the government smoothed tax over time. Following Barro (1979), we employed different 
unit roots tests on tax rate to examine its stationarity properties. Moreover, we employed univariate 
autoregression and vector autoregression to examine the unpredictability of tax rate.  Both 
approaches confirm that tax rate changes are unpredictable which implies that tax smoothing 
hypothesis hold under the review period.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Fiscal deficit and its financing is a major problem and cause for concern for the government of 
Sierra Leone. For over three decades, Sierra Leone has been running persistent deficits. Recent 
fiscal policy, mainly the reduction of fiscal deficits, has been a tool used for short-term macro-
stabilisation and medium-term adjustment programmes. Domestic revenue mobilization in Sierra 
Leone has been abysmal coupled with the increase spending needs by the government has put the 
budget in persistent deficits since 1980. The government  has been struggling to raised tax revenue 
above 11.00 per cent per annul in GDP (Gupta 2007).  Despite the various reforms to the tax system 
ranging from changes in tax rates, introduction of new taxes, tax harmonisation etc, revenue 
mobilisation continues to be inadequate to meets the government financing needs.  
Large and persistent deficits have been highlighted as one reason for slow growth (Fischer, 1993; 
Adam and Bevan, 2005) and general macroeconomic instability (Schmidt-Hebbel, 1996).  
Moreover, fiscal deficits put a burden on future generations, as excessive public spending is 
financed by issuing debt. Large and persistent fiscal deficits could reduce growth and lead to fiscal 
crises (Romer, 2006). Such deficits may result also in excessive accumulation of public debt, 
which in turn raises some issues regarding public sector budgetary policies. One such issue is the 
sustainability of fiscal deficits, and another is if the government practises optimal fiscal policy 
measures such as tax smoothing.  
Prior to the publication of Keynes’, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 
1936, the policy rule was for government to run balance budget (Buchanan and Wagner, 2000). 
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The idea was that government should not spend without imposing taxes. Present fiscal burden 
should not be shifted to the future by issuing bonds to financed excess public expenditure. Fiscal 
deficits should only be tolerated in extreme cases such as wars and/or recession, which means that 
public debt should increase only in extraordinary periods (for detail see Burkhead (1954), 
Buchanan (1958) and Buchanan and Wagner (1967)).  
Approaches to fiscal policy entirely changed following Keynes’ publication. In Keynesianism, 
government budget is assigned a key role to achieve important macroeconomic aims such as 
growth and employment (Pierce, 1971).  Large deficits and debt accumulation are therefore not 
major sources of concern for government and policy makers if excess spending is used to stabilise 
the macroeconomy. Moreover, Keynesianism highlights that deficits do not matter if they are 
financed by domestic debts (Dalton, 1954; Feldstein, 1995), which means that government is not 
mandated to run a balanced budget. Because of the unbalanced budget rule, governments tend to 
make apparently irresponsible spending decisions (Feldstein, 1995).  Also, unrestricted spending 
regulations result in rent-seeking activities. When fiscal policy involves non-Ricardian 
approaches, fiscal deficits increase interest rates and crowd-out private investment, which erodes 
long-term growth (Mühleisen, 2004; Mühleisen and Towe, 2004; Adam and Bevan, 2005). 
Additionally, fiscal deficits create huge deadweight loss to the economy (Feldstein, 1995). 
Because governments understand the impacts of large fiscal deficits, recent fiscal policy measures 
have aimed to reduce the gap between government spending and revenue as a means of ensuring 
sustainable fiscal policy. In many countries, the size of the deficits has significantly reduced from 
their high figures in the 1990s (Auerbach, 2003; Adams and Bevan, 2005). According to Bohn 
(1998), one reason for the contractionary fiscal policy in recent years is the high debt accumulation 
in the past. In some developing countries, declining fiscal deficits are owing to policy targets set 
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by international agencies such as the World Bank and IMF. Governments themselves often create 
larger deficits, for example through spending increases and/or tax cuts for political gain. Fiscal 
deficits are difficult to avoid, and accumulation of debt is therefore inevitable. As such, this kind 
of fiscal policy obviously warrants macroeconomic concerns.  
1.2. Fiscal Policy in Sierra Leone 1980-2015 
The fiscal policy tools of Sierra Leone comprise mostly of taxes and government spending. The 
tax system is inherited from the British colonial era and has experienced significant reforms. The 
tax system is categorised into direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes in Sierra Leone comprised of 
company income tax, personal income tax, payroll tax and property tax. Indirect taxes on the other 
hand comprised of import sales tax, domestic sales tax, entertainment tax, restaurant and food tax, 
message tax, hotel accommodation tax, professional tax and exercise duty. Other sources of 
revenues are categorised as non-tax revenue which includes among others non-exclusive 
prospective license, exclusive prospective license, exploration license, mining lease and royalties. 
Whereas government spending can be grouped into three main categories: Government investment 
spending (capital expenditures) also known as the gross capital formation which includes spending 
on infrastructures such as road, electricity, information technology etc, Government consumption 
expenditure spending (mostly recurrent expenditure) such as wage bill of government employees, 
and Transfer which includes subsidies, grants and other social benefits. Like other developing 
countries the agricultural sector of Sierra Leone contributes significantly to the GDP accounting 
for about 44 per cent per annum. Services sector is was next to agriculture followed by mining and 
manufacturing (Kargbo and Egwaikhide 2012).  
Domestic revenue mobilisation over the sample period has been very low with tax revenue as a 
share of GDP less than 15%. The short fall in revenue coupled with government expansionary 
16 
 
spending resulted in persistent fiscal deficits. To address these obstacles of enhancing revenue 
collections, various reforms have been introduced in the tax system ranging from changes in tax 
rats, harmonisation of tariffs, introduction of new taxes and establishing an autonomous agency 
for tax collections. In 1989, the IMF conducted a review on the tax system in Sierra Leone and 
offered some technical advice to the government. The recommendations included the introduction 
of sales tax on imports and local manufactures, and to increase excise duty on petroleum. After a 
series of technical discussions with government experts and IMF, in 1990 the government of Sierra 
Leone finally adopted these measures and introduced the import sales tax and increased the 
exercise duty on petroleum products. In 2002, the National Revenue Authority hereafter NRA was 
formed by an act of parliament with the aim of establishing an efficient tax system. Prior to 2002, 
the tax system was fragmented with different sub-national units (Income Tax Department and 
Customs and Exercise Department) responsible for administering different categories of taxes, and 
these units were grossly inefficient. Finally, in 2009, the IMF recommended to the government of 
Sierra Leone for the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). After careful 
consideration, GST was officially passed into law in January 2010, and introduced at 15%. 
Sierra Leone fiscal performance over the sample period has been weak characterised by decades 
of fiscal deficits. This persistent deficit can be due to the shortfall in revenue mobilization coupled 
with the government’s fiscal stance of expansionary spending. In the 1980s, the fiscal deficits 
excluding grants as a ratio of GDP was less than 15%.  
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Table 1.1 Fiscal Performance of Sierra Leone 1980-2015 
YEAR Government 
Revenue % of GDP 
Government 
Spending % of 
GDP 
Deficits Excluding 
Grants % of GDP 
1980 13.94 24.91 -10.97 
1981 14.78 26.17 -11.39 
1982 10.41 23.03 -12.62 
1983 7.41 21.98 -14.57 
1984 6.42 17.24 -10.82 
1985 5.72 14.62 -8.9 
1986 3.82 13.32 -9.50 
1987 4.69 11.33 -6.64 
1988 5.86 14.67 -8.81 
1989 8.54 14.17 -5.63 
1990 7.03 16.65 -9.62 
1991 7.74 14.73 -6.99 
1992 4.99 15.43 -10.44 
1993 10.25 19.23 -8.98 
1994 11.04 20.06 -9.02 
1995 9.05 19.73 -10.68 
1996 8.53 16.84 -8.31 
1997 4.65 12.25 -7.6 
1998 6.33 16.81 -10.48 
1999 6.28 15.43 -9.15 
2000 10.12 19.91 -9.79 
2001 12.01 21.94 -9.93 
2002 11.31 24.94 -13.63 
2003 11.33 25.84 -14.51 
2004 10.91 26.92 -16.01 
2005 10.02 27.67 -17.65 
2006 9.18 25.36 -16.18 
2007 11.01 28.68 -17.67 
2008 9.68 20.86 -11.18 
2009 11.23 19.39 -8.16 
2010 11.21 20.41 -9.2 
2011 10.6 20.76 -10.16 
2012 9.86 24.14 -14.28 
2013 10.23 23.93 -13.7 
2014 9.89 22.86 -12.97 
2015 10.76 20.2 -9.44 
Source: Calculated by author from (i)World Bank database and (ii)National Revenue Authority  
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Figure 1.1 Fiscal Deficits as a percentage of GDP 1980-2015 
 
 (Sources: (i) World Bank (ii) National Revenue Authority Sierra Leone) 
 
Figure 1.2 Government Spending and Revenue as a Percentage of GDP 1980-2015 
 
(Sources: (i) World Bank (ii) National Revenue Authority Sierra Leone) 
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In 1980, Sierra Leone hosted the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) summit. The government 
increase its spending on infrastructure such as light and electricity ahead of the summit in order to 
boost the image of the country.  The budget deficit improves from 10.97% in 1980 to 8.81% in 
1988. The improvement in the budget deficits during these periods can be attributed to the decline 
in government spending on development and payroll expenditures, elimination of the rice subsidy 
for non-military personnel and transfer to public enterprises from 1980-1986. Also, the budget 
deficits improve from 10.44% in 1992 to 7.60% in 1997. These periods include part of the civil 
war era as it can also be observed that government spending fell from about 15.43% in 1992 to 
12.25% in 1997. Revenue from taxation also deteriorated from 10.25% in 1993 to 6.28% in 1999. 
From 1992 to 1997, government spending fell more than tax revenue leading to an improvement 
in the deficits from 10.44% to 7.60%.  However, the budget deficit sharply increased from 9.93% 
in 2001 to about 17.67% in 2007. This could be due to the post-war reconstruction drive by the 
government. 
In the first half of the 1980s, the economic condition deteriorated abruptly. Government revenues 
plummeted sharply, from about 14% of the GDP in 1980 to about 6% in 1985, due to the fall-off 
in imports and official diamond exports reducing the tax base, coupled with the increasing 
negligence of public sector management, which eroded revenue generation efficiency. The fall in 
revenue generation in the first half of the 1980s forced the government to significantly reduce its 
spending, particularly wasteful public expenditures. These reductions heavily involved reductions 
in development and payroll expenditures. Government eliminated the rice subsidy for non-military 
personnel and transfer to public enterprises. In sum, government spending fell significantly from 
about 25% of GDP in 1980 to about 15% of GDP in 1988. It is worth to note that the following 
years 1996, 2002 and 2012 correspond to periods of multi-party presidential and parliamentary 
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elections in Sierra Leone. The increased government spending in the 2000s can be due to the post-
war reconstruction drive to provide electricity, roads etc. Budget deficits during these periods 
worsen as it increased from 9.93% in 2001 to 13.70% in 2013. The deficits improve from 13.70 in 
2013 to 9.44% in 2015. This improvement in the deficits can be due to the austerity measures 
introduced in 2014 comprised of spending cuts and tax increase.  
1.3 Statement of the Research Problem 
The first issue that this thesis addresses is the sustainability of fiscal policy in Sierra Leone. We 
examine this issue to determine if the current fiscal policy would lead the country into insolvency. 
The second topic investigated is the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks. We examine 
how the economy responds to both spending and tax shocks as well as how the different 
components of government spending and revenue affect the macroeconomy. The third problem 
that is examined in this thesis is whether the tax smoothing hypothesis holds for Sierra Leone. 
Because taxes create a distortionary effect, we investigate whether the government follows optimal 
tax principles such as tax smoothing to spread the tax burden over time.  The objectives of thesis 
are thus as follows: 
i) to examine whether the current fiscal policy is sustainable in Sierra Leone; 
ii) to explore how the government reacts to a rising debt-to-GDP ratio in Sierra Leone; 
iii) to determine the causal direction between government spending and revenue in Sierra 
Leone; 
iv) to investigate how the economy responds to shocks in both taxes and government 
spending in Sierra Leone; 
v) to determine which fiscal policy tool is most efficient in Sierra Leone 
vi) to investigate if the government of Sierra Leone follows optimal tax policy theory  
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1.4. Outline of the Thesis  
This thesis comprises three empirical chapters of related themes on fiscal policy in Sierra Leone. 
The first issue examined in this thesis (in Chapter Two) is whether Sierra Leone’s fiscal policy 
over the sample period is sustainable by exploring different methodological approaches. 
Unsustainable fiscal policy ultimately leads the government into fiscal crises characterised by late 
repayment of loans, debt reschedule, default, and so forth. The second issue (considered in Chapter 
Three) is how the economy responds to fiscal policy shocks. If the fiscal policy is weakly 
sustainable, unfavourable fiscal shocks will put budgetary operations into unsustainable path. It is 
therefore important to understand the impacts of fiscal policy shocks. The third empirical chapter 
(Chapter Four) examines whether the fiscal policy is consistent with the tax smoothing hypothesis. 
Taxation creates a distortionary effect, it is expected that the government should smooth tax over 
time to minimise the deadweight loss. Tax smoothing is therefore a precondition for fiscal 
sustainability. Moreover, financing any temporary spending and/or shocks to the tax base increases 
the stock of debt. It can be seen that all the three empirical chapters are closely related, with similar 
themes.  Each of these chapters is discussed in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. 
In the first empirical chapter, titled “Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Reaction Function: 
Empirical Evidence for Sierra Leone”, we examine the sustainability of fiscal policy in Sierra 
Leone using annual data spanning 1980-2015. We investigate the issue of sustainability using all 
three approaches in the empirical literature. First, we investigate the whether the government 
intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) is violated. We test for stationarity of the primary balance 
as proposed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986).  
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Second, the approach taken by Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Quintos (1995), among others, is 
adapted. These authors address the issue of the sustainability of fiscal policy by examining the 
cointegration relationship between government expenditure and revenue, if it is found that both 
government expenditure and revenue are stationary at first difference. Both the stationarity and 
cointegration approaches confirm that the IBC is satisfied, which means that over the sample 
period, the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone has been sustainable. Third, as argued by Bohn (1998), 
the traditional econometric approach of unit root and cointegration tests have low power in 
rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root from near-unit root alternatives. Bohn (2005) has shown 
that the IBC is not a sufficient condition for sustainability. He argues that it is possible to satisfy 
the IBC while having an explosive path to debt ratio.  With this observation in mind, we estimate 
a fiscal reaction function (policy rule) by augmenting Bohn’s (1998) fiscal reaction function. The 
results show that the primary balance ratio positively responds to variations in debt ratio. In sum, 
all three approaches confirm that Sierra Leone’s fiscal policy over the sample period is sustainable. 
Moreover, we find that causality runs from government revenue to expenditure, which means that 
the decision to spend depends on the revenue. The causality result supports the tax-and-spend 
hypothesis as proposed by Friedman (1978). 
In the second empirical chapter, “Fiscal Policy Shocks in Sierra Leone: A Structural Vector 
Auto-Regression Approach”, we investigate the impacts of fiscal policy shocks within the 
framework of structural vector autoregression (SVAR). We adopt two approaches to achieve 
identification in the SVAR model, the recursive approach and Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) 
approach. We estimate a five-variable model following Perotti (2005). In addition, we estimate a 
six-variable VAR model to examine the impact of government spending and taxes on private 
consumption and investment.  
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The key results are that output and private consumption respond with strong and persistent effects 
to government spending shocks; both spending and tax shocks are inflationary; government 
investment expenditure strongly stimulates the economy compared to government consumption 
expenditure; and tax shock moderately reduces output and private investment.  
In the final empirical chapter, “Fiscal Policy and Optimal Taxation: Tests for Tax Smoothing 
Hypothesis in Sierra Leone”, we investigate whether the fiscal behaviour of the government is 
consistent with optimal taxation in the context of Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis.  
According to the tax smoothing theory, the timing of taxes matters due to the distortionary effects, 
and it is therefore necessary for the government to smooth tax over time. As such, the tax rate 
should follow a random walk. In addition, changes in tax rate should be unpredictable.  We perform 
a battery of unit root tests and the results show that tax rate follows a random walk. Moreover, a 
univariate autoregression and VAR test were performed. We find that tax rate changes are 
unpredictable either by its own lagged values or by lagged values of other variables in the model. 
We therefore conclude that the fiscal behaviour in Sierra Leone over the sample period is 
consistent with optimal tax policy theory.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Reaction Function: Empirical Evidence for Sierra Leone 
2.1 Introduction  
Is Sierra Leone fiscal policy sustainable? How do government react to the rising debt-to-GDP 
ratio? These questions have occupied the centre of public finance debates after the Latin American 
debt crisis in the 1980s (Brown and Hunter, 1999). It became even more interesting to 
policymakers, creditors and academics after the great financial crisis in 2008, when some 
countries’ fiscal policy shifted towards an unsustainable trajectory characterised by late repayment 
of interest, debt reschedule or an outright default. While a sustainable fiscal policy is necessary for 
a healthy economy, large and persistent deficits have been highlighted as reasons for slow growth 
(Fischer, 1993; Adam and Bevan, 2005) and general macroeconomic instability (Schmidt-Hebbel, 
1996). In addition to the above policy questions, we are also interested if the fiscal policy involves 
a structural break and the causal direction between government expenditure and revenue. Any 
causal direction between these two fiscal variables could offer valuable insight into how the 
government can manage the size of the deficits in the future.  
The empirical literature on fiscal sustainability is categorised into three  strands: i) the stationarity 
approach of public debt and/or primary deficits series, as seen in Hamilton and Flavin (1986), 
Trehan and Walsh (1988), Kremers (1989) and Wilcox (1989) among others; ii) the cointegration 
approach of public debt and deficits and/or revenue and expenditure as demonstrated by Hakkio 
and Rush (1991), MacDonald (1992), Haug (1995) and Quintos (1995); and iii) the policy rule or 
fiscal reaction as seen in, for example, Bohn (1998, 2005). 
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Following the seminal work by Hamilton and Flavin (1986), there has been a large volume of 
research on fiscal sustainability focusing mostly on the United States and European countries. Yet 
little has been done in the case of developing countries, especially Sierra Leone. The recent – and 
only – work that analysed Sierra Leone’s fiscal sustainability is by Oshikoya and Tarawalie (2010). 
These authors empirically test for the sustainability of fiscal policy in the West Africa Monetary 
Zone (WAMZ) countries, which comprise Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone, using annual data from 1980-2008. They test for cointegration relation between 
government expenditures and revenue and find that the fiscal behaviour for all the countries is 
sustainable except for Sierra Leone. There is no uniform fiscal policy across countries because 
each country is governed by different tax laws. The sustainability of fiscal policy therefore needs 
to be assessed at a country level. This current chapter therefore aims at providing answers to the 
above questions for Sierra Leone. 
The aims of this chapter are therefore of two-fold: first, to empirically investigate whether the 
fiscal policy in Sierra Leone is sustainable, and second, to carefully document how the government 
responds to rising debt-to-GDP ratio. It is believed that such empirics are useful to creditors on 
one hand, serving as a guide for lending to the government, and, on the other hand are quite useful 
to government, cautioning policymakers to avoid public debt from exploding, leading to fiscal 
insolvency.  
Comparing our work to Oshikoya and Tarawalie (2010), our contribution can be documented as 
follows: i) we use an extended data set, the longest available data set from 1980-2015; ii) we 
identify structural breaks endogenously in the cointegration relationships between government 
spending and revenue; and iii) we test for fiscal sustainability by adopting all different channels 
put forward in theoretical grounds – that is, stationarity tests of the primary-balance ratio, the 
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cointegration relation between government expenditure and revenue, and the relationship between  
lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and primary balance-to-GDP ratio (fiscal reaction function).  
Overall, our results show that the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone is sustainable, and the cointegration 
between government spending and revenue is positive (but less than unity) and statistically 
significant. This finding implies that for each percentage point of GDP increase in government 
spending, government revenues increase by less than one percentage point of GDP. In terms of the 
error correction mechanism, the speed of adjustment from government expenditure tends to work 
faster than revenues to restore fiscal equilibrium. We find uni-directional causality running from 
government revenues to expenditure and the government is unable to raise the required revenue to 
finance the budgeted expenditure. Additionally, the estimated coefficient of the fiscal reaction is 
positive and statistically significant, which means the government takes prudent measures by 
adjusting the primary balance ratio (spending cut and/or tax increase) in response to rising debt 
ratio. The response of the output gap to primary balance ratio is negative, implying that the fiscal 
policy over the estimation period has been procyclical. The results also reveal that institutional 
capacity and political stability positively improve the primary balance ratio. Finally, the results 
confirm the existence of twin deficits in Sierra Leone as the response between the primary balance 
ratio and current account balance ratio is positive and statistically significant.  
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2.2 Theoretical Framework  
Following Hakkio and Rush (1991), the government budget constraint is specified as:                           
                                 𝐵𝑡 =   (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐵𝑡−1+ 𝐺𝑡− 𝑅𝑡                                                      (2.1) 
where 𝐵𝑡 represents the real stock of outstanding public debt, 𝑟𝑡 represents the real interest rate, 
𝐺𝑡 is real government expenditure inclusive of interest payment and  𝑅𝑡 is the real tax revenue.  
Given that equation (2.1) holds for each period, taking expectation and solving recursively for 
government real debt, we obtain the intertemporal government budget constraint for the period n=t 
to t=T1: 
        𝐵𝑡 = ∑  
T
𝜏=𝑡+1
[∏ 
1
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗)
(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1
] + [∏
1
(1 + 𝑟𝑗)
𝐵T
𝑇−1
𝑗=𝑡
]                                (2.2)  
Assuming a constant interest rate r, equation (2.2) is simplified as: 
𝐵𝑡 = ∑  
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1
[
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡)] +  [
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇−𝑡
𝐵𝑇]                    (2.3)  
which implies that the present-value government budget constraint is specified as: 
𝐵𝑡 = ∑  
∞
𝜏=𝑡+1
[
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡)] + lim
T→∞
 [
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇−𝑡
𝐵𝑇]                    (2.4)  
 
An existing fiscal policy is sustainable based on the second term of equation (2.4). If the 
transversality condition: 
                                                          
1 See Hamilton and Flavin (1986) or Hakkio and Rush (1991). 
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                                             lim
T→∞
 [
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇−𝑡
𝐵𝑇]                                                                                 (2.5) 
holds, the present value budget constraint of the government is specified as: 
                           𝐵𝑡 = ∑  
∞
𝜏=𝑡+1
[
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡)]                                                                          (2.6) 
Equation (2.5) implies that the solvency conditions of the government must always be satisfied. 
This condition is known in the literature as ‘no Ponzi game’, which means the rate at which public 
debt is growing is no more than the rate at which interest rate is growing. This condition also rules 
out bubble financing – the option of servicing outstanding government debt by issuing new debt. 
In other words, it means that the government solvency condition must be satisfied in each period. 
Equation (2.6) means that the government must achieve a future primary surplus whose present 
value is enough to offset the value of the existing public debt and the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the sustainability of fiscal policy is that the real interest rate should be less than the 
growth rate of public debt caused by the deficit. If the real growth rate exceeds the real interest 
rate, the transversality condition in equation (2.5) is sufficient but not necessary for the 
sustainability of fiscal policy (Domar, 1944). 
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2.3 Literature Review 
The empirical studies on fiscal sustainability can be categorised into three methodological strands. 
The first category applies unit root tests on primary deficits and/or the public debt series. The 
existence of unit roots is thus taken as evidence for unsustainable fiscal policy. This approach was 
first pioneered by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) in tests for the sustainability of United States fiscal 
policy from 1960-1984. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) assume the interest rate is constant and test 
the following relationship: 
lim
T→∞
[
1
(1+r)T
BT] =  A0= 0                                                                       (2.7 ) 
as the null hypothesis where BT is the stock of outstanding real public debt and r is the real interest 
rate and: 
lim
T→∞
[
1
(1+r)T
BT] =  A0 > 0        (2.8) 
as the alternative hypothesis. 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) insert equation (2.8) into equation (2.4), and rearranging it gives:  
       Bt = ∑  
∞
𝜏=𝑡+1
[
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝜏−𝑡
(𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡)]  +  A0 (1 + r)
t                                                    (2.9) 
where 𝐺𝑡 is real government expenditure inclusive of interest payment and  𝑅𝑡 is the real tax 
revenue.  
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) argue that the sufficient condition for the validity of the government 
intertemporal budget constraint is the stationarity of the primary deficits (𝐺𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡 ). If  A0 = 0 in 
equation (2.9), it is interpreted as evidence of stationarity in debt and primary deficits, hence a 
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sustainable fiscal policy. On the other hand, if A0 > 0, public debt/primary deficits will be non-
stationary, which implies that the fiscal policy is unsustainable. Using annual United States data 
spanning from 1960-1984, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
to test the federal deficits and public debt series. Their empirical findings reject the hypothesis of 
a unit root in public debt and primary balance. On this basis, they conclude that the federal 
government budget is sustainable in present value terms. Other studies that adopt this approach 
include Trehan and Walsh (1988; 1991), Kremers (1989), Wilcox (1989) and Smith and Zin 
(1991). 
Wilcox (1989) introduces a stochastic interest rate departing from Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) 
assumption of a constant interest rate and tests for the sustainability of United States fiscal policy. 
Using the same data set as in Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Wilcox (1989) arrives at a different 
conclusion. He argues that the sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability is for the discounted 
public debt to converge to zero. Wilcox (1989) further tests for structural breaks in the data and 
the hypothesis of no structural break was rejected. He split the data into two small samples with a 
break date occurring at 1974 and finds that fiscal policy in the United States was unsustainable 
post-1974.   
MacDonald (1992) provides a comparable approach to Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) test of the 
intertemporal budget constraint based on the cointegration between public debt and fiscal deficits 
if these series are of the same order of integration. To derive a testable hypothesis, MacDonald 
(1992) modifies equation (2.4), takes expected values and substitutes St for primary fiscal deficits, 
so St = 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡.  
 
33 
 
Rearranging these, he arrives at: 
                       Bt −
1
r
= Et [ ∑  
∞
τ=t+1
∆St
(1 + r)τ−t
]                                                                            (2.10)   
Equation (2.10) means that the test for stationarity of  ∆St is akin to the test of stationarity of (Bt - 
St
r
 ), which implies that for fiscal policy to be sustainable, it requires the cointegration between  St 
and  Bt with cointegrating vector [1 − r]. MacDonald (1992) uses monthly United States data from 
1951:1-1984:12 to test for the sustainability of United States fiscal policy over these horizons by 
employing both Engle and Granger’s (1987) and Johansen’s (1988) approach to cointegration. His 
results fail to reject the hypothesis of no-cointegration, and he concludes that the United States 
fiscal policy violates the intertemporal government budget constraint, hence an unstainable fiscal 
policy was carried out over the sample period. The same methodology was applied by Haug 
(1991), who arrives at the same conclusion using quarterly United States data from 1960q1-
1987q4. 
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The second category in the empirical literature tests for the cointegration relationship between 
government expenditure and government revenue to determine the sustainability of the 
intertemporal budget constraint, hence testing the sustainability of fiscal policy. Hakkio and Rush 
(1991) propose and rewrite equation (2.4) with total government expenditure and revenue in real 
per capita term as: 
TGt = Gt + rBt−1 = Rt + ∑  
∞
τ=t
[
1
(1 + r)τ−t−1
(∆Rt − ∆Gt)] + lim
T→∞
 [
1
(1 + r)T−t
∆BT]    (2.11) 
where 𝑇𝐺𝑡 denotes the total government spending on goods and services, transfer payments and 
interest on government debt, 𝐺𝑡 denotes government expenditures net of interest payment and 𝑅𝑡 
is the real tax revenue. Hakkio and Rush (1991) argue that if 𝑅𝑡 and 𝐺𝑡 are integrated of order 1, 
that is, both variable are I(1) processes, then ∆𝑅𝑡 and ∆𝐺𝑡 are stationary. If both Rt and Gt follow 
a random walk with drifts: 
                                        Rt= 𝛼1 + 𝑅𝑡−1+ 𝜖1𝑡  
   Gt= 𝛼2 + 𝐺𝑡−1+ 𝜖2𝑡 
 
then equation (2.11) can be rewritten as:  
TGt = α + Rt  + lim
T→∞
  [
1
(1+𝑟)𝑇−𝑡
𝐵𝑇]  + ϵt      (2.12) 
where  
𝛼 = ∑ 
𝑇
𝑟=𝑡
(𝛼1 − 𝛼2 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑟−𝑡−1
= (
1 + 𝑟
𝑟
) (𝛼1 − 𝛼2 ) 
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and 
   ϵt = (
1+𝑟
𝑟
) (𝜖1𝑡 − 𝜖2𝑡 ) 
Assuming the transversality condition holds – that is, the second term in equation (2.12) goes to 
zero – the testable equation for the sustainability of fiscal policy can be written as: 
Rt = α + βTGt  +  ϵt         (2.13) 
If Rt  and  TGt are both difference-stationary and cointegrated of order I(1), Hakkio and Rush 
(1991) argue that the necessary condition for fiscal sustainability requires that government revenue 
and expenditure be cointegrated with 0<𝞫≤ 1, which is also necessary for the transversality 
condition to hold in equation (2.5). Hakkio and Rush (1991) assume a stochastic real interest rate 
and test for the United States fiscal sustainability using quarterly data spanning from 1950q2-
1988q4 using equation (2.13).  
They found revenue and expenditure to be cointegrated with β significantly less than 1 and 
conclude that United States fiscal policy was sustainable.  However, by accounting for structural 
breaks in the data and by using a subsample from 1964-1988, they show that the United States 
government violates its intertemporal budget constraint and the fiscal policy was not sustainable 
post 1964, owing to non-cointegration between revenue and expenditures. Haug (1995) arrives at 
the same conclusion using the same approach for United States quarterly data from 1950q2-
1990q4.  
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Quintos (1995) uses methodology comparable to Hakkio and Rush (1991) but with the modified 
interpretation of the results. She introduces the concept of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ conditions of fiscal 
sustainability. She proposes the following interpretation: i) strong sustainability requires the 
cointegration between revenue and expenditure with cointegrating vector [1 -1], ii) while weak 
sustainability requires 0<β<1; and iii) the fiscal deficits is not sustainable when β ≤ 0.   
Using the same equation as in Hakkio and Rush (1991) in terms of first differences, Quintos (1995) 
rewrites equation (2.4) as:  
∆Bt = ∑  
∞
τ=t+1
[
1
(1 + r)τ−t
(∆Rt − ∆Gt)] + lim
T→∞
 [
1
(1 + r)T−t
BT]                          (2.14) 
For equation (2.14) to converge to a stable solution, the last term should converge to zero, that is: 
lim
T→∞
[
1
(1+r)T−t
∆BT] = 0     (2.15) 
Assuming the interest rate r is constant, under the condition that ∆BT is stationary, Quintos (1995) 
derives the trajectory of the limit term depending on the stochastic characteristics of ∆Bt.  
If this is stationary, the evolution of the term at the limit in equation (2.15) behaves as: 
Et [ lim
T→∞
ℯ−𝜆𝑇 ] = 0      (2.16) 
where 𝜆 is a constant (𝜆≥0). If ∆BT is non-stationary, then the evolution of the limit term in 
equation (2.15) behaves as: 
Et [ lim
T→∞
ℯ−𝜆𝑇 √𝑇] = 0        (2.17) 
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Quintos (1995) show that the stationarity of  ∆BT is a sufficient condition for equation (2.15) to go 
to zero. Moreover, if government revenue and expenditure are not cointegrated, equation (2.16) 
tends towards zero faster than equation (2.17).  Quintos (1995) defines equations (2.16) and (2.17) 
as ‘strong’ and as ‘weak’ conditions for fiscal sustainability. The weak form of fiscal sustainability 
implies that primary deficits and undiscounted debt may be slightly volatile. In such a scenario, 
surprise shocks to government intertemporal budget constraint will put budgetary operations on 
the unsustainable path. Under this condition, the government faces potential difficulties in 
managing its debt and will likely face higher interest on debt service payment.  
To derive the testable hypothesis, Quintos (1995) inserts equation (2.13) into equation (2.1). After 
rearranging, she obtains: 
                                              ∆Bt = (1 −β)TGt −α − 𝜖𝑡     (2.18) 
She shows that if 0<β<1 in equation (2.18), ∆B  is like TG nonstationary, irrespective of whether 
government revenue and expenditure are cointegrated. She further argues that the necessary and 
sufficient condition for fiscal sustainability is for β = 1 and for revenue and expenditure to be 
cointegrated for equation (2.15) to hold.  
Quintos (1995) employs her modified methodology using United States quarterly data from 
1947q1-1992q4 and finds that United States fiscal deficits are weakly sustainable. She further tests 
for structural shifts endogenously and find that revenues and expenditures are not cointegrated 
post-1980, which implies that the United States fiscal policy was unsustainable in the subsample 
period.  
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Finally, the third category examines fiscal sustainability from the perspective of how government 
responds to rising public debt. Bohn (1998, 2005) criticises the traditional approach to fiscal 
sustainability on methodological grounds, in that it makes certain contestable assumptions about 
the discounts rate on government debt and future state of nature, hence the approach is of limited 
concept of sustainability. Also, according to Adams, Ferrarini and Park (2010), the power of 
stationarity tests tends to be low in small samples in differentiating between situations when a 
fiscal policy may be close to being sustainable when it is not. In an event when debt-to-GDP ratio 
is declining, it becomes apparently difficult to reject a unit root test. In effect, we lack the ability 
to discern whether the fall in debt-to-GDP ratio is because of luck – for example, high economic 
growth – or prudent policy design. As Bohn (2005) puts it, the traditional approach relies on 
stationarity and/or cointegration tests, which is misplaced faith because in an infinite sample, any 
order of integration of debt is consistent with the transversality condition, meaning that IBC is 
always satisfied. As such, Bohn (1998, 2005) proposes a different approach to fiscal sustainability. 
His idea basically entails modelling a corrective approach of how government responds to rising 
public debt-to-GDP ratio. The idea underscored here is estimating a policy rule that investigates 
the response of primary balance to change in debt-to-GDP ratio, which is known as a fiscal reaction 
function in the existing literature.  
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This modelling-based sustainability (MBS) approach is based on the regression equation below: 
                                                st =ρdt−1 +αzt + ϵt = ρdt−1 +μt                                      (2.19) 
where 𝑠𝑡 is the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, 𝑑𝑡 is the debt-to-GDP ratio, 𝜇𝑡= 𝛼𝑧𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 is a 
composite of other determinants of primary balance and 𝜖𝑡 is the residual. The parameter ρ is the 
fiscal response otherwise known as the fiscal reaction coefficient, which tells us how primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio responds to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. According to Bohn (1998, 
2005), a positive and significant response of primary balance fiscal to an increase in (lagged) stock 
of public debt both expressed as a share of GDP indicates a sufficient condition for fiscal 
sustainability.  
He argues that in response to rising public debt stock, policymakers design and implement prudent 
measures to increase revenue and/or reduce government expenditures (austerity measures) to raise 
the primary balance to prevent the debt-to-GDP ratio from exploding. Following Barro’s (1979) 
tax smoothing theory, Bohn (1998, 2005) proposes a measure of temporary government spending 
(𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) and business cycle indicator (𝑌𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡) as other determinants of primary balance in 𝑍𝑡. 
Tax smoothing theory suggests that either a temporary increase in government expenditure or a 
temporary decline in income (that is, in the tax base) will result in higher than nominal fiscal 
deficits. In studying how the United States government reacts to rising public debt-to-GDP ratio,  
Bohn (1998) estimates a policy rule in the regression below: 
                                           st =ρdt−1 +α0 +αGGVARt +αYYVARt + ϵt                   (2.20) 
Bohn (1998) applies the MBS approach to study the sustainability of United States fiscal policy 
spanning from 1916-1995 based on the policy rule in equation (2.20) and finds that United States 
fiscal is sustainable.  
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Despite the large volume of literature on fiscal sustainability, most of the empirical studies are 
focused on the United States and other advanced economies or groups of countries, mostly in the 
Euro areas. There are few studies on developing countries, especially sub-Sahara African 
countries. Those that do exist include Oshikoya and Tarawalie (2010), who test for fiscal 
sustainability in the WAMZ countries using annual data spanning from 1980-2008. They employ 
both Engle and Granger’s (1987) and Johansen’s (1988, 1991 and 1995) cointegration approach 
and find evidence of fiscal sustainability in all countries except for Sierra Leone.  
Ndoricimpa (2013) then examines whether east African economies’ fiscal policy is sustainable. 
This researcher tests for cointegration between total government expenditures and revenues and 
finds evidence of weak fiscal sustainability in all the countries. In Botswana, Fincke and Greiner 
(2010) adopt the sustainability approach following Bohn (2005). They estimate a fiscal reaction 
function and find evidence of sustainable fiscal policy in Botswana. A similar conclusion was 
reached by Asiam, Akosah and Owusu-Afriyie (2014) for Ghana.   
Before proceeding to the methodology section, it is important to close the present section by 
summarising some empirical findings of previous studies for both developed and developing 
countries. Table 2.1 shows the methodology, variables, and conclusion from selected empirical 
studies.  
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Table 2.1 Some Empirical Evidence on Fiscal Policy Sustainability 
Author(s) 
and Date 
Data 
Frequency 
Period and 
Country 
Test Performed Sustainability? 
Hamilton 
and Flavin 
(1986) 
Annual 1962-1984 
US 
Stationarity tests (deficits 
and public debt) 
Yes 
Trehan and 
Walsh (1988) 
Annual 1890-1983 
US 
Stationarity tests 
(deficits) 
Yes 
Kremers 
(1988) 
Annual 1920-1985 
US 
Stationarity tests (public 
debt) 
Yes until 1981, 
no afterwards 
Wilcox 
(1989) 
Annual 1953-1986 
US 
Stationarity tests (public 
debt) 
 
Hakkio and 
Rush (1991) 
Quarterly 1950q1-1988q4 
US 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
No 
Smith and 
Zin (1991) 
Monthly 1946:1-1984:4 
Canada 
Stationarity and 
cointegration tests 
(deficits and public debt) 
No 
Trehan and 
Walsh (1991) 
Annual 1960-1984 
US 
Stationarity tests (deficit 
and public debt) 
Yes 
MacDonald 
(1992) 
Monthly 1951:1-1984:12 
US 
Stationarity tests (public 
debt) deficit and debt 
cointegration 
No 
Haug (1991) Quarterly 1960:1-1987:4 
US 
Stationarity tests (public 
debt) deficit and debt 
cointegration 
No 
Ahmed and 
Rogers 
(1995) 
Annual 1692-1992 US 
1792-1992 UK 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
Yes 
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Haug (1995) Quarterly 1950:1-1990:4 
US 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
Yes 
Quintos 
(1995) 
Quarterly 1947:2-1992:4 
US 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
Yes until 1980, 
no afterwards 
Caporale 
(1995) 
Semi-
annual and 
annual 
1960-1991 
EU countries 
Stationarity tests (deficit 
and public debt) 
No for Italy, 
Greece, 
Denmark and 
Germany 
Payne (1997) Annual 1947-1994 
G7 Countries 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
Yes, for 
Germany 
Artis and 
Marcelino 
(1998) 
Annual 1963-1994 
EU countries 
Stationarity tests (Public 
debt) 
Yes, for 
Austria, 
Netherlands, 
UK 
Bohn (1998) Annual  1916-1995 
US 
Relationship between 
primary surpluses and 
debt ratio 
Yes 
Markydakis 
(1999) 
Annual 1958-1995 
Greece 
Stationarity tests (public 
debt) 
No 
Uctum and 
Wickens 
Annual  1965-1994 
US and 11 EU 
countries 
Stationarity tests (public 
debt) 
Yes, for 
Denmark, 
Netherlands, 
Ireland and 
France 
Afonso 
(2005) 
Annual 1970-2003 
EU 15 
Stationarity tests public 
debt and public revenues 
and expenditure 
cointegration 
No 
43 
 
 
Arghyrou 
and Luintel 
(2007) 
Quarterly Greece 1970:1-
1998:3 Italy 
1962:2-1997:4 
Ireland and 
Netherlands 
1957:1-1998:4 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration  
Yes 
Wolde-
Rufael (2008) 
Annual 13 African 
Countries 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
 
Oshikoya 
and 
Tarawalie 
(2010) 
Annual 1980-2010 
Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
No for Sierra 
Leone 
Fincke and 
Greiner 
(2010) 
Annual Botswana Relationship between 
primary deficits and debt 
ratio 
Yes 
Asiam, 
Akosah and 
Owusu-
Afriyie 
(2014) 
Annual Ghana Relationship between 
primary deficits and debt 
ratio 
Yes 
Ndoricimpa 
2013 
 
Annual  1985-2012 
Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, 
Tanzania and 
Uganda 
Public revenues and 
expenditures 
cointegration 
Yes 
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As shown in Table 2.1, different approaches have been used to examine the sustainability of fiscal 
policy in both developing and developed countries. Unsustainable fiscal policy could lead to fiscal 
crises such as debt defaults, late repayment of interest on loans, slow growth etc. Also, during 
fiscal crises, the central bank may not have control over inflation especially in Sierra Leone- a 
country where the central bank is not independent. Some studies have applied the unit root tests to 
primary deficits and/or public debt series to investigate the sustainability following Hamilton and 
|Flavin (1986), while other studies adopt the cointegration approach between government revenue 
and expenditure as a means of examining the sustainability of fiscal policy following the seminal 
work of Hakkio and Rush (1991). However, more recent studies have examined sustainability of 
fiscal policy by investigation the response of primary balance to debt ratio. As argued by Bohn 
(1998, 2005), sustainability needs to be examined how policy makers respond to rising debt ratio.  
For the empirical analyses to be robust I adopt all three approach in the empirical literature to 
examine the sustainability of fiscal policy in Sierra Leone over the sample period of 1980-2015. 
First, unit root tests will be applied to primary deficits in line with Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and 
other studies. Second, I will examine sustainability based on the cointegration relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure following Hakkio and Rush (1991), Quintos (1995) etc. 
Finally, a fiscal reaction function (policy rule) will be estimated to show how government respond 
to rising debt ratio.  
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2.4. Data  
To carry out the econometric analysis on fiscal sustainability in Sierra Leone, we use data on total 
government expenditure inclusive of interest payment and total government revenue excluding 
seigniorage. Our data source is the world development indicators (World Bank dataset) and the 
National Revenue Authority of Sierra Leone. The data frequency is annual, spanning from 1980-
2015. We compute real government revenue and expenditure, deflating nominal series by the GDP 
deflator. As Hakkio and Rush (1991) argue, an analysis based on ratios is more appropriate for 
growing economies. Indeed, McCallum (1984), among others, deems these ratios – per capita 
spending and revenue, and spending and revenue as a fraction of GNP – are pertinent for a growing 
economy. With this concept in mind, the fiscal variables are expressed here as a percentage of 
GDP, as in Afonso (2005).  
Time series econometric theory tells us that owing to the effect of small sample bias, unit 
root/stationarity and cointegration test are of little value if the series are too short to allow for the 
mean reversion or trend equilibrium. Hakkio and Rush (1991) and Otero and Smith (2000) have 
shown that increasing the frequency of the sample does not significantly raise the test power and 
the false null hypothesis is still easily accepted. Nor are the size distortions of the tests alleviated 
by increasing the frequency while staying at a relatively short time span: a true null hypothesis is 
still easily rejected.  
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2.5 Model  
The testable model for fiscal sustainability is given below: 
                                             Rt = α + βTGt  + ϵt                                                                  (2.21) 
where Rt and TGt are total government revenue and expenditure respectively. 
The approach adopted here to test for fiscal sustainability is based on the second strand in the 
empirical literature, as we are testing for the cointegration between total government revenue and 
total government expenditure in the regression equation above.  Unlike testing for the stationarity 
of the discounted public debt series, this approach has an advantage over the former in the 
following ways. First, this approach avoids the unrealistic assumption of constant interest rate seen 
in Hamilton and Flavin (1986) as criticised by Wilcox (1989). Second, the fiscal variable used in 
this approach (total government revenue and total government expenditure) are mostly available 
over a long period unlike public debt data, which is not available for long period in most 
developing countries. Moreover, by focusing entirely on expenditure and revenue variables, this 
approach avoids the subjective assumption about the average interest rate on outstanding 
government debt. Third, the most adequate measure of debt series is the net market value that is 
officially unavailable in most economies, both developed and developing, except for the United 
States. Since debt is usually available in par value, it is difficult to transform it to net market value 
owing to the various financing sources. Using the discounted par value to test the sustainability of 
fiscal policy may give misleading results.  
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2.6 Econometric Methodology 
The empirical procedure is carried out here by employing the standard methodology in the 
literature that tests for unit roots and/or cointegration in the budget variables. We summarise below 
the econometric methodologies adopted in this study. 
2.6.1 Unit Root Tests 
The first step in examining the sustainability of fiscal policy is to check for a unit root in the fiscal 
variables. The existence of unit roots in a series has both economic and econometric implications. 
Whether a series is stationary or non-stationary, it nevertheless provides useful information that 
helps to identify some features of the underlying data-generating process. If a series has no unit 
roots, it is characterised as stationary, and therefore exhibits mean reversion in that it fluctuates 
around a constant long-run mean. Also, the absence of unit roots implies that the series has a finite 
variance, implying that the series is time-invariant, which has an implication for forecasting. 
Additionally, the effects of shocks disintegrate over time. Otherwise, if there exists a unit root in 
the series, characterised as a non-stationary process, it has no tendency to return to a long-run 
deterministic path. Also, the variance of the series is time-dependent and goes to infinity as time 
approaches infinity, which results in severe problems for forecasting. Non-stationary time series 
suffer long-lasting effects from random shocks. If both government revenue and expenditure 
present a distinct order of integration, it means that they will not converge to equilibrium in the 
long run, which characterises unsustainable fiscal policy. Several approaches have been proposed 
and applied in the empirical literature to test for stationarity. We adopt the conventional 
econometric techniques to test for the existence of unit root in the fiscal series, i.e.: the ADF, 
Phillips and Perron’s (1998) technique, known as the Phillips-Perron (henceforth PP) and the 
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Dickey-Fuller generalised least square (henceforth DF-GLS) tests. For robustness, we also employ 
the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) (henceforth KPSS) test. 
2.6.1.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Following the pioneering work by Dickey and Fuller (1979), which was popularised by Nelson 
and Plosser (1982), many studies have employed these tools in empirical macroeconomics. The 
standard ADF test is specified as: 
∆Yt =α0 +α1t1 + 𝛿Yt−1 + ∑𝛽𝑖∆
L
j=1
Yt−1 + ϵt                                                         (2.22) 
where 𝛼0 is the constant,  𝛼1 is the coefficient on the trend term t, ∆Yt−1 is the first difference 
operator to control for serial correlation in the error term, and from the estimation of δ the ‘tau’ 
statistic is obtained and compared to relevant critical values. The null hypothesis is that δ is zero, 
i.e. there is a unit root. We reject this hypothesis when the computed statistic is more than the 
conventional critical values. The assumption for the validity of the original Dickey-Fuller test is 
that the residuals in the regression are not serially correlated. If they are, the aim of the ADF is to 
add lags to the dependent variable in the above equation until the serial correlation is overcome.  
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2.6.1.2 Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square Test 
The DF-GLS proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996), is akin to the ADF test, except 
that the series is transformed via a generalised least squares (GLS) detrending regression before 
performing the test. The detrended data is defined as: 
 
∆𝑌𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑌𝑡 − ?̂??̂?
′D𝑡                                                                       (2.23) 
where ?̂??̂?
′ =  (𝐷?̂?
′D𝜑)
−1𝐷?̂?
′y𝜑.  Using the GLS detrended data, estimate by least square the ADF 
test regression without deterministic term is given by: 
          ∆𝑌𝑡
𝑑 = 𝜋𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 + ∑𝜑𝑗∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑑
L
j=1
+ ϵt                                                   (2.24)   
The null hypothesis is that 𝞹 is zero. Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) have shown that this test 
has significantly greater power than the previous versions of the ADF. Just as the standard ADF 
test may be run with or without a trend term, there are two forms of DF-GLS: GLS detrending and 
GLS demeaning. With GLS detrending, the series is regressed on a constant and linear trend, and 
the residual series is used in a standard Dickey-Fuller regression. With GLS demeaning, only a 
constant appears in the first stage regression; the residual series is then used as the regressand in a 
Dickey-Fuller regression.  
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2.6.1.3 Phillips and Perron Test 
To correct for the possible serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the Dickey-
Fuller test, Phillips and Peron (1998) proposed an alternative unit root test. These authors use the 
Newey-West (Newey and West, 1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix estimator, a non-parametric correction of the Dickey-Fuller test in which 
allowance is made for possible heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. The 
asymptotic distribution and the critical values for the PP test statistic are the same as in the ADF 
test. The PP test has a null hypothesis if the series is I(1). However, the PP test was shown to 
exhibit an inferior small sample performance relative to the ADF test, and therefore should be used 
only as a complement to other approaches (see for example Schwert (1989), Campbell and Perron 
(1991), Agiakloglou and Newbold (1992), De Jong et al. (1992) and Liu and Praschnik (1993)). 
The test equation is specified as: 
∆Yt =β0 +β1t +ρYt−1 + ϵt                                                                                  (2.25) 
where 𝛽0 is the constant,  𝛽1 is the coefficient on the trend term t and from the estimation of 𝞺 the 
‘tau’ statistic is obtained and compared to relevant critical values. The null hypothesis is that 𝞺 is 
zero, i.e. there is a unit root. The rejection criteria of the PP test are the same as those for the ADF 
and DF-GLS. 
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2.6.1.4 Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin Test 
In small samples, both the ADF and PP tests suffer from low power when the coefficient of the 
trend term 𝞫 is close to one.  Moreover, misspecification vis-à-vis a trend or the numbers of lags 
that ensure that the test captures any short-term dynamics may affect the size of the test, which 
may result in the through null being rejected. As an alternative test, we perform the KPSS test to 
the fiscal series as a robustness check. Unlike the ADF, DF-GLS and PP, this test has the opposite 
null hypothesis: that the series being tested has no unit root (stationary).  Doing both ADF, DF-
GLS, PP and KPSS tests guarantees robustness when the findings are not inconsistent at a given 
level of significance. The KPSS uses a similar autocorrelation correction to the PP but in 
parametric sense. The KPSS assumes the observed time series is disintegrated into deterministic 
trend, random walk and stationary error term. The KPSS statistic is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
statistic and is based on the residuals from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of a time 
series in question on exogenous variable 𝑦𝑡: 
𝜏𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 ̂
′ 𝞭 +ϵ𝑡 
 
The associated KPSS LM test statistic is specified thus: 
KPSS =  ∑
𝑆𝑡
2
𝑇2𝑓0
T
=1
                                                         (2.26)       
where  
𝑆𝑡 = ∑ϵ̂𝑠
𝑇
s=1
 
is a cumulative function based on the residuals,  𝑓0 is an estimator of the residual spectrum at 
frequency zero and T is the sample size.   
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2.6.2 Cointegration  
If both government revenue and expenditure are found to be stationary in levels after testing for 
unit roots, the test for cointegration is unnecessary and we should conclude that the fiscal policy 
is sustainable.2 However, if both series are found to be stationary only at first difference, we 
proceed to test for cointegration. Granger (1981) introduced the concept of cointegration, 
acknowledging that a linear combination of nonstationary series could be itself stationary. The 
cointegration between total government revenues and total expenditures is the testable condition 
for fiscal sustainability here, and cointegration refers to a stationary linear combination of 
individually integrated variables. Haug (1996) compares several cointegration tests using Monte 
Carlo simulations and concludes that the Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue test and the Engle and 
Granger ADF test reveal the least size distortions. Also using a Monte Carlo study, Gonzalo (1994) 
shows that the Johansen procedure has better properties than single-equation methods or 
alternative multivariate methods. It performs even better in the presence of problems of non-
normality in the errors or over parameterisation by including too many lags in the model. Kremers, 
Ericsson and Dolado (1992), Banerjee (1995) and Zivot (1996) claim that the residual-based tests 
have low power. Phillips (1991) also argues that the Johansen maximum likelihood tests are 
generally superior to the residual-based cointegration tests. With this in mind, we perform the 
following cointegration methodologies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 See figure 2.1 for the empirical procedure.  
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2.6.2.1 Johansen’s Cointegration Approach 
The system-based approach proposed by Johansen (1988, 1991 and 1995) is a test for cointegration 
that allows for more than one cointegrating relationship, unlike the Engle-Granger method. The 
methodology takes its starting point from the VAR of order ρ given by: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜖𝑡                                                      (2.27) 
where 𝑦𝑡 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of variables that are integrated of order one and 𝜖𝑡 is a 𝑛 × 1 vector of 
innovations. This VAR can be re-written as: 
       ∆yt =  μ +  Πyt−1 + ∑  Γi∆yt−1 + ϵt 
p=1
i=1
                                 (2.28) 
where 
Π = ∑Ai − I
p
i=1
                                                                                              
Γi = − ∑ Aj                                                                                                        
p
j=i+1
 
If the coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank r < n then there exists n × 𝑟 matrices 𝝰 and 𝞫 each 
with rank r such that Π= 𝛼𝛽′ and 𝛽′𝑦𝑡 is stationary. r is the number of cointegrating relationships, 
the elements of 𝝰 and 𝞫 are known as the adjustment parameters in the vector error correction 
model and each column of 𝞫 is a cointegrating vector.  
It can be shown that for a given r, the maximum likelihood estimator of 𝞫 defines the combination 
of 𝑦𝑡−1 that yields the r largest canonical correlations of ∆𝑦𝑡 with 𝑦𝑡−1  after correcting for lagged 
differences and deterministic variables when present.  Johansen (1988) proposes two different 
54 
 
likelihood ratio tests of the significance of these canonical correlations and thereby the reduced 
rank of the Π matrix, which are the trace test and maximum eigenvalue test, shown as: 
𝐽𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 = −𝑇 ∑ ln
𝑛
𝑖=𝑟+𝑛
(1 − 𝜆1)                                                                    
𝐽𝑚𝑎𝑥 = −𝑇 ln (𝜆𝑡+1) 
Here, T is the sample size and 𝜆𝑖is the ith largest canonical correlation. The trace test tests the null 
hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of n cointegrating vectors. 
The maximum eigenvalue test, on the other hand, tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating 
vectors against the alternative hypothesis of r + 1 cointegrating vectors. 
2.6.2.2 Dynamic Ordinary Least Square Approach 
Additionally, we test for cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure 
by employing the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) proposed by Stock and Watson (1993). 
This methodology is asymptotically equivalent to the Engle-Granger cointegration approach and 
also has the advantage of performing better in small-sample properties by controlling for potential 
endogeneity among the variables in the regression by the inclusion of lead and lags.  
The DOLS is estimated based on the regression below:  
                Rt = α +βGt + ∑ λk∆Gt−k + ϵt                                                                               (2.29)
k
t=−k
 
where ∆ represents the first difference operator, ϵt is the error term and k is the lead/lag order. 
There is no unique method for choosing the lead and lag order (Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007). If k 
is too large compared to the sample size, estimates from the regression above will not be feasible 
(Saikkonen, 1991). In view of the small samples in this study, we set the lead and lag to 1.  
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The Johansen’s system approach and DOLS have shown to be superior to the Engle-Granger 
cointegration approach. Nevertheless, a major limitation of these methods is that they both assume 
that the cointegrating vector remains constant over time. Practically, it is possible that the long- 
run relationships between the underlying variables change. The reason for such might be 
technological progress, economic crisis, changes in people’s preferences and behaviour, policy or 
regime alteration and institutional development. 
To account for the possible shift in the structure of the fiscal policy, the empirical literature is 
grouped into two categories. The first group exogenously imposes a break in the data by selecting 
a date that the researcher believes corresponds to an event that has shifted or brought change to 
the existing policy. For example, Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991), MacDonald (1992) and 
Haug (1995) account for structural breaks in their studies by exogenously choosing the break dates. 
In contrast, Quintos (1995) and Gabriel and Sangduan (2011) account for structural breaks 
endogenously. The latter approach tends to be more credible than the former because by 
exogenously imposing a break in the data, the researcher is bound to miss the exact timing of the 
break.  
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2.6.2.3 Structural Break in the Cointegration Relationship 
The issue of structural breaks in time series econometric has attracted considerable attention in 
applied macroeconomic research. Following Engle-Granger (1987) seminal work on cointegration 
large volume of research have spurred investigation the long-run relationship in time series 
variables. Engle-Granger approach to cointegration has been criticised on the ground that it does 
not take into account the presence of structural change which most is often in time series data. 
Also, the Engle-Granger approach is inapplicable to a multi-equation system. These two 
aforementioned pitfalls have been addressed in the empirical literature by subsequent studies.   
Several approaches have been proposed to test to structural change. Earlier studies such as Hansen 
(1992b), Andrews (1993) among other studies developed the parameter stability tests with the null 
hypothesis of no change in a cointegrated models in which all coefficient are allowed to change.  
Phillips and Ouliaris (1990), Gregory and Hansen (1996) and Bai (1997) etc. test for structural 
change in the long-run relationship by means of least square equation methods. While Bai, 
Lumsdaine and Stock (1998) considered a single break in a multi-equation system, Inoue (1999) 
test for cointegration by allows for a one time shift in the trend function of the series at some 
unknown date, either in level for non-trending series and for both level and slope in trending series. 
All the literature discussed so far test for single break in the cointegration relationship. However, 
in time series econometrics, it is possible to have more than a single break.  Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) have addressed this problem by extending previous tests and estimation analysis in 
accounting for multiple structural change at an unknown time. Kejriwal and Perron (2008, 2010) 
extend the work of Bai and Perron (1998) in testing for multiple structural breaks at an unknown 
date by allowing for both stationary and non-stationary variables in the regression.  
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However, Bai and Perron (2006) have shown that the size and power of multiple break tests can 
be significantly distorted by a small sample size. Due to the small sample size for Sierra Leone (36 
observations), I test for single break endogenously in the cointegration equation by adopting 
Gregory-Hansen (1996) approach. Also, in the empirical literature on fiscal policy sustainability, 
if there is a break in the cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure, 
the procedure is to split the data two subsamples and test for the sustainability of fiscal policy 
before and after the break date(s). See for example Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991) and 
Quintos (1995) etc.  This idea also render testing for multiple breaks for Sierra Leone less required 
due to the sample small size.  
Gregory and Hansen (1996) extend and modify the Engle-Granger (1987) cointegration approach 
to allow for an endogenous break in a univariate series.  
Given that the series are I(1), Gregory and Hansen (1996) introduce four different models to 
consider for structural change in the cointegration relationship, which are as follows: 
Model 1: Level shift denoted as C and defined as: 
Yt = α +βDt +δXt +μt                                                                 (2.30) 
where Yt is a scalar variable, Xt is a vector of explanatory variables, μt is the disturbance term, 
Dt is a step dummy variable defined as Dt = 1 (t > Tb), where parameters 𝝰 represents the intercept 
before the shift, 𝞫 represents the change in the intercept at the time of the shift, 𝞭 is the parameter 
of the cointegrating vector and Tb is the break date. 
Model 2: Level shift with trend denoted as C/T and defined as:  
Yt = α +βDt + Φt +δXt+μt                                                         (2.31) 
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where t is time trend. 
Model 3: Shift in regime denoted as C/S and defined as: 
                                         Yt = α +βDt +δXt +ΦXtDt+ μt                                                (2.32) 
where 𝞭 denotes the cointegrating slope coefficients before the regime shift and Φ denotes the 
change in the slope coefficients. 
Model 4: Shift in regime with trend denoted as C/S/T and defined as: 
Yt = α +βDt +Φt +δXt +ΦXtDt+ μt                                   (2.33) 
The advantage of the GH model over various types of unit root tests with structural breaks is that 
the approach only has a single structural break point for multivariate variables, thus making it 
empirically easier to test the null of no cointegration with regime shift.  
All the GH tests are residual based, the null hypothesis of no cointegration corresponds to a unit 
root in the OLS residuals of models C, C/T, C/S and C/S/T and break point in the cointegrating 
relationship is calculated at the point where the t-statistic is at minimum 
2.7 Empirical Results 
This section presents the empirical findings that emerge from the sustainability tests. We proceed 
first to test for the sustainability of fiscal policy without accounting for breaks in the full samples. 
To do this, we start with testing for unit root in the fiscal variables followed by the cointegration 
tests. A battery of tests is performed, and the findings are summarised in Table 2.2. 
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2.7.1 Unit Root Tests Results 
When both series of revenues and spending are found to be stationary, it is accepted that these are 
necessary conditions for the sustainability of fiscal policy – it is not necessary to proceed to check 
for a cointegration relationship. If both series are found to be non-stationary at levels, but are first 
difference stationary, we proceed to check whether both series are cointegrated. In an event that 
the series contain distinct orders of integration then fiscal policy will be unsustainable as both 
series will not converge to long-run equilibrium. Table 2.2 shows the unit root tests in levels and 
first difference for the full sample. 
Table 2.2. Unit Root Tests Results   
  ADF TEST  
Variables Constant          Trend First Difference 
Revenues         -2.74          -2.59 -6.09*** 
Expenditures         -2.59          -4.17 -4.70** 
Primary Balance               -3.82***              -4.09**  
  DF-GLS TEST  
Revenues         -2.00         -2.59 -6.09*** 
Expenditures         -2.77          -3.79 -4.81** 
Primary Balance              -3.21***              -4.12***  
  PP TEST  
Revenues         -2.77        -3.70 -6.05*** 
Expenditures         -2.79        -2.90 -8.55*** 
Primary Balance            -2.95**            -3.79**  
        KPSS TEST  
Revenues              0.27**                 0.15**                                0.12 
Expenditures              2.84**                 0.21**                                             0.29 
Primary Balance         0.23            0.13  
 
ADF-lags selections were based on the Schwarz Information Criterion. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
PP and KPSS lags selections were based on the Newey-West Bandwidth using Bartlett Kernel Criterion. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 ADF, DF-GLS and PP has the null hypothesis that there is unit root 
 KPSS has the null hypothesis that the series is stationary 
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We start with the interpretation of the primary balance ratio as a means of sustainable fiscal policy. 
The ADF, DF-GLS and PP all have the null hypothesis that the series been examined is non-
stationary (i.e. there is unit root).  For the ADF, the test statistics are -3.82 and -4.09 for constant 
and trend which are significant at 1% and 5% respectively. The DF-GLS have test statistics of -
3.21 and -4.12 for constant and trend terms respectively which are both significant at 1%. The PP 
test have test statistics of -2.95 and -3.79 for constant and trend respectively which are significant 
at 5%. The null hypothesis of unit root in primary balance is rejected by the ADF, DF-GLS and 
PP tests.  
For robustness, we perform the KPSS test. This unit root test differs from the other tests in that it 
has the null hypothesis of stationarity in the series been examine. As shown in Table 2.2, the test 
statistics are 0.23 and 0.13 for constant and trend respectively which I fail to reject. The KPSS 
complement the findings from the ADF, DF-GLS and PP tests that primary balance is stationary. 
Following Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and in other studies in the literature, we conclude that the 
fiscal policy in Sierra Leone over the sample period is sustainable.  
The ADF test statistics for revenues are -2.74 and -2.59 for constant and trend respectively, also, 
for expenditures are -2.59 and -4.17 for constant and trend respectively.  These statistics are found 
to be insignificant. Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root in these series and 
conclude that both revenues and expenditure are non-stationary. However, they are found to be 
stationary are first difference with ADF test statistic of -6.09 and -4.70 which are significant at 1% 
and 5% respectively.  
The DF-GLS test statistics for revenues are -2.00 and -2.59 for constant and trend respectively, 
also, for expenditures are -2.77 and -3.79 for constant and trend respectively. These statistics are 
insignificant. I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root in these series and conclude 
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that both revenues and expenditure are non-stationary. However, they are found to be stationary 
are first difference with DF-GLS test statistic of -6.09 and -4.81 which are significant at 1% and 
5% respectively.  
The PP test statistics for revenues are -2.77 and -3.70 for constant and trend respectively, also, for 
expenditures are -2.79 and -2.90 for constant and trend respectively. I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root in these series as the test statistics are insignificant and conclude that both 
revenues and expenditure are non-stationary. However, they are found to be stationary are first 
difference with PP test statistic of -6.05 and -8.55 which are significant at 1% respectively.  
Finally, KPSS with the null hypothesis that the series been examine is stationary is employed. The 
test statistics for revenues are 0.27 and 0.15 respectively for constant and trend, also, for 
expenditures re 2.84 and 0.21 for constant and trend respectively. For both revenues and 
expenditures, the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% which implies revenue and expenditure are not 
level stationary. However, the null hypothesis is not rejected at first difference with test statistics 
of 0.12 and 0.29 for revenues and expenditures respectively.  
I proceed to tests for sustainability using an alternative approach – the cointegration relationship 
between total government revenue and expenditure. The unit root tests results displayed in Table 
2.2 do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of unit roots in both government revenue and 
expenditure in levels for both constant and trend terms at the conventional 5% significance level. 
However, both variables are found to be stationary at first difference. The KPSS test that is 
employed for robustness also rejects the null hypothesis that the series are stationary in levels at 
5% significance levels. Given that all the tests confirmed both government revenue and 
expenditure are I(1) series, we proceed to test for cointegration. 
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2.7.2 Cointegration Test Results 
 For comparability, I interpret the cointegration coefficient as in the empirical literature on fiscal 
policy sustainability3. Table 2.3 summarised the interpretation of the cointegration coefficient as 
in the empirical literature.  
Table 2.3 Interpretation of the Cointegration Coefficient 
Cointegration 
Coefficient 
Value Conclusion Implications  
β 1 Strong form of 
sustainability  
  
β 0<β<1 Weak form of 
sustainability  
Government 
Expenditure is 
growing faster 
than revenue 
 
β ≤0 Unsustainability  Fiscal crises, 
debt defaults, 
late repayments 
etc.  
 
 
As the results of stationarity indicate the existence of unit root in both revenues and expenditures, 
the next step is to check for cointegration. We employ both DOLS and Johansen’s system 
approach. We start with the DOLS test, which is performed by running a DOLS regression and 
test the residual for unit root. The ADF test statistic is compared to the critical value to determine 
whether there is cointegration or not. If the ADF test statistic is greater than the critical value, we 
conclude that a long-run relationship exists, and the variables are cointegrated, which means the 
fiscal policy is sustainable. We fail to reject the hypothesis if the opposite occurs. The result of the 
DOLS is presented in Table 2.4. 
 
                                                          
3 See Quintos (1995), Afonso (2005) for survey. 
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Table 2.4. DOLS Cointegration Test Result 
Cointegration test without Break full sample 
 DOLS 
Estimated equation 1980-2015 
Rt = α + βTGt  + ϵt 
 
 
α [p-value] 3.46[0.201] 
𝛽 [p-value] 0.21[0.048] 
F-Wald test, 𝐻0: β =1 [p-value] 64.65[0.000] 
F-Wald test, 𝐻0: β =0 [p-value] 4.17[0.005] 
t-ADF stat. on ϵt -3.42** 
5% critical value -3.21 
S.E. of regression 2.098 
 
The value of ADF test statistic is -3.42, which is greater than the 5% critical value of -3.21, which 
suggests that government revenue and expenditure are cointegrated, indicating sustainable fiscal 
policy. The estimated cointegration β is 0.21, indicating that for each 1% point of GDP increase 
in government expenditure, government revenue increases by approximately 0.21% of the GDP4. 
Government expenditure exhibits a higher growth rate than government revenue for the period 
under consideration in Sierra Leone. Shown in Table 2.4, the Wald test for coefficient restriction 
with a null hypothesis of 𝞫 =1 (strong form of sustainability) is rejected at 1% and the alternative 
hypothesis of 𝞫 = 0 (unsustainability) is rejected at the 5% significance level. These results imply 
that the strong form of fiscal sustainability as well as unsustainability are rejected for Sierra Leone. 
The cointegration coefficient 𝞫 satisfies the inequality constraint 0< 0.21< 1. Following Quintos’ 
(1995) definition, we conclude that the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone is weakly sustainable with 
cointegration vector [1 -0.21] 
                                                          
4 Remember that government revenue and expenditure are both expressed as a percentage of GDP 
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In addition to the DOLS test, we perform Johansen’s cointegration, or the system approach. The 
trace test as well as the maximum eigenvalue test are performed to test for the number of 
cointegrating vectors in the system. Lütkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler (2001) suggest that in a 
small sample simulation, the trace test performs better and is superior to the maximum Eigen test. 
They do however suggest using both tests. As such, we report both tests for robustness in Table 
2.5.  
Table 2.5. Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Null Alternative Rank Test     5% Critical Value    prob 
Panel A Unrestricted  
 
r =0 
r ≤ 1 
 
Panel B Unrestricted 
r =0 
r ≤ 1    
 
 
Cointegration 
  
r =1 
r =2 
 
Cointegration 
r =1 
r =2 
 
Vector   
[1   -0.457]  
 
Trace Statistic 
 
23.73490* 
9.478016* 
 
Max-Eigen Stat. 
14.25688 
9.478016* 
 
 
 
 
 
    15.4947                   0.0023                  
    3.84166                   0.0021 
 
 
    14.26460                0.0521 
    3.841466                0.0012 
 
     
                                   0.000 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values. 
r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
Panel A shows the result of the trace test. The null hypothesis of no cointegration for r = 0 is 
rejected at 5% significance level. The trace statistic of 23.73490 and 9.478018 are more than the 
5% critical value of 15.4947and 3.84166 and the probability values 0.0023 and 0.0021 are less 
than the conventional probability value of 0.05. In summary, the trace test indicates the existence 
of a cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure.  
Panel B shows the result of the maximum eigenvalue test and the hypothesis of at most one 
cointegrating relationship is not rejected. The maximum eigenvalue 9.478016 is more than the 5% 
65 
 
critical value of 3.841466 and the probability value 0.0012 is less than conventional probability 
value of 0.05. In summary, the maximum eigenvalue test indicates that the system has at most one 
cointegration.  
Having established that the Johansen approach confirms that both government revenue and 
government expenditure are cointegrated, which implies sustainable fiscal policy, we proceed 
further to interpret the cointegration coefficient. In the last panel, the estimated cointegration 
vector 𝞫 is 0.46, indicating that for each 1% point of GDP increase in government expenditure, 
government revenue increases by approximately 0.46% of the GDP. Government spending 
exhibits a higher growth rate than government revenue for the period under consideration in Sierra 
Leone. This result also confirms that the fiscal policy is sustainable in Sierra Leone but only in a 
weak sense. The cointegration coefficient 𝞫 is larger in Johansen’s approach compared to the 
DOLS. 
The DOLS and Johansen approach both confirm that the fiscal policy is Sierra Leone is weakly 
sustainable. However, under such conditions, unfavourable fiscal shocks will put the economy’s 
budgetary operations toward an unsustainable path and the government will find it difficult to 
market its debt instrument. The DOLS and Johansen approach to cointegration assumes the 
cointegrating vector remains constant over the time series period (stable cointegration).  
However, such an assumption only holds for specific cases and not in general cases, because there 
are factors such as technological progress, financial and economic crises, policy and regime 
change, wars and institutional development that will change the long-run relationship among 
variables. We therefore proceed to further test for cointegration between government revenues and 
spending by accounting for an endogenous structural shift in the deficits process.  
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Table 2.6. Summary of Cointegration Test Results 
  DOLS Johansen approach 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Revenues 
 Cointegrating Vector 
 
 
 [1 -0.21] **  
Cointegrating Vector  
 
 
[1 -0.46] *** 
** and ***indicates 5 and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
2.7.3 Fiscal Sustainability Subjected to Structural Shifts 
In this section, we test for the sustainability of fiscal policy accounting for an endogenous shift in 
the deficits process. Following Gregory and Hanson (1996), we check for a single break in the 
cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure. We are unable to test for 
multiple breaks as we are constrained by the number of observations. We present in Table 2.7 the 
Gregory-Hansen test for cointegration with single break date. 
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Table 2.7. Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test Results 
 Model 1            Level Shift     
 Test 
Statistics 
Break Date Asymptotic Critical  Value Reject H0 of 
No 
Cointegration 
   1% 5% 10%  
ADF -5.31 1984 -5.13 -4.61 -4.34 Yes 
Zt -6.04 1984 -5.13 -4.61 -4.34 Yes 
Za -39.79 1984 -50.07 -40.48 -36.19 Yes 
  
Model 2 
 
Level Shift    
 
& Trend 
 
 
  
 Test 
Statistics 
Break Date Asymptotic Critical Value Reject H0 of 
No 
Cointegration 
   1% 5% 10%  
ADF -5.71 1984 -5.45 -4.99 -4.72 Yes 
Zt -6.32 1984 -5.45 -4.99 -4.72 Yes 
Za -40.91 1984 -57.28 -47.96 -43.22 Yes 
  
Model 3 
 
Change in 
 
Regime 
   
 Test 
Statistics 
Break Date Asymptotic Critical Value Reject H0 of 
No 
Cointegration 
   1% 5% 10%  
ADF -5.22 1984 -5.47 -4.95 -4.68 Yes 
Zt -5.99 1984 -5.47 -4.95 -4.68 Yes 
Za -39.92 1984 -57.17 -47.04 -41.85 Yes 
  
Model 4 
 
Change in  
 
Regime & 
 
Trend 
  
 Test 
Statistics 
Break Date Asymptotic Critical Value Reject H0 of 
No 
Cointegration 
   1% 5% 10%  
ADF -6.37 2011 -6.02 -5.50 -5.24 Yes 
Zt -6.46 1984 -6.02 -5.50 -5.24 Yes 
Za -41.00 1984 -69.37 -58.58 -53.31 Yes 
Note: Critical values are from Gregory-Hansen (1996a). 
 
Though the results of all the four GH models are presented, our focus here is on model 3 (regime 
change) denoted as C/S as it is the most relevant for empirical discussion of fiscal policy 
sustainability.  IBC is based on a theoretical restriction preventing a long-run relationship with 
deterministic trend (an ever-growing deficit) – that is, the absence of ‘the Ponzi game’. Doing so 
automatically renders models 2 and 4 irrelevant for our discussion. In all four GH models, the null 
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hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. The findings here confirm the earlier result that 
government revenues and expenditures are cointegrated and that the fiscal policy is sustainable but 
with a structural shift in deficits in 1984. The break date corresponds to the policy measure 
introduced by the government in 1983 to severely cut on its spending to reduce the size of the 
deficits. In the 1980s, Sierra Leone’s economy deteriorated sharply, experiencing a decline in 
government revenues from 16% in 1980 to 5% in 1985. Coupled with the fall in imports and 
official exports of diamonds reducing the tax base, the increasing laxness of the central government 
eroded the efficiency of revenue mobilisation (World Bank, 1994). The government responded 
with severe expenditure cuts as a means of reducing the deficits owing to fall in revenues 
generation.  Government expenditures declined from 31% of GDP in 1981 to 18% 1n 1986. Payroll 
expenditure declined from 48% of total recurrent expenditures to 22% in 1986. In addition, 
development expenditures also fell from 4.9% of the GDP to 2.2%, together with government 
outlays for goods and service from 31.5% of recurrent expenditures to in 1980 to 22% in 1984.5  
2.7.4 Fiscal Sustainability Post Structural Break   
Since the break occurred in the early years of the sample, it is practically impossible to test for 
sustainability before the break (pre-break) because of insufficient observations. We therefore 
proceed to test for sustainability of the fiscal policy after the break (post-break). The reason for 
this test is to validate whether fiscal policy is sustainable after the structural shift in the deficits 
process. The results for the post-break are shown in Table 2.8 and 2.9 respectively.  
 
                                                          
5 For a detailed analysis, see World Bank (1994). 
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The results of the DOLS (Table 2.8) show that there exists a long-run relationship between 
government revenues and spending. This finding is shown by the t-ADF test on the residual -3.25, 
which is more than the 5% critical value of -2.79. The cointegration coefficient 𝞫 is 0.17, which 
means that for each 1% point of GDP increase in government spending, government revenue 
increase by 0.17% of the GDP. The Wald test for coefficient restriction with a null hypothesis of 
𝞫 =1 (strong form of sustainability) is rejected at 1% and the alternative hypothesis of 𝞫 = 0 
(unsustainability) is rejected at 5% significance level. As such, the strong form of fiscal 
sustainability as well as unsustainability are rejected for Sierra Leone. However, the cointegration 
coefficient (𝞫) satisfies the inequality constraint 0< 0.17< 1. Following Quintos’ (1995) definition, 
we conclude that the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone is weakly sustainable with cointegration vector 
[1 -0.17].  
Table 2.8. DOLS Cointegration Test Result Post-Break Date 
Cointegration test with Break Sub-sample 
 DOLS 
Estimated equation 1987-2015 (after adjustment) 
Rt = α + βTGt  + ϵt 
 
 
α [p-value] 4.39[0.077] 
𝛽 [p-value] 0.17[0.046] 
F-Wald test, 𝐻0: β =1 [p-value] 85.62[0.000] 
F-Wald test, 𝐻0: β =0 [p-value] 4.02[0.006] 
t-ADF stat. on ϵt -3.25** 
5% critical value                                         -2.97 
S.E. of regression                                          1.983 
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Alternatively, we test for cointegration using the Johansen cointegration approach. The results are 
presented in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9. Johansen Cointegration Test Results Post Break Date 
Null Alternative Rank Test     5% Critical Value    Prob 
Panel A Unrestricted  
 
r =0 
r ≤ 1 
 
Panel B Unrestricted 
r =0 
r ≤ 1    
 
Dependent Variable 
Revenue 
 
Cointegration 
  
r =1 
r =2 
 
Cointegration 
r =1 
r =2 
 
Vector   
[1   -0.439]  
 
Trace Statistic 
 
16.84374* 
7.008928* 
 
Max-Eigen Stat. 
9.834810 
7.008928* 
 
 
 
 
 
    15.4941                   0.0311                  
    3.84166                   0.0081 
 
 
    14.26460                0.2230 
    3.841466                0.0081 
 
     
                                   0.000 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis  p-values. 
  r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. 
 
Panel A shows the result of the trace test. The null hypothesis of no cointegration when r = 0 is 
rejected at 5% significance level. The trace statistics 16.84374 and 7.008928 are more than the 5% 
critical value of 15.4941 and 3.84166 and the probability values 0.0311 and 0.0081 are less than 
the conventional probability value of 0.05.  
Panel B shows the result of the maximum eigenvalue test and the hypothesis of at most one 
cointegrating relationship is not rejected. The maximum eigenvalue 7.008928 is more than the 5% 
critical value of 3.841466 and the probability value 0.0081 is less than conventional probability 
value of 0.05. In summary, both the trace and maximum eigenvalue test show that government 
revenue and expenditure are cointegrated after the break and that there is sustainability in the fiscal 
policy.  
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We proceed further to interpret the cointegration coefficient. In the last panel, the normalised 
cointegrating vector is [1 -0.43]. The result here also suggests the fiscal policy is Sierra Leone is 
sustainable in a weak sense. Comparing to the coefficients of the sub-sample to the full sample, 
we observe that the cointegration coefficient became smaller after the break as indicated by both 
cointegration methods.   
2.7.5 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Having established a cointegration relationship among the variables, the appropriate procedure is 
to estimate the vector error correction model (VECM).6 The VECM model is specified as follows: 
∆yt =  μ +  Πyt−1 + ∑  Γi∆yt−1 + ϵt 
p
i=1
                                             (2.34) 
where Π=𝛼𝛽′represents the long-run relationship ,  Πyt−1= (𝛼𝛽
′) yt−1 = 𝛼(𝛽
′yt−1), ∆yt is an  m 
x 1 vector of the first difference of the variables in  yt (i.e. government revenue and expenditures),  
μ is an m x 1 vector of intercept coefficient, Γi is (k x k) parameter matrices of the lagged 
stationary differences of  yt, 𝞫 is the (k x r)  matrix of k-dimensional cointegrating vectors and 𝝰 
is the corresponding (k x r) matrix of error correction coefficients (otherwise called the adjustment 
coefficient).  
We estimate a VECM to ascertain whether fiscal policy reacts to deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium trajectory, estimates of ECM will provide us information as to whether the adjustment 
comes through the revenue or expenditure side, or both. In the VECM, if the dependent variable 
is government revenue, a negative error correction term  gives rise to deficits and must be 
accompanied by an increase in revenues to move the economy towards a surplus to eliminate the 
                                                          
6 See Granger (1988) and Rambaldi (1997) for detailed discussion. 
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disequilibrium resulted from the deficits. Likewise, if the error correction term takes a positive 
value, this give rise to a surplus. In this regard, government revenues may be allowed to decline 
until the disequilibrium term become zero, leading to a balanced budget scenario.  
If the dependent variable is government expenditure and the disequilibrium term takes a positive 
value (significant or insignificant) so that the budget will be in surplus, the government can afford 
to increase its spending until the disequilibrium term converges to zero, leading to balanced budget 
scenario. Conversely, if the error correction term is negative, which implies the budget is in deficit, 
government should decrease its spending to restore a balanced budget. The result of the error 
correction model is shown in Table 2.10 
Table 2.10. Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Dependent 
Variable 
Government Revenue   
Parameters Coefficients St-error t-stat p-value 
𝛼𝑟 -0.129 0.147 -0.87 0.383 
Dependent 
Variable  
Government Expenditure   
Parameters Coefficients St. error t-stat p-value 
𝛼𝑔 -0.245 0.171 -1.432***   0.002 
*** indicate 1 % significant level 
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From the results above, the error correction term when revenue is the dependent variable (revenue 
adjustment model) 𝛼𝑟 is negative and statistically insignificant. As such, the budget is in deficit 
and should be accompanied by an increase in revenue to restore fiscal equilibrium. The estimated 
coefficient of -0.129 implies that about 13% of the fiscal disequilibrium in government budget 
deficits is corrected annually by government revenues. The error correction term 𝛼𝑔  
when government expenditure is the dependent (expenditure adjustment model) is negative and 
statistically significant, which implies the budget is in deficits. The estimated coefficient is -0.245 
which implies that about 25% of the disequilibrium in government budget deficit is corrected 
annually by government expenditures. Though both coefficients are of the expected sign, spending 
adjustments work faster than revenue to restore budget balance.   
2.7.6 Granger Causality Test 
As a complement to the previous sustainability test, we test for causality between government 
revenue and spending following the intuitive notion of a variable’s forecasting ability (Granger, 
1969). Granger causality should be interpreted as a forecast, i.e. whether one thing that happens 
before another thing helps predict it (Hamilton, 1994). Government revenue is said to Granger- 
cause expenditure when both the lagged and present values for government revenue help in 
forecasting government expenditure. The existing literature offers four hypotheses on the causal 
relationship between government revenue and expenditure.  
The first proposition is that the government’s decision to tax should come before the decision to 
spend, known as the tax-and-spend policy. Friedman (1978) and Buchanan and Wagner (1977) 
among others are proponents of this hypothesis, which assume a unidirectional causality from 
government revenue to government spending with no feedback effect.  
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Friedman (1978) predicts this relation to be positive in that an increase in revenue will bring about 
an increase in government spending and reducing taxes will possibly lower the existing budget 
deficits. This belief is in contradiction to Buchanan and Wagner (1977), who predict this causal 
relation from government revenue to government expenditure to be negative – that is, an increase 
in revenue will lower the outstanding fiscal deficits. They argue that if government reduces taxes 
to boost aggregate demand as a means of stimulating the economy, the public will suffer from 
fiscal delusion. In other words, the public will perceive the reduction in taxes as a fall in the cost 
of government programmes. As such, the public tends to demand more from the government, 
which puts an upward pressure on the deficits. A plausible means of reducing deficits is to increase 
revenue and set some fiscal limits to financing deficits (Buchanan and Wagner 1977).  
The second hypothesis is that a government’s decision to spend should come before the decision 
to tax, known as the spend-and-tax hypothesis in the literature. Proposed by Barro (1979) and 
Peacock and Wiseman (1979), it assumes a unidirectional causality from spending to revenue with 
no feedback effect. Positive shocks to government spending, such as in times of crisis, could lead 
to a permanent increase in government revenue (Peacock and Wiseman, 1979). Increase in current 
government spending will bring about an additional borrowing, imposing a constraint on 
household consumption, which in turn will increase household tax liability in the future to finance 
the deficits (Barro 1979).  
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The third hypothesis is based on bidirectional causality between government revenue and 
government spending. The idea here is analogous to the equilibrium condition of utility 
maximising agents in a free market. Public sector decision makers make simultaneous decisions 
on tax and spending policies by accounting for the cost and benefits of providing government 
projects. This hypothesis conforms to the classicalist opinion of public finance (Musgrave, 1966).   
The last proposition is based on the belief that there is no causality between government spending 
and government revenue, due to the fiscal autonomy between institutions that determine tax and 
spending policies. This hypothesis means there is no cointegration between spending and revenue, 
which has an implication for fiscal sustainability (see, for example, Wildavsky (1988)). 
The Granger causality test involves estimating the VAR system, which in general can be written 
as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑𝜓𝑖
𝜌
𝑖=1
𝑦𝑡−1𝜖𝑡  𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, …… . . 𝑇                                                (2.35) 
where 𝑦𝑡  is a (m x1) vector of jointly determined endogenous variables, 𝜓𝑖 is (m x m) coefficient 
matrices, p is order of lag and 𝜖𝑡 is a (m x1) vector of innovations and is a white noise process. For 
this paper, 𝑦𝑡 = (𝑅𝑡, 𝐺𝑡 ), where 𝑅𝑡 is the government revenue-to-GDP ratio and  𝐺𝑡 is the 
government expenditure-to-GDP ratio. Based on the VAR, the Granger causality between revenue 
and expenditure can be tested by applying the block exogeneity Wald test (Enders, 2009). This test 
detects whether the lags of one variable can Granger cause any other variables in the VAR system.  
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The null hypothesis is that all lags of one variable can be excluded from each equation in the VAR 
system. The test statistic is: 
                    (𝑇 − 3𝜌 − 1)(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∣ ∑𝑟𝑒 ∣  −𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∣ ∑𝑟𝑢 ∣) ∽ 𝜒
2(2ρ)                       (2.36) 
where T is the number of observations, ∑𝑟𝑒 is the variance/covariance matrix of the restricted 
system, ∑𝑟𝑢 is the variance/covariance matrix of the unrestricted VAR system and p is the number 
of lags of the variable excluded from the VAR system. Based on the Granger causality/block 
exogeneity Wald test, we can obtain the information about the direction of causality between 
variables.  The Granger causality test results are presented in Table 2.11 
Table 2.11. VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Test Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
Excluded 
Variable 
Chi-sq. df p-value 
Revenue Spending 0.0592 2 0.9708 
Expenditure Revenue 8.167** 2 0.0168 
** indicates 5% significance level 
 
The Granger causality/block exogeneity Wald test suggests that when expenditure is excluded 
from the revenue equation, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of expenditure does not Granger- 
cause revenue because the p-value of 0.9708 for the chi-square is greater than the 5% significance 
level. Conversely, when revenue is excluded from the expenditure equation, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of revenue does not Granger cause expenditure because the p-value of 0.0168 for the 
chi-square is less than the 5% significance level. Based on the above result, we conclude that there 
exists a unidirectional causality running from revenue to spending – that is, the decision to tax is 
taken before the decision to spend. A similar conclusion was reached by Oshikoya and Tarawallie 
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(2010) for Sierra Leone and Wolde-Rufael (2008) for Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Mali and 
Zambia.  This result conforms to the tax and spend hypothesis.  
2.7.7 Fiscal Reaction Function for Sierra Leone 
In this section, I address to the second research question regarding how policymakers respond to 
the rising public debt-to-GDP ratio in Sierra Leone by estimating a policy rule (fiscal reaction 
function). As Bohn (1998, 2005) argues, in an event when debt-to-GDP ratio is declining, it is 
difficult to tell whether the fall in debt-to-GDP ratio is because of luck (for example, high 
economic growth) or prudent policy design.  The objective here is to ascertain whether government 
takes prudent policy measures when the debt-to-GPD ratio starts rising by adjusting the primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio to ensure fiscal sustainability. We estimate the fiscal policy reaction function 
using the augmented Bohn (2005) model in the regression equation below: 
                          𝑝𝑏t =α0 +ρdt−1 + ∑  𝛽𝑖Xt
k
n=1
+ ϵt                                                                      (2.36) 
where  𝑝𝑏t is the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, dt−1 is the lagged debt to-GDP-ratio, ρ is the 
fiscal reaction coefficient and Xt is a set of macroeconomic and political determinants of primary 
balance ratio. In the regression above, Xt comprises the following: election dummy, which 
represents a political indicator that captures the effect of political stability on primary balance, 
current account balance, capturing any effect of the twin deficit hypothesis (i.e. if fiscal deficits 
lead to current account deficits and hence balance of payment problem) and institution dummy 
capturing the effect of the establishment of Sierra Leone National Revenue Authority in 2002.  
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The two main policy variables in the literature are cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) or 
primary balance (PB). We chose PB following Bohn (2005), since models with CAPB do not 
reflect business cycles whereas models with PB are associated with output gap. As in Bohn (1998) 
in the spirit of Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis, we employ other non-debt determinants 
of primary balance-to-GDP ratio: temporary measure of government spending, GVAR (spending 
gap), and temporary change in output, YVAR (output gap). GVAR and YVAR are computed using 
the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing parameter set to 100 for annual series. The 
parameters YVAR gives the deviation of real output from its trend. Positive values show signs of a 
boom and negative values indicate a recession. GVAR represents the deviation of real government 
spending from its nominal trend. Positive value means public spending is above the nominal value 
and negative value means government spending is below the nominal value. The political dummy 
and institutional dummy are time dummies. The political dummy captures the effect of 1996 
regime change in Sierra Leone when the country return to multi-party democracy from dictatorial 
military government. The dummy is constructed as follows- all periods between 1980-1996 takes 
the value of 1 and 0 otherwise.  The institution dummy is employed to captures the effect of the 
establishment of the Sierra Leone National Revenue Authority in 2002, an autonomous institution 
charged with the responsibility of collecting tax revenues. Prior to 2002, different government 
institutions were collecting revenues on behalf of the government which was deemed as inefficient. 
The institution dummy is also a time dummy taking the value of 1 from 1980-2002 and 0 otherwise. 
The result for the fiscal reaction is given in Table 2.12. 
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Table 2.12. Fiscal Reaction Function Estimates 
Variables Coefficients  Newey-
West St. 
Error 
t-Statistics Prob. value 
Constant -.222 .012 -19.17 0.000 
Lagged Debt Ratio  .010  .004   2.43** 0.026 
GVAR -.946 .059 -16.10*** 0.000 
YVAR  -.004 .072  -0.05 0.957 
Current Account Balance   .403 .168  2.41** 0.027 
Election Dummy   .060 .0140   4.31*** 0.000 
Institution Dummy    .006 .0115   0.56 0.582 
F (6, 18) = 115.50                                               p-value [0.000]    
Note: standard errors and t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West   heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) method where *, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
 
The coefficient of the lagged debt (fiscal reaction coefficient) is 0.010, which is positive and 
statistically significant. The estimated coefficient implies that for each 1% point of GDP increase 
in public debt, primary balance increased by 0.010% of the GDP. The finding suggests that the 
government improves the primary-to-GDP ratio (either through tax increase and/or spending cut) 
in response to the rising debt ratio. Our findings are in line with Fincke and Greiner (2010) and 
Asiama, Akosah, and Owusu-Afriyie (2014) for Botswana and Ghana respectively. The positive 
response of deficit ratio to public debt ratio means sustainable fiscal policy, which is due to prudent 
policy response from fiscal authorities in Sierra Leone.  The coefficient YVAR (output gap) is -
0.004, which is negative but statistically insignificant. The negative response of primary balance 
to output gap indicates that the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone over the sample period is procyclical. 
In other words, the government implements fiscal expansion during good times (boom) and fiscal 
contraction in bad times (recession). This means that the primary deficits ratio rises in booms and 
falls in downturns. Similar results were reported by Gavin and Perotti (1997) for Latin American 
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countries, IIzekzki and Vegh (2008) and Catão and Sutton (2002) for developing countries and 
Kaminsky, Reinhard and Vegh (2004 for a sample of 104 countries, noting that procyclical fiscal 
policy is a common trend in many although not all developing countries. In Sierra Leone, the 
procyclicality observed could be due to that fact that during recession (bad times), the government 
finds it difficult to borrow at higher interest rate. Thus, in periods of downturns, the government 
cannot run deficits and should reduce spending and/or increase taxes, while in periods of good 
times (booms), the government can borrow more easily and usually chooses to do so, increasing 
public spending. Other reasons could be due to weak institutions (Manasse, 2006) and election 
mistrust of corrupt politicians (Alesina and Tambellini, 2005).  GVAR (spending gap), otherwise 
known as the spending gap, is negative and statistically significant with estimated coefficient of -
.946. This finding means that public spending is below trend and it is associated with lower primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio. It is plausible for government to increase spending. We find evidence of the 
twin deficit hypothesis in Sierra Leone. The estimated coefficient of current account balance is 
0.403 which is statistically significant, showing that fiscal deficits in Sierra Leone contribute to 
current account deficits. The dummy used to capture the effect of political stability on primary 
balance-to-GDP ratio is also positive and statistically significant, meaning a stable political 
environment positively impacts primary balance. The dummy used to capture institutional capacity 
is positive but insignificant, meaning that improving the capacity of revenue institution will help 
to increase the revenue base for the government which helps in reducing the size of the primary 
deficits.  
 
 
 
81 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the sustainability of fiscal policy in Sierra Leone spanning from 1980-2015. 
I employed all three approaches presented in the empirical literature: the stationarity approach, the 
cointegration between government revenues and expenditures and finally, the fiscal reaction 
function approach. The results show that the primary deficits is stationary which is a necessary 
condition for sustainable fiscal policy. Also, I find evidence of cointegration between government 
revenues and expenditure, with the cointegrating vector significantly less than one. This result 
means the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone over the years is sustainable but in a weak sense. This 
finding is further supported by estimates from the policy rule, which show that the government 
consistently manages the size of the deficits ratio in response to rising debt ratio to ensure fiscal 
sustainability. The latter finding implies that the sustainability of fiscal policy in Sierra Leone is 
due to prudent policy design by the government and not just luck (for example high economic 
growth). With all three approach arrives at similar conclusions, I finally conclude that over the 
sample period, fiscal policy in Sierra Leone has been sustainable.  
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Figure 2.1. Empirical Procedure to Test for Fiscal Policy Sustainability 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Fiscal Policy Shocks in Sierra Leone: A Structural Vector Auto-regression Approach 
3. 1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, the use of discretionary fiscal policy has been a subject of great controversy. 
Unlike monetary policy where there is some agreement on how it affects the macroeconomy 
following Taylor’s rule, there is no such consensus among macroeconomists regarding fiscal 
policy. Prior to the first and second oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, fiscal policy was extensively 
viewed as a powerful tool for stabilisation. However, its inability to boost economic recovery 
following these shocks and the related increase in fiscal deficits and public debts have led some 
macroeconomists and policymakers to be doubtful about its potential to smooth business cycle 
fluctuations (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011), and thus its effectiveness as a stabilisation tool 
(Afonso and Sousa, 2012). However, during the 2008 financial crisis when many advanced 
economies were experiencing zero lower bound interest rates that hindered the effectiveness of 
monetary policy for economic recovery, policymakers in these economies resorted to fiscal policy 
as an alternative tool for stabilisation and growth. According to Auerbach (2012),  the United 
States government approved a fiscal stimulus package as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which comprised tax cuts, transfers and spending expansion 
amounting to 5.5% of the GDP. In a similar vein, the European Union adopted the European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) equivalent to 1.5% of the EU GDP (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 
2011). Fiscal policy is once again at the centre of macroeconomic policy debate.  
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On both theoretical and empirical fronts, there exists some considerable disagreement in terms of 
the qualitative and quantitative effect of fiscal policy, the transmission mechanisms and the 
magnitude of its effects. One key reason for such disagreement on the impact of fiscal policy stems 
from theoretical predictions regarding the response of private consumption and private investment 
to government spending. The former is the largest component of aggregate demand, and how it 
responds determines the size of the government spending multiplier. 
Macroeconomic models that analyse the effect of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy offer 
heterogeneous predictions stemming from different underlying theoretical assumptions. 
Irrespective of the relevance of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool, there has been no clear 
agreement on how fiscal policy affects the economy (Perotti, 2001). The neoclassical real business 
cycle model claims that economic agents make decisions based on rational expectations, which 
implies they are forward-looking with respect to consumption and labour supply decisions. In 
effect, the model predicts that discretionary changes in taxes, for example temporary tax cuts, have 
no effects on household intertemporal budget constraints, resulting in a consumption pattern. 
Moreover, the model states that discretionary changes in government spending that are 
expansionary create a negative wealth effect for representative households. Increase in government 
spending creates a deficit that should be financed by higher taxes in the future. Households respond 
by reducing current consumption and increasing labour supply, which raises output. This effect is 
at odds with the conventional Keynesian wisdom, which assumes that consumers are not forward-
looking and expansionary government spending crowds-in household consumption and private 
investment leading to an increase in output.  
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Some earlier studies on fiscal policy often depend on the cyclically adjusted primary deficits as 
determinants of fiscal policy stance.  Though cyclically adjusted deficits do offer insight into 
current fiscal policy, their use is unsuitable in dynamic macroeconomic analysis, because 
competing macroeconomic theories predict different effects from spending increases and tax cuts 
on the macroeconomy (Fatás and Mihov 2001). SVAR is more appropriate in the dynamic 
macroeconomic context (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).  
In the framework of SVAR, the identification of fiscal shocks can be documented in five 
methodological groups. First, fiscal policy shocks can be identified by using dummy variables that 
capture specific episodes, such as the military-build ups (i.e. the Korean and the Vietnam wars) or 
the Reagan fiscal expansion in US (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 
1999; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2000). Second, sign restrictions can be imposed on the 
impulse-response functions (Mountford and Uhlig, 2002) and third, fiscal shocks and be identified 
based on recursive ordering  (Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Favero, 2002). Fourth, fiscal policy shocks 
can be identified by assuming decision lags in policy-making and information about the elasticity 
of fiscal variables to economic activity (Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Perotti, 2005) and finally, 
fiscal shock can be identified by exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity of the structural 
shocks (Bouakez, Chihi and Normandin, 2014). This chapter employs on the third and fourth 
identification strategies stated above.  
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The aim of this chapter is to answer the following questions: What are the dynamic effects of 
discretionary changes in government spending and taxes on economic activity?7 What is the most 
efficient fiscal tool in stabilising the economy? Though such questions are useful and are often 
asked in academic and policy discussions about the efficacy of fiscal policy in stimulating growth 
and welfare, such has not been done for the case of Sierra Leone despite the large volume of 
literature. Little is known about how this economy responds to fiscal surprises. Specifically, there 
are no known studies that characterise the dynamic effect of fiscal policy shocks on the 
macroeconomy in the framework of the VAR model given the various tax reforms that have been 
introduced over the past decades and the corresponding changes in government spending 
behaviour.  
Against this backdrop, this chapter exploits this grey area and contributes to the literature in the 
following ways. (i) We employ higher frequency data in our empirical analyses as it is uncommon 
in empirical analyses for developing countries. Doing so makes this study and findings comparable 
to the existing literature as most, if not all, fiscal VARs employ quarterly data.  (ii) To the best of 
our knowledge, we not aware of any studies that have analysed the macroeconomic effect of fiscal 
policy shocks for Sierra Leone in the context of SVAR. This study is the first to offer recent 
findings on the dynamic effects of fiscal surprises for Sierra Leone. 
Our results are in line with studies documented in the literature. Output and private consumption 
respond to government spending shocks with strong and persistent effects. Government spending 
moderately increases private investment and government revenue. Shocks to government revenue 
temporarily reduce output and private investment.  
                                                          
7 The aim of this chapter is to assess the short-run impacts of discretionary fiscal policy. There are however other 
studies that have examined the long-run impact of discretionary fiscal policy which is outside the scope of this chapter. 
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The response of private consumption to tax shocks is insignificant – close to zero on impact. Both 
spending and tax shocks are inflationary and interest rates rise with spending increase in the short 
run. Investigating the response of output to shocks in the components of government spending and 
revenue gives a broader picture. The results reveal that government investment expenditure 
strongly stimulates the economy in contrast to government consumption expenditure.  
3.2 Literature Review 
Theoretical predictions and empirical findings still offer contrasting views on the effects of fiscal 
policy. The new Keynesian model with price rigidity predicts that positive government spending 
shocks will stimulate labour demand, household consumption and a rise in real wages, thereby 
increasing output. Models with increasing return to scale and perfect competition have shown that 
positive shocks to government spending increase real wage (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992)  and 
consumption and real wage  (Devereux, Head and Lapham, 1996).  Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2006) assume habit persistence regarding consumption, which gives rise to countercyclical 
mark-ups of price over the marginal cost in an imperfectly competitive market. They show that 
positive shocks to government spending create a negative wealth effect, but also increase aggregate 
demand to which firms respond by reducing their mark-ups. In response, labour demand increases 
and offsets the initial negative wealth thereby increasing real wage and consumption. Galí 
LópezSalido and Vallés (2007)  introduce the sticky price model adapted to capture the presence 
of ‘rule-of-thumb consumers’ with non-Ricardian consumption pattern. They show that due to 
countercyclical mark-up, real wages increase, and consumption respond positively to spending 
shocks because of the presence of ‘rule-of-thumb’ consumers. 
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However, the standard neoclassical real business cycle model, which assumes a perfect 
competitive market with constant return to scale, shows that following a positive shock to 
government spending, output increases and produces a negative wealth effect, because of the 
assumption that consumers are forward-looking. Increase in government spending creates deficits 
that have to be financed by higher taxes in the future. This increase in taxes influences households 
to lower consumption and increase labour supply, which leads to a fall in the real wage.  Positive 
spending shocks that are financed by non-distortionary taxes cause a negative wealth effect for 
representative households, where output and real interest rise but consumption and real wage fall 
(Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Burnside and 
Eichenbaum, 1996). If the shock is persistent, marginal productivity of capital may rise, leading 
to an increase in investment (Baxter and King, 1983). Ramey and Shapiro (1998) introduce the 
narrative approach, following Hamilton (1985) and Romer and Romer (1989) to capture 
exogenous increase in defence spending, implying government spending. The methodology 
involves constructing a dummy in a series of univariate equations to account for the increase in 
defence spending that takes value one at quarter and zero otherwise when large military build-ups 
took place in the United States to identify episodes of discretionary fiscal policy.  Edelberg, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) present a modified version of the neoclassical model by 
disaggregating investment into residential and non-residential categories in the context of VAR. 
They argue that persistent shocks to government spending increases taxes on households, leading 
to a fall in consumption and increase in hours of work. Marginal productivity of labour and real 
wage decline but employment increases.  
Because of the complementarity in production between hours of work and market capital, non-
residential investment rises and residential investment falls in the form of consumer durables.  
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Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) show that their estimated neoclassical model can account 
for the qualitative effect of spending shocks with distortionary taxes. Edelberg, Eichenbaum and 
Fisher (1999) employ this methodology in a multivariate setting, and Burnside, Eichenbaum and 
Fisher (2004) as well as Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) present modified versions. 
Notwithstanding the minor methodological modifications, these studies reach similar conclusions. 
From a qualitative point of view, in response to a discretionary positive government spending 
shock, output and non-residential investment increase and consumption, wages and residential 
investment fall. In effect, these findings support the neoclassical business cycle theory. The 
disparities in predictions between the new Keynesian and the neoclassical model are due to the 
theoretical assumptions underpinning consumers’ behaviour. The new Keynesian model assumes 
consumption depends on current disposable income, which implies consumers to be non-
Ricardian. In the neoclassical real business cycle model, however, consumption depends on 
lifetime wealth, which implies that consumers are Ricardian optimising agents (Galí, LópezSalido 
and Vallés, 2007).   
Recent empirical literature that examines the effects of fiscal policy shocks do so within the 
framework of SVAR to determine the dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables. Fatás and 
Mihov (2001) employ the recursive approach to achieve identification in a five-variable VAR 
system. They find strong, positive and persistent impacts of fiscal expansions on economic 
activity. Consumption, real wage and residential investment rise in response to positive 
government spending shocks.   
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ a three-variable VAR model to identify the impact of 
government spending and tax policy on output. Following positive spending shocks, output and 
consumption increase and investment fall. This approach is extended in Perotti (2005) to study the 
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effect of fiscal policy in five OECD countries.   Mountford and Uhlig (2002) propose and adopt a 
different approach to achieve identification of fiscal shocks from VAR residuals by imposing sign 
restrictions on the impulse responses instead of contemporaneous restrictions. However, they find 
a small response of consumption, significant only on impact. Investment falls to positive spending 
and tax shocks.  Yet by imposing restrictions on the impulse response, this approach finds a 
positive relationship between output and revenue shocks as opposed to business cycle shocks and 
by implication rules out the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. That is, it rules out that output 
may respond positively to tax shocks for a few quarters after the shocks (Caldara and Kamps, 
2008).  The disagreements in the empirical literature on SVAR stems from the differences in 
specification of the VAR model, methods of identifications and the policy experiments conducted 
(Caldara and Kamps, 2008).  
Many studies have adopted the SVAR to estimate the dynamic effects of exogenous fiscal policy 
shocks. For example, De Castro and De Cos (2008) estimate the effects of fiscal policy shocks in 
Spain and find positive response in output and consumption to positive government spending 
shocks. Giordano et al. (2007) estimate the impact of fiscal policy in Italy and find small positive 
response of output to government spending shocks; however, the shocks are temporary and fade 
out in the short run. Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010) find government spending to be 
significant in stimulating growth but output fails to respond to revenue shocks in Germany.   
Afonso and Sousa (2009) investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. Their results reveal that the impact of 
spending shocks on output is relatively small while the exchange rate depreciates, with varied 
impacts on housing prices.  
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The empirical literature presented so far essentially focussed on studies relating to developed 
countries. The literature on fiscal policy shocks in developing countries, specifically in sub-Sahara 
Africa, is very thin. This paucity in research could be due to the fact that most studies on fiscal 
policy surprises are conducted using higher frequency data, which is absent in most developing 
countries. The few studies that have emerged so far essentially rely on recursive ordering to 
achieve identification because the restrictions imposed on Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) approach 
to achieve identification is limited to quarterly frequency data.  In studying the impacts of 
discretionary fiscal policy change in Egypt and Tunisia, Slimane and Tahar (2013) find significant 
and positive effects of output to spending expansion. A similar conclusion was reached by Mutuku 
and Elias (2014) for Kenya.  Driss, Bettahar and Benbouziane (2014) examine the impacts of fiscal 
policy shocks and exchange rate dynamics in Algeria. They find that both government spending 
and revenues expansion significantly increase output. The latter is, however, counterintuitive, as 
conventional wisdom predictions expect tax shocks to lower output.  Akpan and Atan (2015) 
investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks in Nigeria using the recursive 
ordering and find that output significantly rises to spending expansion while private investment is 
insignificantly crowded-in by government spending. Millo and Kollamparambi (2016) investigate 
how government spending and tax policy affects output and employment in South Africa using the 
recursive approach.  
They surprisingly find that output does not respond to spending expansion in the short run while 
positive revenue shocks increase output. They conclude that the transmission mechanism from 
government spending to output is not direct as predicted by the Keynesian doctrine, but is rather 
seen indirectly through employment, conforming to supply-side economics. 
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Even the size of the fiscal multiplier remains contentious in the empirical literature. There is an 
existing disagreement empirically on the impact of government spending and the tax multiplier. 
Researchers are yet to agree on which has stronger impacts or works faster in stimulating growth, 
probably owing to the different factors that have been empirically proven to influence the size of 
the fiscal multiplier. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and Monacelli, 
Perotti and Trigari (2010) use the reaction of interest rate to discretionary fiscal policy, while the 
extent of openness to trade is found in Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh (2013) and Faia, Lechthaler 
and Merkl, (2010). Furthermore, Leeper, Walker and Yang (2010) and Cogan et al. (2010) among 
others argue that the size of the fiscal multiplier is influenced by the models’ properties. 
Before proceeding to the next section, it is important to close the present section by summarising 
some empirical findings of previous studies. Table 3.1 shows clearly shows that the empirical 
findings on the effects of fiscal policy shocks are heterogenous. Specifically, the impact of 
government spending on private investment and private consumption is still debateable on both 
theory and empirics. Sierra Leone is a small open economy with large public sector employment. 
It is therefore necessary to empirically investigate the effects of fiscal policy surprises.  
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Table 3.1 Some Empirical Evidence on Fiscal Policy Shocks 
Authors Country Year Spending Shocks  Revenue Shocks  
   GDP I C GDP I C 
Fatás and 
Mihov 
US 2001 + + + NA NA NA 
Blanchard 
and Perotti 
US 2002 + - + - + - 
Mountford 
and Uhlig  
US 2009 + - - - + - 
Perotti OECD 2004 + + - - Mixed Mixed 
 
Galí, 
LópezSalido 
and Vallés 
US 2007 + - + NA NA NA 
 
De Castro Spain 2006 + Mixed + Mixed - + 
 
Giordano et 
al. 
Italy 2007 + + + + 0 0 
Heppke-
Falk et al. 
Germany 2010 + - + 0 + 0 
Lozano and 
Rodriguez 
Colombia 2009 + + + + - - 
Akpan and 
Atan 
Nigeria 2015 + + + _ _ NA 
 
(+) = Positive response, (-) = Negative response, I = Investment and C= Consumption 
NA = Not Applicable 
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3.3 Methodology  
This section describes the econometric model used to investigate the impact of surprise fiscal 
policy shocks on real output in Sierra Leone. Sims (1980) criticises the specification methodology 
of large-scale macro-econometric models, citing two different methodological short-comings. 
First, the simultaneous equations systems are specified based on the aggregation of partial 
equilibrium models, neglecting any concern for the subsequently omitted interrelations. Second, 
the dynamic structure of the model was often specified to provide restrictions that were essential 
to achieve identification or over-identification of the structural form (Amisano and Giannini, 
2012).  As such, Sims (1980) recommends the use VAR as an alternative to simultaneous equation 
systems for forecasting with macro-econometric models, which has given rise to the use of VAR 
in empirical research in macroeconomics. This chapter adopts the SVAR model as a framework 
for forecasting. The model is estimated using quarterly data for Sierra Leone from 1980q1-2014q4, 
providing us with a sample size of 140 observations. Following Perotti (2005), our benchmark 
model is a five-variable VAR model comprising output  𝑌𝑡, government spending 𝐺𝑡, government 
revenue 𝜏𝑡 , inflation rate 𝜋𝑡 and interest rate 𝑟𝑡.  In addition, we specify a six-variable VAR model 
incorporating per capita private consumption 𝑐𝑡 and per capita private investment  𝑖𝑡.   All variables 
are real in log and per capita terms, except for the interest rate.  
Denoting the vector of endogenous variables by 𝑋𝑡 and the vector of reduced form residual as 𝑈𝑡 , 
the reduced form VAR can be written as:  
                                                𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑡                                                                     (3.1) 
where 𝐴 is (𝐾 × 𝐾) VAR coefficient matrices,  𝐿 is a polynomial shift operator or lag length   
and 𝑈𝑡 is a white noise error term with zero-mean and non-singular variance-covariance 
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matrix  ∑ 𝑢,   such that, 𝑈𝑡 ~ (0, ∑ 𝑢).  𝑋𝑡 ≡ [ 𝑔𝑡, 𝑦𝑡,𝜋𝑡𝜏𝑡𝑟𝑡]′,  𝑈𝑡  ≡ [𝑢𝑡
𝑔 𝑢𝑡
𝑦  𝑢𝑡
𝜋  𝑢𝑡
𝜏 𝑢𝑡
𝑟]′  with 
𝐸[𝑢𝑡] = 0 and 𝐸[𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′] = ∑𝑢 and 𝐸[𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑠
′ ]=0 for  𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 . The reduced-form disturbances are 
usually correlated, which requires us to transform the reduced-form model into a structural model. 
Multiplying equation (1) by (𝐾 × 𝐾) matrix 𝐴0 gives the structural form of the model: 
               𝐴0𝑋𝑡 = 𝐴0𝐴(𝐿)𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑒𝑡                                                            (3.2)   
where 𝐵𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑈𝑡, defines the relation between the structural residuals  𝑒𝑡 and the reduced-form 
residuals  𝑢𝑡. Matrix 𝐴0 defines the contemporaneous relation among the variables in the vector 𝑋𝑡.  
Knowing that 𝐵𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑈𝑡, the relation between the reduced form of residuals and the structural 
residuals, matrix B needs to satisfy the condition  ∑𝑢 = 𝐵∑ℯ 𝐵
′.  The relation ∑ 𝑢 = 𝐵𝐵′  does 
not however uniquely determine matrix B, because ∑ 𝑢  is symmetric and contain at most 𝐾(𝐾 +
1)/2 different elements, while B has 𝐾2 elements (Lütkepohl, 2005). Therefore, the structural 
shocks will not be uniquely determined without additional restrictions. Conversely, at least 𝐾(𝐾 −
1)/2 additional restrictions are required for unique specification of matrix B transformation in 
characterising the shocks.   
This model is known as the B model.  In the SVAR literature, the restrictions in both matrices A 
and B are combined, such that 𝐵𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴𝑈𝑡 with   𝑒𝑡 ~ (0, 𝐼𝐾) follows 𝑈𝑡 = 𝐴
−1𝐵𝑒𝑡, therefore ∑𝑢 =
 𝐴−1𝐵𝐵′𝐴−1.  This model gives us 𝐾(𝐾 + 1)/2 elements, where matrices A and B each comprise  
𝐾2 elements. To just identify the 2𝐾2 elements in both matrices A and B, we require extra 2𝐾2 −
1
2
𝐾(𝐾 + 1) restrictions (Lütkepohl, 2005), known as the AB model in SVAR literature. Without 
imposing restriction on the parameters in A and B based on economic justifications, the structural 
model will not be identified.  We present below the identification approaches used in our empirical 
application. 
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3.3.1 VAR Identification 
To study the effect of fiscal policy shocks in Sierra Leone, we apply a SVAR technique. In doing 
so, we adopt two identification techniques in our empirical analysis: the recursive approach 
proposed by Sims (1980) as applied in the study of fiscal policy shocks in the United States by 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) and the identification approach proposed and applied by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) to study the effects of government spending and taxes on output in the United States 
and applied to the study of fiscal policy shocks in OECD countries by Perotti (2005). We 
summarise the two identification approaches used in this study. 
3.3.1.1. Recursive Approach  
The first identification approach considered in this chapter is the recursive identification approach, 
sometimes referred to as the Cholesky decomposition, which restricts matrix B to an identity 
matrix and 𝐴0 to a lower triangular matrix with all diagonal elements equal to one and all elements 
above the diagonal equal to zero. Let 𝑃 be a 𝐾 × 𝐾 lower-triangular matrix with all positive main 
diagonal elements such that ∑𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃
′, which gives the decomposed covariance matrix ∑𝑢 =
𝐴0
−1∑𝑒(𝐴0
−1)′ .  Let 𝐷 be a diagonal matrix such that 𝐷 and 𝑃 have the same main diagonal 
elements and by specifying 𝐴0
−1 = 𝑃𝐷−1 and  ∑ℯ=𝐷𝐷′ (Lütkepohl, 2005).  This tells us that the 
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix (that is the main diagonal elements) of matrices 
D and P is equal to the square root of the scalar variances (Kilian, 2011). The idea here is to 
separate the structural innovations 𝑢𝑡  from the reduced-form innovations 𝑒𝑡, such that the errors 
are uncorrelated with each other. In our VAR system, the recursive approach suggests a causal 
ordering of the model variables. We order the variables as follows: government spending enters 
the model first, output is ordered second, inflation is ordered third, government revenue is ordered 
104 
 
fourth and interest rate last. The relation between the reduced-form disturbances 𝑢𝑡 and the 
structural disturbance 𝑒𝑡 takes the following form: 
[
 
 
 
 
      1 0    0
     −𝛼𝑦𝑔 1     0
     −𝛼𝜋𝑔 −𝛼𝜋𝑦     1
  0     0
   0      0
     0       0
        −𝛼𝜏𝑔 −𝛼𝜏𝑦 −𝛼𝜏𝜋
        −𝛼𝑟𝑔 −𝛼𝑟𝑦 −𝛼𝑟𝜋
1    0
−𝛼𝑟𝜏    1]
 
 
 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑢𝑡
𝑔
𝑢𝑡
𝑦
𝑢𝑡
𝜋
𝑢𝑡
𝜏
𝑢𝑡
𝑟 ]
 
 
 
 
 
=  
[
 
 
 
 
1     0 0
0     1 0
0     0  1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0    0 0
0     0 0
1 0
0 1]
 
 
 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑒𝑡
𝑔
𝑒𝑡
𝑦
𝑒𝑡
𝜋
𝑒𝑡
𝜏
𝑒𝑡
𝑟 ]
 
 
 
 
 
       (3.3) 
 
We order our variables following Perotti (2005), Favero (2002) and Fatás and Mihov (2001). The 
ordering of the variables implies that: (i) government spending does not respond 
contemporaneously to shocks to other variables in the system; (ii) output does not react 
contemporaneously to shocks to inflation, government revenue and interest rate, but is affected 
contemporaneously by spending shocks; (iii) inflation does not react contemporaneously to 
government revenue and interest rate shocks, but is affected contemporaneously by government 
spending and output shocks; (iv) government revenue does not react contemporaneously to interest 
rate shocks but is affected by government spending, output and inflation shocks; and (v) interest 
rate is affected by all shocks in the system. It is worth noting that after the early period, the 
variables in the system can interact freely – for example, inflation shocks can affect output in all 
periods after the period in which the shock occurred.  
According to Caldara and Kamps (2008), the underlying assumptions for ordering the variables 
are justified as follows: changes in government spending in contrast with changes government 
revenue are often unconnected to business cycles. In this regard, it is reasonable to assume that 
government spending is not affected contemporaneously by shocks emanating from the private 
sector.  Ordering output and inflation before government revenue is justified based on the grounds 
105 
 
that shocks to these variables have an instantaneous impact on the tax base and, therefore, a 
contemporaneously effect on government revenue. This specific ordering of variables thus 
captures the effects of the automatic stabiliser on government revenue, while it rules out (possible 
important) concurrent effects of discretionary changes in taxes on output and inflation. Interest 
rate is ordered last, which is justified on the premise that given government spending and revenue 
as defined here (net of interest payment) are not sensitive to changes to interest rate. 
3.3.1.2. Blanchard-Perotti Approach  
Next, we consider the identification strategy proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). This 
technique relies on institutional information about taxes and transfer and their collection period. 
This approach helps us to identify the automatic feedback of taxes and government spending on 
economic activity. This approach is of two-fold. First, the institutional information is used to 
estimate cyclically adjusted taxes and government spending. In the second step, estimates of the 
fiscal policy shocks are obtained. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) used a three-variable VAR model 
to estimate the effects of government spending and taxes on output in the United States. Perotti 
(2005) extends this approach to study the effect of fiscal policy shocks in OECD countries using 
a five-variable VAR model. In this subsection, we adopt the approach used in Perotti (2005), i.e. 
a five-variable VAR model.  
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Adopting this approach, the relationship between the reduced-form innovations   𝑢𝑡 and the 
structural innovations  𝑒𝑡 is written as follows: 
                               𝑢𝑡
𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝑔𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛽𝑔𝜏𝑒𝑡
𝜏 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
            (3.4) 
                                 𝑢𝑡
𝜏 = 𝛼𝜏𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝜏𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝜏𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛽𝜏𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑔 + 𝑒𝑡
𝜏            (3.5) 
                                 𝑢𝑡
𝑦 = 𝛼𝑦𝑔𝑢𝑡
𝑔 + 𝛼𝑦𝜏𝑒𝑡
𝑔 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑦
                                    (3.6) 
                               𝑢𝑡
𝜋 = 𝛼𝜋𝑔𝑢𝑡
𝑔 + 𝛼𝜋𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝜋𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝜏 + 𝑒𝑡
𝜋                                                  (3.7) 
                                 𝑢𝑡
𝑟 = 𝛼𝑟𝑔𝑢𝑡
𝑔 + 𝛼𝑟𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝑟𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑟                                     (3.8) 
 
The above system of equations is not identified. The variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-
form disturbances has 10 distinct elements, whereas the above system of equations comprises 17 
free parameters.  
The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach is quite different from the recursive approach. In the 
recursive approach, all seven parameters are restricted to zeros, whereas Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) estimate some of the parameters. The first step of the estimation procedure involves an 
adjustment of government spending and revenues for the contemporaneous response to these 
variables to the business cycle and inflation.  
As in Perotti (2005), the aggregate output elasticity of government revenue 𝛼𝜏𝑦 and the aggregate 
value of the inflation elasticity of government revenue are estimated outside the model and these 
estimates are used in the VAR in order to identify the fiscal shocks. Since government spending is 
excluded from transfer, output elasticity of government spending (𝛼𝑔𝑦)  is set to zero.  Inflation 
elasticity of government revenue is set to -0.5, as in Perotti (2005). This figure is argued on the 
premise that nominal wages of government employees, which account for a large portion of 
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government consumption, do not contemporaneously respond to changes in inflation, implying 
that government wage bill declines in real terms if there is an unanticipated inflation. Moreover, 
interest rate elasticities on government spending (𝛼𝑔𝑖) and government revenue (𝛼𝜏𝑖) are set to 
zero, because interest paid, and interest received by government are omitted from the definition of 
government spending and revenue respectively.  
From the reduced form residuals in equations (3.4) and (3.5), the structural innovations  𝑒𝑡
𝑔
 and 𝑒𝑡
𝜏 
are linear combinations of three components. The first component is the systematic response of 
taxes and government spending to shocks in output, inflation and interest rate under an existing 
fiscal policy regulation – such as an unanticipated change in taxes in reaction to output shock, for 
a particular tax rate.   
The second is the systematic discretionary reaction of policymakers to shocks in output, inflation 
and interest rate – for example, decrease in tax rates applied contemporaneously in response to 
recession – while the final component comprises random discretionary shocks to fiscal policies, 
referred to as ‘structural’ fiscal shocks, which unlike the reduced-form residuals are uncorrelated 
with all other structural shocks. This is the component that is of interest when estimating the 
impulse responses of fiscal policy shocks.  
Formally, we can write: 
                                 𝑢𝑡
𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝑔𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛽𝑔𝜏𝑒𝑡
𝜏 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
                       (3.9) 
                                 𝑢𝑡
𝜏 = 𝛼𝜏𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝜏𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝜏𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟 + 𝛽𝜏𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑔 + 𝑒𝑡
𝜏            (3.10) 
where the coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑘 capture the remaining two components and 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
 and 𝑒𝑡
𝜏 are the ‘structural’ 
fiscal shocks, i.e. cov (𝑒𝑡
𝑔
 , 𝑒𝑡
𝜏) = 0. We can see that 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
 and 𝑒𝑡
𝜏 are correlated with the reduced form 
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residuals, making it impossible to obtain estimates using OLS regression of equations (3.9) and 
(3.10) above.  
To achieve identification here, it is argued that because fiscal policy has long inside lags, the 
systematic discretionary fiscal response to any unanticipated event is absent within a quarter, 
because policymakers require more than a quarter to respond to the given shock, such as shocks to 
output. Perotti (2005) argues that government spending does not systematically respond to surprise 
changes in output within a quarter, therefore 𝛼𝑔𝑦  is set equal to zero. As such, the coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑘 
in equations (3.9) and (3.10) capture only the automatic response of fiscal variables to economic 
activity.  
With available external information on the elasticity of government revenue and spending to 
output, inflation and interest rate, we can compute the fitting values of the coefficients 𝛼𝑗𝑘. Then, 
we can further construct the cyclically adjusted fiscal shocks, which are linear combinations of 
two structural shocks, as follows: 
                               𝑢𝑡
𝑔,𝐶𝐴 ≡  𝑢𝑡
𝑔 − (𝛼𝑔𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝑔𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟) = 𝛽𝑔𝑡𝑒𝑡
𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
                (3.11)                  
                                𝑢𝑡
𝜏,𝐶𝐴 ≡ 𝑢𝑡
𝜏  − (𝛼𝜏𝑦𝑢𝑡
𝑦 + 𝛼𝜏𝜋𝑢𝑡
𝜋 + 𝛼𝜏𝑟𝑢𝑡
𝑟)   = 𝛽𝑡𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑔 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑡                            (3.12)
                                            
The potential endogeneity between taxes and spending is corrected for by assuming either taxes 
come first, or spending is ordered first. If government spending is ordered before taxes, 𝛽𝜏𝑔 is set 
to zero, and if tax is ordered before spending, 𝛽𝑔𝜏 is set to zero. By placing such a restriction, we 
can estimate the above equation by OLS. The ordering does not really matter, as noted in Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005). We assume government spending is ordered first to conform 
to our assumption of ordering in the recursive approach. This gives us: 
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                                               𝑢𝑡
𝑔,𝐶𝐴
 = 𝑒𝑡
𝑔
                             (3.13) 
                                             𝑢𝑡
𝜏,𝐶𝐴 = 𝛽𝑡𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑔 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑡                            (3.14) 
Kargbo and Egwaikhide (2012) provide estimates of output elasticities of government revenue for 
Sierra Leone.8 These authors estimate the total tax output elasticity 𝛼𝜏𝑦 to be 0.89. We estimate 
the aggregate value of inflation elasticity on government revenue (𝛼𝜏𝜋) as 0.44. The reduced-form 
residuals and the structural residuals take the AB matrices form as follow: 
            
[
 
 
 
 
1 0    0.5
−𝛼𝑦𝑔 1     0
−𝛼𝜋𝑔 −𝛼𝜋𝑦     1
0 0
−𝛼𝑦𝜏 0
−𝛼𝜋𝜏 0
        0 −0.81 −0.44
        −𝛼𝑟𝑔 −𝛼𝑟𝑦 −𝛼𝑟𝜋
1 0
−𝛼𝑟𝜏 1]
 
 
 
 
  
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑢𝑡
𝑔
𝑢𝑡
𝑦
𝑢𝑡
𝜋
𝑢𝑡
𝜏
𝑢𝑡
𝑟 ]
 
 
 
 
 
=  
[
 
 
 
 
1     0 0
0     1 0
0     0  1
0 0
0 0
0 0
𝛽𝜏𝑔 0 0
0 0 0
1 0
0 1]
 
 
 
 
  
[
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When we compare the Perotti (2005) approach to the recursive approach, differences are evident. 
In the recursive approach, all elements of 𝐴0 above the principal diagonal are restricted to zero, 
yet there are three exceptions in Perotti’s (2005) identification approach. Estimating the output 
elasticity of government revenue in Perotti’s approach and using this value as an instrument in 
estimating the fiscal shocks implies fixing the size of the automatic stabiliser. Therefore, Perotti 
(2005) estimates the contemporaneous effect of government revenue on output and inflation. In 
the recursive approach, the size automatic stabiliser is freely estimated while imposing zero 
restrictions on the contemporaneous effect of government revenue on output and inflation. 
Surprisingly, the empirical analyses reveal that the conceptual differences between the recursive 
approach and the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach have little effect on the results for the 
                                                          
8 See Kargbo and Egwaikhinde (2012). 
110 
 
benchmark value of output elasticity of government revenue imposed in the Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) approach.  
3.4 Data, Sources and Description of Data  
GDP, private consumption, private investment and GDP deflator (inflation rate) are obtained from 
the world development indicators (World Bank), treasury bill rate is obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and tax revenue is obtained from two different sources; 
National Revenue Authority, Sierra Leone and the International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005), the empirical literature on fiscal policy 
shocks are conducted using five standard variables; government spending, government revenue, 
GDP, inflation and interest rate.  See for example Giordano et al (2007) for Italy, de Castro (2006) 
for Spain, Lozano and Rodriguez (2011) for Columbia, Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) for New Zealand, 
Shaheen and Turner (2010) for Pakistan, and Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010) for 
Germany among other studies. In structural VAR, ordering of the variable matters as it affect the 
impulse response, also, using different variable will make comparability with the existing literature 
on fiscal policy shock very unlikely. The key aim of estimating the effects of fiscal policy shocks 
is to examine fiscal variables respond to changes in government spending and taxes.  Commodity 
price and foreign income don’t constitute fiscal variables. With this in mind, I estimate the effects 
of fiscal policy shocks for Sierra Leone using the standard variables as in the empirical literature 
on fiscal policy shocks. 
Most studies on fiscal VARs are carried out using quarterly data owing to various assumptions. 
For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach assume that it takes at least a quarter for fiscal 
authorities to intervene during economic downturns. However, most economies do not have 
quarterly data on fiscal variables. This problem of unavailability of higher frequency data have led 
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researcher to rely on interpolation of time series. For example, Favero (2002) and Marcellino 
(2006) estimate fiscal VAR using half-yearly data in four European countries: France, Italy, Spain 
and Germany. In the first three countries, the budget data was interpolated from annual series 
(Perotti, 2005). Because of the unavailability of quarterly data, which is a common feature of 
developing and emerging countries, we interpolate the available annual data to quarterly data. A 
similar approach can be found in the works of Lisman and Sandee (1964), Goldstein and Khan 
(1976), Wymer (1979), Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Al-Turki (1995) and Moosa (1995) among 
others. Parkyn and Vehbi (2014) and Shaheen and Turner (2010) apply the Chow and Lin (1971) 
approach to interpolate the series used in estimating their fiscal VAR for New Zealand and 
Pakistan respectively.9 The same approach is adopted here given the unavailability of quarterly 
data. The data used in this study was interpolated from the annual series using the method proposed 
by Chow and Lin (1971), available in EVIEWS.  
The issues of temporary disaggregating time series data are well known. Problems in 
disaggregation can arise from either distribution. That is when the observed values of a flow low-
frequency series of a particular length must be distributed across sub-period values. Alternatively, 
interpolation problem could arise due to generating a high-frequency series with the values of the 
new series being the same as the ones of the low-frequency series for those temporal moments 
where the latter is observed. Sometimes, the issues encountered with temporal disaggregated series 
includes residual autocorrelation in the disaggregated series, missing values at the end of the series 
etc. However, several approaches have been proposed by different authors to overcome the pitfall 
of disaggregating time series.  For example, Boot, Feibes and Lisman (1967), Cohen, Muller and 
                                                          
9 Cavallo (2005) employs the same method to construct a quarterly series for hours worked in estimating the impact 
of fiscal shocks on government employment expenditure in the United States. 
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Padberg (1971), Denton (1971) and Chow and Lin (1971) etc. Applied macroeconometric research 
essentially rely on temporary interpolation in an even the choice of data frequency in 
unavailable.The data was transformed to real from their nominal values using the GDP deflator.  
It is worth noting that the use of annual data does not change the result, as has been shown by Born 
and Müller (2012). These authors estimate the effect of government spending shocks using both 
annual and quarterly data for Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and 
find identical effects on the impulse response function. 
3.4.1 Data Definitions 
As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) as well as other studies in the literature, we define government 
spending as the sum of general government final consumption expenditure (government 
consumption) and gross capital formation (government investment). Net taxes are defined as the 
sum of all total tax revenues less transfers (subsidies, grants, and other social benefits include all 
unrequited, non-repayable transfers on current accounts to private and public enterprises; grants to 
foreign governments, international organisations, and other government units; and social security, 
social assistance benefits and employer social benefits in cash and in kind). Inflation rate is the 
GDP deflator annual percentage, while interest rate is the treasury bill rate. 
3.4.2 Time Series Properties of the Data 
This section discusses the time series properties of the data used in this study. We proceed to test 
for unit roots in the series using the conventional ADF and PP unit root tests. The ADF and PP 
reject the hypothesis of no unit root in levels for the series at the conventional 5% level of 
significance. However, both tests confirm that the series are stationary at first difference. As the 
test for stationarity indicates the existence of unit root in all the series, the Johansen cointegration 
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test is carried out. The Johansen cointegration test shows there exist a cointegration relationship 
between the fiscal variables for the benchmark model. 
 To obtain more efficient estimates when there exists a cointegration relationship, we should 
specify a vector error correction model (VECM). However, we specify a VAR in levels,10 since it 
offers also a consistent estimate of the VAR coefficients and the impulse response function. Sims, 
Stock and Watson (1990), among others, argue against differencing a series, claiming that the aim 
of a VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among the variables (impulse response) 
rather than determining the parameter estimates. Using first differencing when the variables are 
cointegrated throws away the information inherent in the cointegration relationship. This, in turn, 
leads to a misspecification error, making inferences invalid (Enders, 2008). With these arguments 
in mind, and for our results to be comparable to the existing literature, we follow Mountford and 
Uhlig (2009), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010) among others and specify the VAR in levels, ignoring 
unit root since our goal is to determine the relationships among variables and not parameter 
estimates.  
3.4.3 VAR Diagnostic Tests 
In the VAR specification, it is important to obtain the optimal lag length to have a true forecast. 
Braun and Mittnik (1993) show that if the true lag from the VAR estimate is not selected, the 
output gives poor estimates and misleading inferences as the impulse response and variance 
decomposition result are unreliable. Lütkepohl (2005) indicates that overfitting (selecting a higher 
order lag length than the true lag length) causes an increase in the mean-square forecast errors of 
                                                          
10 See Enders (2008) for detail on this argument. 
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the VAR and that underfitting the lag length often generates autocorrelated errors. Hafer and 
Sheehan (1989) find that the accuracy of forecasts from VAR models varies substantially for 
alternative lag lengths. Table 3.2 below shows the optimal lag selected by the different criteria. 
Table 3.2. Lag Order Selection Criteria 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -289.4441 NA   6.38e-05  4.529910  4.640200  4.574724 
1  599.8719  1696.541  1.07e-10 -8.767260 -8.105521 -8.498373 
2  853.5483  464.4231  3.18e-12 -12.28536 -11.07217 -11.79240 
3  1041.061  328.8690  2.62e-13 -14.78556 -13.02092 -14.06853 
4  1132.771  153.7902  9.48e-14 -15.81186  -13.49578 -14.87076 
5  1169.219  58.31592  8.05e-14 -15.98798 -13.12044* -14.82280 
6  1210.181  62.38972  6.42e-14 -16.23356* -12.81458 -14.84431 
7  1253.291  62.34258  5.00e-14 -16.51216 -12.54173 -14.89884 
8  1302.459  67.32330  3.58e-14* -16.88399 -12.36211 -15.04660 
9  1353.150  65.50836  2.53e-14 -17.27924 -12.20591 -15.21777 
10  1414.956*   75.11818*   1.53e-14  -17.84548 -12.22071  -15.55995* 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: Sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error  
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion  
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
 
The criteria often selected as the optimal lag length in VAR are the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and the Schwarz information criterion (SC). However, Ozcicek and Mcmillin (1999) have 
shown that for the short-lag models, the SIC slightly outperform the AIC, but the difference is 
small. For the longer-lag models, the AIC-specified lag length almost always forecasts better than 
the other criteria, especially the SC.  When the sample size is small (60 observations and below), 
AIC and FPE perform better and should be chosen over the other criteria. 
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However, in larger sample sizes (above 60 observation), AIC and FPE perform poorly compared 
to SC (Liew, 2004). As shown in Table 3.2, the SC suggests five lags, while the AIC suggests six. 
I choose five lags as the optimal lag length.  
I proceed next to test for the stability of the VAR model. If a VAR model is unstable, the results 
from forecasting with will unreliable. Also, the shocks to variable in the system will explode and 
will not die out.  
Figure 3.1 VAR Stability Graph 
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Figure 3.1 above shows the results of the root polynomial graph for the VAR model. The model is 
stable if no root lies outside or on the circle. As shown in Figure 3.1, no roots lie outside or on the 
circle. This means that the VAR model satisfy the stability condition. Next, I test for 
autocorrelation in the VAR residual and the result is presented in Table 3.3 
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Table 3.3 VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
    
Lag LM statistic df Prob. 
    
    
1  53.46008  25  0.0008 
2  47.52267  25  0.0043 
3  53.33356  25  0.0008 
4  110.5833  25  0.0000 
5  29.00364  25  0.2638 
6  32.47384  25  0.1448 
    
    
Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at lag h 
 
The Langrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic shows that the model suffers from autorrelation from 
lag 1 to lag 4. At lag 1, 2, 3 and 4, the LM test statistics are 53.46, 47.52, 53.33 and 110.58 with 
corresponding probability values of 0.008, 0.043, 0.008 and 0.000. I can reject the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. However, at lag 5 and 6 the LM test statistic are 29.00 and 32.47 with 
corresponding probability values of 0.263 and 0.145. I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation at both lag 5 and 6. The autocorrelation test give credence to the optimal lag 
length criterion test obtained earlier. The optimal lag length chosen was 5 and the autocorrelation 
test shows that at lag 5, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
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3.5 Empirical Results 
This section presents the forecast error of variance decomposition, impulse response functions and 
the output multiplier to the respective fiscal shocks. The impulse responses are reported for 16 
quarters which gives a forecast for four years and one standard deviation confidence bands attained 
by Monte Carlo integration approach with replications set at 100.  
3.5.1 Variance Decomposition of Forecast Errors 
Table 3.4 shows the results of the forecast errors and variance decomposition for the benchmark 
model. In both approaches, after 16 quarters the forecast error of government spending 𝑮𝒕 is 
explained by itself above 65%, inflation 𝝅𝒕 is 19% and 22% for each approach respectively, and 
taxes are at least 6%. Output and interest rate do not explain significant shares. More than 40% of 
the forecast error in net taxes,  𝜏𝑡 is explained by itself under both identification strategies (42.23% 
and 41.14% respectively). Government spending explains 37.68% and 30.03%, inflation explains 
10.39% and 11.91%, output explains 9.34% and 8.22%, and interest rates explain 0.34% and 
8.70% respectively. The moderate inflation and interest rates could be due to the fact that an 
increase in taxes reduces inflationary pressure because an increase in tax reduces output, leading 
to downward pressure on inflation and interest rate. 
 Above 40% of the variations in output  𝑌𝑡 is explained by shock to government spending (45.52% 
and 44.18% respectively) whereas shock to output itself explains 34.96% and 33. 40% in each 
approach. 
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Table 3.4. Variance Decomposition in the Baseline VAR: Recursive Approach (RA) and 
Blanchard-Perotti Approach (BP) 
  𝑮𝒕  𝒀𝒕  𝝅𝒕  𝝉𝒕  𝒓𝒕  
  RA BP RA BP RA BP RA BP RA BP 
 4 93.58 92.62 2.18 1.82 0.36 0.31 3.24 3.34 0.64 1.91 
𝑮𝒕 8 83.44 83.02 3.07 2.19 5.57 6.01 7.17 7.06 0.75 1.92 
 12 75.27 73.54 2.48 2.20 12.76 16.04 6.93 6.81 2.56 1.41 
 16 68.89 67.28 3.25 2.27 19.01 22.77 6.07 6.22 2.78 1.48 
            
 4 0.78 0.40 96.71 95.89 0.07 0.22 2.36 1.96 0.08 1.53 
𝒀𝒕 8 7.13 6.26 85.23 85.89 0.79 0.80 6.71 5.24 0.14 1.81 
 12 36.55 36.62 52.76 52.73 1.34 4.14 4.61 3.70 4.74 2.81 
 16 45.52 44.18 34.96 33.40 6.33 12.25 5.03 5.62 8.16 4.55 
            
 4 14.14 15.40 0.94 0.77 74.56 77.21 5.40 5.68 4.96 0.94 
𝝅𝒕 8 14.53 16.93 9.24 6.90 66.38 69.72 4.98 5.50 4.87 0.94 
 12 21.66 21.14 9.68 8.60 59.77 63.79 4.74 4.71 4.15 1.76 
 16 22.12 20.51 11.99 12.57 57.06 59.55 5.12 5.64 3.71 1.71 
            
 4 39.97 37.49 3.61 4.16 2.58 3.32 53.79 53.43 0.05 1.60 
𝝉𝒕 8 29.78 28.48 8.06 11.86 5.94 6.92 55.98 51.29 0.24 1.45 
 12 37.97 35.41 8.59 9.52 7.92 10.62 45.21 37.58 0.31 6.87 
 16 37.68 30.03 9.34 8.22 10.39 11.91 42.23 41.14 0.34 8.70 
            
 4 0.63 4.77 0.07 9.80 4.37 1.26 1.41 0.68 93.51 83.49 
𝒓𝒕 8 0.42 5.06 0.37 9.82 12.15 9.86 4.79 1.37 82.27 73.89 
 12 1.94 6.66 0.40 7.82 20.10 12.66 8.50 9.68 69.06 63.18 
 16 10.97 10.92 0.41 6.64 21.17 15.97 11.22 12.13 56.23 54.33 
 
Inflation explains about 12% and net taxes about 5% respectively. The high variation of output 
explained by government spending shock could be due to the rising spending-to-GDP ratio until 
2011 linked to the post-war reconstruction period11 and the increase in public investment in roads, 
education and telecommunication infrastructure. More than 55% of the variations in inflation 
(57.06% and 59.55% respectively) is explained by shock to inflation itself. Government spending 
accounts for more than 20% (22.12% and 20.51% respectively), showing that government 
                                                          
11 The eleven-year civil war officially ended in January 2002. 
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spending stimulates the economy by increasing output but at the cost of higher inflation. Above 
50% of the variation in interest rate 𝑟𝑡 is self-explanatory (56.23% and 54.33% respectively). 
Inflation accounts for more than 15% (21.17% and 15.97% respectively), whereas government 
spending accounts for about 10 % (10.97% and 10.92% respectively) of the variation in interest 
rate. The high share of inflation followed by an increase in interest rate could owing to an increase 
in interest rate increasing the demand for government securities, which in turn increases 
government spending, putting an upward pressure on inflation. 
3.5.2 The Fiscal Policy Shocks 
In the recursive approach, since all elements of matrix A above the principal diagonal are restricted 
to zero, which means imposing zero restrictions on the contemporaneous effect of taxes on output 
and inflation, the size of the automatic stabiliser is freely estimated. In the Blanchard-Perotti 
approach, the size of the automatic stabiliser is predetermined since the elasticity of government 
revenue on output is estimated outside the VAR model and is used an as instrument in the VAR in 
estimating the fiscal shocks. Thus, this approach easily estimates the contemporaneous effect of 
revenue on output and inflation. The two approaches yield identical findings with respect to the 
impulse response functions. Similar conclusions were reached by Caldara and Kamps (2008) and 
Lozano and Rodríguez (2011), among other studies. 
The results presented show the impulse response function for government spending and 
government revenue shocks in the baseline model (𝑔𝑡, 𝑦𝑡,𝜋𝑡 𝜏𝑡𝑟𝑡). To account for the effect of 
fiscal policy shocks on private consumption and private investment, as these variables constitute 
major disagreements in both theoretical and empirical literature, we estimate a six-variable VAR 
model (𝑔𝑡, 𝑧𝑡  𝑦𝑡,𝜋𝑡 𝜏𝑡𝑟𝑡), where 𝑧𝑡 is components of output – that is, private consumption or 
investment. 𝑧𝑡 (private consumption or private investment) is ordered before output 𝑦𝑡 on 
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justification that private consumption or investment contemporaneously react to government 
spending shocks. Since they are components of output, structural consumption and investment 
shocks are deemed to affect output within the quarter. Because of the identical impulse response 
in identification approaches, the results presented below for government spending and revenue 
shocks equivalently hold for both. 
3.5.2.1 Government Spending Shocks 
Figures 3.2 (recursive approach) and 3.3 (Blanchard-Perotti approach) show effect of one standard 
deviation shock to government spending on the endogenous variables in the system. 
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Figure 3.2. Responses to Government Spending Shocks – Recursive Approach 
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Figure 3.3. Responses to Government Spending Shocks – Blanchard-Perotti Approach 
 
Output increased with a hump shape, attaining its peak at the end of the third year, with the shock 
on impact at about 0.07%. The effect became significant at the start of the second year and lasted 
throughout the horizon. Private consumption displays similar response as output, with a similar 
hump shape. The effect became significant at the start of the second year, reaching its peak at the 
end of the third year, after the shock on impact being at about 0.015%. The shock lasted throughout 
the horizon but became insignificant in the first half of the fourth year after the shock. These 
findings are in line with those reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001) 
and Galí, LópezSalido and Vallés (2007) among other studies.  
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Private investment rose with respect to government spending expansion, attaining it peak effect in 
the first year after the shock, which on impact was about 0.08%.  The shock lasted throughout the 
period but fades out after the third year. The response of private investment to government 
spending expansion is in line with findings reported by Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010) 
and de Castro (2006). In the short-run, shocks to government spending had significant positive 
impact on output and its components (private investment and private consumption). More 
importantly, expansionary government spending significantly increases output and private 
consumption and the shock lasted throughout the horizon. These findings conform to the 
Keynesian prediction of expansionary government spending. These results are not surprising due 
to the fact that Sierra Leone have large public sector in terms of job creation, investment and the 
provision of services. Households essentially rely more on government for jobs and thin private 
sectors also depends on government for the award for contracts and the provision of essential 
services to boost the investment climate for example roads, electricity etc. The significant impacts 
of government spending on output and private consumption could be due to the spending plan of 
2002 initiated by the government of Sierra Leone. The plan includes but not limited to increase 
government investment spending on infrastructure- a post-war development drive, increase job 
creation for ex-war combatant, building of technical and vocation institution to train former child 
soldiers to acquire technical skills. 
Government revenue increased in response to spending shock and attained its peak in the third 
year after the shock, which on impact was 0.035%. Similar findings were reported by Mountford 
and Uhlig (2009), De Castro (2006) etc. This short-run response of taxes to spending expansion 
could be due to positive reaction of output to government spending shock as shown in the impulse 
response graph and/or the authorities’ willingness to finance the increased spending needs by the 
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government- more specifically the increase in government spending in 2002 following the end of 
the eleven-year civil war. Inflation increased for the first two years after the spending shock. The 
peak effect was attained in the second quarter after the shock on impact was 0.07%. However, it 
fell after the seventh quarter and remained insignificant throughout the horizon while the shock 
lasted. Similar result was reported by De Castro (2006) for Spain.  The effect of government 
spending on inflation is not surprising. This is due to the fact that Serra Leone don’t have an 
independent Central Bank neither and inflation targeting objective by the monetary authorities. 
Finally, interest rate rose for the first two years after the shock on impact was 1.2% and the peak 
effect was attained in the sixth quarter, a result similar to those reported by De Castro (2006) and 
Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010).  It is worth noting that the identical impulses between 
these two approaches are of no surprise. In response to government spending shocks, the 
assumptions in both identification approaches are almost the same (compare the first row of matrix 
A in equations (3.3) and (3.15)  
3.5.2.2 Government Revenue Shocks 
Figures 3.4 (Recursive approach) and 3.5 (Blanchard-Perotti approach) show the impulse response 
for government revenue shock. Government spending fell in response to government revenue 
shock and the effect was only significant for one year. The peak effect was attained in the third 
quarter after the shock on impact was about 0.016%.  The fall in government spending when 
revenue increased could be interpreted as ‘deficit-reducing tax increase’. This finding could be due 
to the spending cut conditionality recommended by the IMF to the government of Sierra Leone. 
In 1984, the government of Sierra Leone, based on policy advise by the IMF, reduces its spending 
by cutting subsidies to rice importers, reducing the size of the public workforce especially in the 
civil service due to the rising deficits and deterioration in revenue collections. Output and Private 
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investment fell for two years in response to government revenue shocks, but the effect was only 
significant for the sixth quarter and died out after the second year.  These findings are in line with 
results reported by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Private 
consumption and interest rate fell on impact but were not statistically significant.  
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Figure 3.4. Responses to Government Revenue Shocks – Recursive Approach 
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Figure 3.5. Responses to Government Revenue Shocks – Blanchard-Perotti Approach 
 
Inflation rose to tax shocks and the peak effect of 0.06% was attained in the third quarter, while 
the shock lasted throughout the horizon. The response of inflation to tax shocks seems puzzling. 
A similar result is reported by Ravnik and Žilić (2011). Some plausible argument for this finding 
could be found in the supply-side perspective.  An increase in taxes increases a firm’s cost of 
production. The ultimate tax burden will then be transferred from firms to consumers in the form 
of indirect taxes. The end impact is higher prices of goods and services, hence higher inflation. 
Another argument could be that inflation is caused by other factors outside fiscal policy, such as 
imported inflation, output gap and monetary policy.  
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3.5.2.3. Responses to Shocks in Government Spending Components 
We test for the response of output and its components to shock in government spending 
components – that is, government consumption and investment. The aim of the approach is two-
fold. First, the disaggregation of government spending into components clearly depicts a broader 
picture on how the economy responds to the different categories of government spending at large. 
Second, it guides policymakers how to respond with the appropriate spending tool to smooth 
business cycle fluctuations, stimulus packages and economic recovery. We augment our baseline 
VAR here by replacing government spending with government consumption and government 
investment sequentially. The augment VAR becomes (𝑘𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡 𝑦𝑡,𝜋𝑡  𝜏𝑡𝑟𝑡), where 𝐾𝑡 is either 
government consumption or investment and 𝑍𝑡 is a component of output, i.e. private consumption 
or private investment.  
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3.5.2.4 Responses to Government Consumption Shock 
Figure 3.6 shows the impulse responses of output and its components to shock in government 
consumption expenditure. 
 
Figure 3.6. Responses to Government Consumption Shocks  
Private consumption strongly increased with a hump shape and the shock was persistent 
throughout the horizon. The peak effect of 0.018 was attained in the fourteenth quarter and the 
effect was statistically significant while the shock lasted. Private investment moderately increased 
after the shock and fell gradually while the shock lasted throughout the period. The peak effect of 
0.08% was reached in the sixth quarter and became insignificant after the second year. Output 
increased following the increase in its components. The shock was persistent, and it lasted 
throughout the horizons. The peak effect 0.008% was attained in the fourteenth quarter after the 
shock.  
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3.5.2.5 Responses to Government Investment Shock 
Figure 3.7 presents the response of output and its components to shocks in government investment.  
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Figure 3.7. Responses to Government Investment Shocks 
 
Private consumption strongly increased for the first two years and faded thereafter. The peak effect 
of 0.033% was attained in fourth quarter. Private investment also rose following the shock for 
three years, but the effect was significant only for ten quarters. The peak effect of 0.08% was 
reached in the seventh quarter. Output rose with a hump shape and the shock lasted throughout the 
periods but was significant for the first three years. The peak effect of 0.018% was reached in the 
tenth quarter. Though both spending components increased output and its components positively, 
the effect of government investment strongly stimulated output compared to government 
consumption. Thus, our results are in line with those reported by Baxter and King (1993), de Castro 
(2006), Giordano et al. (2007), Perotti (2005), Marcellino (2002) and Tenhofen, Wolff and 
Heppke-Falk (2010). The response of private investment to government investment could be based 
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on grounds that public investment in Sierra Leone comprises roads infrastructure, electricity and 
telecommunication engineering. Such investment attracts both domestic and foreign companies, 
which greatly impact output. Government investment strongly stimulated the economy in contrast 
with government consumption expenditures, shown by the size of the shocks on output. The above 
finding seems plausible for a small open economy characterised by large public-sector 
employment, small private sector and low savings. 
3.5.2.6 Shocks to Government Revenue Components 
This sub-heading displays how outputs and its components responded to the disaggregated 
components of government revenue. By doing so, it helps us to have a broader picture of how the 
economy responded to different tax policies. Indeed, the results indicate output and its components 
responded differently to direct and indirect taxes. Such analyses are useful for policy design and 
implementation and can guide policymakers as to which kind of tax policy is effective in 
stimulating growth. Output and its component responded to indirect and direct tax in the following 
manner. 
3.5.2.7 Responses to Shocks in Direct Taxes 
Figure 3.8 shows the response of output and its components to direct tax shocks. Output declined 
in response to shock in direct taxes for two and half years and the shock faded out thereafter. The 
peak effect of 0.003% was attained in the sixth quarter following the shock. Private investment 
fell throughout the period, but the effect was significant for only one year. Surprisingly, private 
consumption gradually increased after the first year following the shock, but the effect was not 
significant throughout. This finding is counter-intuitive as we expect private consumption to fall 
in response to an increase in direct taxes. 
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Figure 3.8. Responses to Direct Tax Shocks 
 
3.5.2.8 Responses to Indirect Tax Shock 
In Figure 3.9 we present the result of output and its components to shocks in indirect taxes. Private 
investment gradually increased to shock in indirect taxes while the shock lasted throughout the 
horizon. It was significant between the second and third year following the shock. The peak effect 
of 0.04% was attained in the second year. In the short run, private consumption did not respond to 
indirect tax shock, which could have been due to the delay of increased taxes to result in increased 
prices. In the second year and thereafter, private consumption increased to indirect tax shocks.  
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Figure 3.9. Responses to Indirect Tax Shocks 
 
This result is also surprising. Output strongly fell in the first two-and-a-half years after the shock. 
The peak effect of 0.008% was attained in the second following the shocks while the shock 
gradually died out in the last year of the horizon. Comparing the two tax components, shock to 
direct taxes was less distortionary and the effect on output was much less compared to indirect 
taxes. Our results are similar to de Castro (2006) but contrast with Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-
Falk (2010) and Lozano and Rodríguez (2011), among other studies.  
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3.5.2.9 Further Discussions of Results 
In the short-run, shocks to government spending had significant impact on output and its 
components. Output and private consumption rose with a hump shape and in line with the 
Keynesian prediction of expansionary government spending. These results are not surprising due 
to the fact that Sierra Leone have large public sector in terms of job creation. The significant 
impacts of government spending on output and private consumption could be due to the increased 
spending plan of 2002 initiated by the government of Sierra Leone. The plan includes but not 
limited to increase government investment spending on infrastructure- a post-war development 
drive, increase job creation for ex-war combatant, building of technical and vocation institution to 
train former child soldiers to acquire technical skills, building and rehabilitations of schools in the 
war affected areas, recruit more teachers for primary and secondary schools etc. Again, private 
investment increase in response to expansionary government spending. This result is also in line 
with Keynesian wisdom. The economy of Sierra Leone is characterised by thin private sector 
constrained by credits and/or capital to undertake huge investments. Private sectors also depend 
on government for the award for contracts and the provision of essential services to boost the 
investment climate for example roads, electricity etc. Expansionary government spending 
produces an inflationary effect. This can be due to the fact that Sierra Leone don’t have an 
independent, inflation-targeting central bank. Moreover, the monetary authorities are willing to 
accommodate the spending drive by the government such debt monetisation. Government revenue 
increases to spending expansion. This short-run response of taxes to spending expansion could be 
due to positive reaction of output to government spending shock and/or the authorities’ willingness 
to finance the increased spending needs by the government. 
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Tax shocks reduced output and private investment significantly. However, the shocks to output 
were persistent and significant for only two years, whereas the shocks to private investment were 
temporary. Inflation increased due to an increase in taxes. Some plausible argument for this finding 
could be found in the supply-side perspective.  An increase in taxes increases a firm’s cost of 
production. The ultimate tax burden will then be transferred from firms to consumers in the form 
of indirect taxes. The end impact is higher prices of goods and services, hence higher inflation. 
Another argument could be that inflation is caused by other factors outside fiscal policy, such as 
imported inflation, output gap and monetary policy. With regards to the components of 
government spending (government consumption and government investment), both spending 
components increased output and its components significantly. However, the effect of government 
investment strongly stimulated output compared to government consumption as shown by the size 
of the shocks on output. Comparing the two tax components, shock to direct taxes was less 
distortionary and the effect on output was much less compared to indirect taxes. The above findings 
seem plausible for a small open economy characterised by large public-sector employment, small 
private sector and low savings.  
3.5.2.10 Comparing the Results to the Existing Literature 
The result presented in this paper are in line with studies in the existing literature that provide 
evidence of short-run effects of fiscal policy surprises. Expansionary government spending 
persistently increased output and private consumption with strong significant effects, as reported 
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Galí, LópezSalido and Vallés (2007) 
among others. Government spending expansion persistently crowded-in private investment in line 
with findings by Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010) and de Castro (2006). Government 
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spending shock increased government revenue, which is in line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
but in contrast with Mountford and Uhlig (2009).  
Also, government spending expansion is inflationary, and this finding is in line with De Castro 
(2006) for Spain. Finally, interest rate rises to shock in government spending, a result similar to 
those reported by De Castro (2006) and Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010). Shocks to 
government revenue temporarily reduced output and investment in line with results reported by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). Inflation rose to tax shocks and in 
line with by Ravnik and Žilić (2011). Government investment expenditure strongly stimulated the 
economy when compared to government consumption expenditures. Thus, our results are in line 
with those reported by Baxter and King (1993), de Castro (2006), Giordano et al. (2007), Perotti 
(2005) and Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010). Shocks to indirect taxes are be more 
distortionary than direct taxes. Our results are similar to de Castro (2006) but contrast with 
Tenhofen, Wolff and Heppke-Falk (2010) and Lozano and Rodríguez (2011), among other studies. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents an empirical evidence on the effects of surprise fiscal policy shocks on the 
Sierra Leone economy in the context of VAR. Short-run government spending expansion 
persistently increases private consumption and output. Private investment consistently crowds-in 
spending expansion, exhibiting a link between investment and economic activity and thus 
suggesting the existence of the acceleration hypothesis of investment in Sierra Leone. The empirics 
of this paper will serve as a useful benchmark reference for policy and academic discussions in the 
context of analysing the short-run impacts of discretionary fiscal policy surprises in Sierra Leone. 
Based on the findings, it can be concluded for policy recommendations that fiscal policy has 
proven to be a potent tool for smoothing fluctuations in economic activity in Sierra Leone. Two 
implications are inferred from this conclusion: (i) government spending expansion persistently 
increases output and its component, (ii) while tax increase significantly affects output and private 
investment – however, it fails to significantly affect private consumption, which is the largest 
components of aggregate demand. Spending cuts seem plausible in achieving fiscal consolidation 
compared with tax increase. The results indicate fiscal policy can indeed stabilise short-run 
fluctuations and further characterises the dynamic response of macroeconomic variables fiscal 
shocks.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Fiscal Policy and Optimal Taxation: Tests for Tax Smoothing Hypothesis in Sierra Leone 
4.1 Introduction 
Is the budget imbalance in Sierra Leone consistent with optimal tax policy? Following the 2008 
global financial crises, many developed and developing countries experienced a deterioration in 
their budgetary positions. Sierra Leone, like many developing countries, has a long history of 
running budget deficits and budget imbalance is a common phenomenon. However, no known 
studies have asked whether this situation is consistent with optimal tax policy. The purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to empirically test whether the fiscal behaviour in Sierra Leone is consistent 
with optimal tax policy theory in the context of Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model. 
The tax smoothing hypothesis formulated by Barro (1979) proposes that for tax policy to be 
optimal, the average tax rate should be smooth over time. The idea stems from the fact that tax 
collections are distortionary and to minimise the welfare cost (excess burden) of tax, collection 
should be spread over time. This optimal tax policy has the following implications: i) the issuance 
of public debt should respond positively to temporary increases in government spending and 
negatively to temporary increases in output; and ii) temporary changes in government spending 
and output should have no effect on tax rate. This last implication means that the tax rate should 
be unpredictable.   
Following Barro’s (1979) seminal work, many studies have examined the existence of the tax 
smoothing hypothesis both in developed and developing counties or groups of countries. The 
empirical literature can be broadly categorised into two strands. The first group examines the 
random walk behaviour and whether tax rate is unpredictable by its own lagged value or lagged 
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values of other variables, for example as demonstrated in Barro (1981), Kingston (1984), Kingston 
and Layton (1986), Kingston (1991) and Strazicich (1996, 1997, 2002) among others. The second 
category examines the relationship between budget balance and government expenditure. The idea 
here is that during bad times, the government is expected to run a deficit either through an increase 
in spending or a cut in tax, and in a period of good times, the government should run a surplus. 
According to this approach, tax smoothing should be counter-cyclical in nature. Studies that adopt 
this approach included Huang and Lin (1993), Olekalns (1997) and Cashin, Haque and Olekalns 
(1999), among others.  
Despite the large volume of literature, to the best of our knowledge no studies have examined 
whether Sierra Leone’s fiscal policy is consistent with the tax smoothing hypothesis. Using the 
methodology in Barro (1979), this chapter contributes to the literature by providing recent 
empirical evidence on tax smoothing in Sierra Leone.  
Using annual time series data for Sierra Leone from 1980-2016, three different empirical 
approaches are performed. First, we utilise a battery of unit root tests to examine the random walk 
property of the tax rate. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the tax rate cannot be rejected, 
which implies that the tax rate follows random walk and hence is consistent with the tax smoothing 
hypothesis.  
Second, we examine whether changes in tax rate are predictable by its own lagged values by 
running a univariate regression. The result shows that tax rate is unpredictable as changes in tax 
rate cannot be determined by its lagged values. This finding also supports the existence of the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. Finally, a VAR model is employed to examine whether the tax rate can be 
predicted by its own lagged values together with changes in government spending rate and growth 
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rate of real GDP. Our results indicate that all the variables employed are found not to be significant 
is predicating the tax rate. Overall, the empirical estimation supports the existence of optimal tax 
policy in Sierra Leone over the sample period.  
4.2 Theoretical Framework and Review of Previous Studies 
The tax smoothing hypothesis formulated by Barro (1979) assumes that the present value 
borrowing constraint of the government, exogenously given non-interest government spending and 
the initial debt determine the time path of government tax revenue. According to the Ricardian 
equivalence hypothesis, for a given amount of government spending, if taxes were lump sum, then 
the alteration to taxes and public debt to balance the budget would create no significant effect on 
the economy.  However, in the absence of lump-sum taxation, approximation of non-lump-sum 
tax is as economically effective in the context of this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the absence of non-
lump-sum taxes comes with the effect of excess burden, also known as the welfare cost of taxation.   
This deadweight loss of taxation (Z) is positively related to tax receipt (T) and negatively to tax 
base (Y). Barro (1981) specifies the welfare cost of taxation Z as follows: 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑇𝑡, 𝑌𝑡) = 𝑇𝑡𝑓(𝜏𝑡)                                                                                              (4.1) 
where 𝞽 is the average tax rate ((
𝑇𝑡
𝑌𝑡
). 
 According to Barro (1981), the government objective is to minimise the present value the welfare 
cost of taxation Z: 
∑ (1 + 𝑟)−1𝑓(𝜏𝑡)𝑇𝑡 
∞
𝑡=1
                                                                                                         (4.2) 
subject to the government present value borrowing constraint: 
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∑ (1 + 𝑟)−1𝐺0
𝑡 + 𝐷0 = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
−1𝑓(𝜏𝑡)𝑇𝑡 
∞
𝑡=1
                                                                   (4.3) 
∞
𝑡=1
   
where 𝐺0 is the non-interest government spending, 𝐷0 is the initial public debt and r is the real 
interest rate paid on public debt. 
The constrained optimisation problem in equations (4.2) and (4.3) requires the government to 
choose a tax rate at each period such that the present value of welfare cost of taxation is minimised 
with a given present value borrowing constraint. The necessary condition for the above 
optimisation problem requires that the marginal welfare loss of taxation should be the same for all 
periods due to simultaneity in revenues from taxation and welfare loss. In other words, the planned 
tax rate should be constant over time. However, in the presence of uncertainty, the expectation of 
the current tax rate should be equal to the observed tax rate in the previous period, which means 
that the tax rate should follow martingale or random walk (Barro, 1981). 
If the expected tax rate is constant, it implies that the level of taxes in each period is determined 
by Y and 𝐺0 to maintain the present value borrowing constraint. However, if Y is constant over 
time, the constancy in 𝞽 means a constant T also. In case 𝐺0 is constant, we have a balanced budget 
from the intertemporal budget constraint  𝑇𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡
0 + 𝑟𝐷0. 12  As such, the revenues from taxation 
are sufficient to meet interest payments on previous public debt and non-interest spending. 
 If Y and 𝐺0 are growing at a constant rate such that 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌0(1 + 𝜇) and 𝐺0
𝑡 = 𝐺0
0(1 + 𝛾), a 
constant 𝞽 means that T is also growing at the same rate as Y. Given that 𝝁 and 𝝲 are the conditional 
                                                          
12 In such scenario, the initial debt is not amortised. 
146 
 
expectations of growth rate of Y and 𝐺0
0, setting 𝝲 < 𝝁 < r, Barro (1981) derives the expected tax 
revenue at time zero as: 
𝑇0 = (
𝑟 − 𝜇
1 + 𝜇
) [
𝐺0
0(1 + 𝛾)
(𝑟 − 𝛾)
𝐷0]                                                                           (4.4) 
Equation (4.4) implies that tax revenue is related positively to the growth rate of permanent non-
interest spending and negatively related to the growth rate of permanent income.  
In a situation where the time path of 𝐺0 and Y temporarily depart from their trend growth by 
irregular (+ or -) factors υ and ϛ respectively, one period ahead 𝐺0 and Y are given by  
𝐺𝑡
0 = (1 + 𝜐)𝐺0
0(1 + 𝛾) and 𝑌𝑡 = (1 + ϛ)𝑌𝑡(1 + 𝜇). Equating 𝝲=𝝁, implying that T and  𝐺
0 are 
growing at the same trend growth of Y and assuming two period cases, Barro (1981) arrives at: 
𝑇1 = 𝛼[(𝐺0
0(1 + 𝜇) + (𝑟 − 𝜇)𝐷0 + 𝜐𝐺0
0(1 + 𝜇)β+]                                                            (4.5) 
where  
𝛼 = [
(1 + ϛ)
(1 + ϛ) − ϛ((1 + 𝜇)/(1 + 𝑟))𝑛
] 
𝛽 = 1 − [(1 + 𝜇)/(1 + 𝑟)]𝑘  
Equation (4.5) (𝐺0
0(1 + 𝜇) represents the permanent component of non-interest government 
spending, (𝑟 − 𝜇)𝐷0 is the interest payment net of output growth, 𝜐𝐺0
0(1 + 𝜇) is the temporary 
non-interest government spending, 𝞪 is the factor that accounts for the influence of transitory 
income, n gives the duration of transitory departure of Y and k represents the duration of the 
transitory departure of 𝐺0. From equation (4.5) the following implications emerge: 
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(i) There are no effects of purely transitory expenditure on current taxation (if k→ 0, 𝞫=0). 
If actual government spending deviates from its trend for a long period (if k→∞, 𝞫=1 when 
𝝁 < r), it implies the transitory expenditure has a positive impact on current taxation.  
(ii) If changes in income are purely transitory (if n→ 0), their effect on taxes is specified 
as 𝞪 = (1+ϛ). If the transitory deviation has a long-lasting effect, (if n→∞), 𝞪 approaches 
infirnity. Current taxes are thus a decreasing function of the anticipated duration of 
transitory income.  
According to Barro (1981), one way to test the above theoretical implications is to examine the 
constancy in the planned tax rate over time, in that the tax rate should be unpredictable as it reflects 
only new information on the time path of government spending, output and other variables. This 
observation led to the random walk tests on tax rate to investigate the tax smoothing hypothesis.  
Barro (1981) examines whether the United States government was carrying out an optimal tax 
policy by smoothing the distortionary effects of taxes. Barro (1981) uses average tax rate (tax 
revenue to GNP) as a proxy for marginal tax rate and finds that the tax rate follows a random walk. 
Additionally, he finds no predictive power for tax-rate changes from changes in government 
expenditure and growth of real output. As such, changes in tax rates were unpredictable upon 
arrival of new information. His findings are consistent with optimal tax smoothing hence an 
optimal tax policy.  
Kingston (1984) tests for tax smoothing hypothesis in the United States using actual marginal tax 
rate from 1913-1975. He complements Barro’s theory of tax smoothing by incorporating 
microeconomic foundations. His empirical results accept the hypothesis of random walk in tax 
collection costs, and the parallel hypothesis of tax rate is rejected. Trehan and Walsh (1990) adopt 
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a similar approach and test for evidence of tax smoothing in United States using annual data from 
1890-1982. Their results provide evidence of tax smoothing. Strazicich (1997) examines tax 
smoothing behaviour by the sub-national governments of Canada and the United States. He finds 
that tax smoothing hypothesis is rejected for state government but cannot be rejected for provincial 
government. Horrigan (1986) uses annual United States data spanning from 1953-1978 and finds 
that the tax smoothing hypothesis is rejected.  
Sahasakul (1986) uses the random walk hypothesis of tax rate 𝞽 to arrive at a relationship between 
the optimal tax rate and the permanent component of government expenditure rate. Sahasakul 
(1986) expresses the government budget constraint as:  
𝐷𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑡
0 − 𝑇𝑡                                                      (4.6) 
Dividing throughout by 𝑌𝑡 , Sahasakul (1986) arrives at:  
𝑑𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
′)𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝑔𝑡
0 − 𝜏𝑡                                 (4.7) 
where 𝑑𝑡= 𝐷𝑡/𝑌𝑡 is the debt income ratio, 𝑔𝑡
0 = 𝐺𝑡
0/𝑌𝑡 and 𝜇𝑡
′  is the growth rate of output. Using 
the assumption of martingale together with the assumption of constant r and 𝝁, Sahasakul arrives 
at the following equation for optimal tax rat 𝞽 at time t: 
𝜏𝑡 = (𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
′)𝑑𝑡−1 + [(𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
′)/(1 + 𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
′)]∑𝐸𝑡  (1 + 𝑟𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡
′)−1𝑔𝑡+𝑖
0        (4.8)
∞
𝑖=0
 
Sahasakul (1986) defines the first term on the right-hand-side as the interest payment on public 
debt net of output growth and the second part as the future expectation or the permanent component 
of government expenditure. Sahasakul (1986) uses annual United States data to test for the tax 
149 
 
smoothing hypothesis by regressing marginal tax rate 𝜏𝑡 on permanent expenditure rate. In contrast 
to Barro (1981), he finds a significant response of tax rate to changes in permanent expenditure 
rate, which implies that tax rate is predictable, and that tax smoothing is rejected. In a similar vein, 
Jayawickrama and Abeysinghe (2013) test for tax smoothing behaviour by regressing tax rate on 
permanent expenditure rate.  
They argue that for tax smoothing to hold, future tax rates should cointegrate with permanent 
expenditure rate even when tax rate and expenditure rate follow random walk. Jayawickrama and 
Abeysinghe (2013) propose the concept of weak and strong evidence of tax smoothing hypothesis 
depending on the degree of cointegration between tax rate and permanent expenditure rate. Using 
annual data spanning from 1954-2004 for Australia, Canada, Italy, Holland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, they find evidence that tax smoothing holds for all these countries.  
Recent studies have concentrated on alternative features of the tax smoothing hypothesis. Instead 
of testing for evidence of random walk in tax rate, some studies have tested for tax smoothing 
behaviour by investigating whether the budget balance (deficits/surplus) is informative about 
future changes in government spending. The government sets the budget balance for any period, 
equal to the presented discounted value of expected changes in government expenditure. The 
implication is that when expenditure is expected to rise, the government should run a surplus. 
Conversely, when expenditure is expected to fall, the government should borrow and run a deficit 
budget.  Huang and Lin (1993), Ghosh (1995), Olekalns (1997) among others adopt Campbell’s 
(1987) and Campbell and Shiller’s (1987) VAR approach to explore and test all time-series 
implications of the tax smoothing hypothesis.  
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These authors start with one period, where the government budget constraint specified as: 
                    𝐷𝑡+1 =  (1 + 𝑟)𝐷𝑡+ 𝐺𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 𝑌𝑡 ,     (4.9) 
 
where  𝐷𝑡 is the stock of real government debt,  𝐺𝑡 is real government expenditure, 𝜏𝑡 is the average 
tax rate, 𝑌𝑡 is real output and r is the fixed real interest rate.  
If output grows at a fixed rate equal n, equation (4.1) can be expressed as: 
(1+ n) 𝑑𝑡+1 = (1 + r) 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡                                              (4.10) 
with the lowercase letters denoting the ratio of the respective variable t output. Since equation 
(4.10) holds for every period, taking expectation of it, solving for 𝜏𝑡 by recursive forward 
substitution gives the standard intertemporal budget constraint in expected terms: 
∑ (
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗−𝑡∞
𝑗=𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝜏𝑗 = ∑ (
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗−𝑡∞
𝑗=𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑗 + (1 +  r)𝑑𝑡 + lim
j→∞
(
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗
𝐸𝑡(1 +  n)𝑑𝑡+𝑗           (4.11) 
If the transversality condition on debt is imposed, i.e., the government cannot ignore a debt which 
has a positive expected present value:   
lim
j→∞
(
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗
𝐸𝑡(1 +  n)𝑑𝑡+𝑗                                                                                 (4.12) 
gives 
∑ (
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗−𝑡∞
𝑗=𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝜏𝑗 = ∑ (
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗−𝑡∞
𝑗=𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑗 + (1 +  r)𝑑𝑡                   (4.13) 
where j is the index variable for time, R = (r -n)/(1+n) is the effective net interest rate faced by 
government, and 𝐸𝑡 = E(·𝐼𝑡) is the expectation operator, conditional on the government’s 
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information set at time t, 𝐼𝑡. Equation (4.13) implies that the net present value of expected tax rate 
must be equal to the sum of the net presented value of expected government expenditure plus the 
initial debt. 
When the government levies taxes, it is assumed that distortionary cost is imposed, such as 
collection cost and deadweight loss, which are incurred when individuals substitute market work. 
The government’s aim is to minimise the welfare losses that occur due to the choice of the tax rate. 
These costs are assumed to be proportional to the square root of tax rate. Following Barro (1979) 
and Ghosh (1995), the government’s objective function is to maximise: 
𝑉 = −(
1
2
)∑ 𝛽𝑗−𝑡
∞
𝑗=𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝜏𝑗
2,          0 < 𝞫 <                            (4.14) 
where 𝞫 is the government’s subjective discount rate. The objective here is to maximise equation 
(4.14) subject to equations (4.10) and (4.12).  Assuming 𝞫 = 1/(1+R), the Euler equation implies 
that for any j > t: 
𝐸𝑡𝜏𝑡 =     𝜏𝑡                                                                                                      (4.15) 
Equation (4.5) implies that the tax rate follows a random walk. This is the first basic implication 
of the tax smoothing hypothesis, which has been tested in several empirical studies, for example 
Barro (1981) and Sahasakul (1986). Substituting equation (4.15) into (4.12), the tax smoothing 
hypothesis can be written as: 
𝜏𝑡 = (𝑟 − 𝑛)𝑑𝑡 +
𝑅
1 + 𝑅
∑ (
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗−𝑡∞
𝑗=𝑡
𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑗                              (4.16) 
152 
 
Equation (4.16) means optimal fiscal policy implies that the tax rate should constantly be set equal 
to the annuity value of the sum of government debt and the present discounted value of expected 
government expenditure.  
Thus, the right-hand side of equation (4.16) is the constant flow of government expenditure that is 
anticipated to be sustained for the rest of the government’s time horizon – that is, it is the 
permanent government expenditure. Optimal fiscal policy would mean that the tax rate should 
always be set equal the permanent government expenditure.  
If we define budget balance as:  
𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 = (1 + 𝑛)(𝑑𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡−1)                                                                         (4.17)   
the dynamic government budget constraint can be written as:  
𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡 − (𝑔𝑡 +(𝑟 − 𝑛)𝑑𝑡)  = 𝜏𝑡  +𝑔𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇 ,                                                (4.18)    
where  𝑔𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇 is the total government expenditure, i.e., the sum of current expenditure 𝑔𝑡, and the 
effective interest payment on government debt (𝑟 − 𝑛)𝑑𝑡. 
After substituting equation (4.16) into (4.18), the ta smoothing hypothesis can be restated as: 
      𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑡 = ∑  (
1
1 + 𝑅
)
𝑗−𝑡∞
𝑗=𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡𝛥𝑔𝑡
𝑇𝑂𝑇                                                            (4.19)  
Equation (4.19) implies that for the tax smoothing hypothesis to hold, optimal fiscal policy requires 
that the budget balance for any period always be set equal to the presented discounted value of 
expected changes in government expenditure. In effect, when expenditure is expected to rise, the 
government should run a surplus. Conversely, when expenditure is expected to fall, the 
government should borrow and run a deficit budget.  
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Thus, a temporary positive shock to expenditure means a deficit budget, whereas a permanent 
shock to expenditure means no change in the budget balance as the tax rate is fully adjusted to the 
permanent shock. The behaviour of a tax smoothing government facing an exogenous expenditure 
is equivalent to the actions of a consumer who desires to smooth consumption over time when 
labour income is stochastic (Hall, 1978). 
Huang and Lin (1993) test for optimal tax policy in the United States between 1929-1988. They 
find no evidence of tax smoothing behaviour. In accounting for structural breaks, evidence of tax 
smoothing is not rejected for post 1947.  Ghosh (1995) tests for tax smoothing in the United States 
and Canada in the context of VAR. By using annual data from 1961-1988, he finds that the tax 
smoothing model is successful in explaining the behaviour of the federal government deficits for 
both countries. Olekalns (1997) finds the Australia budget surplus to be too volatile to be fully 
consistent with optimal tax behaviour during the sample period of 1964-1995. 
 Crosby and Olekalns (1998) test for tax smoothing behaviour in Australia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States and find that tax smoothing behaviour exists only for the United States.  
Serletis and Schorn (1999) test for tax and revenue smoothing for the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada and France. They employ a tri-variate VAR and their results shows that tax and 
inflation smoothing hold, but revenue smoothing is rejected.  
The literature on developing countries is relatively thin compared to that on developed counties. 
Only a few studies have investigated tax smoothing hypothesis in developing countries. For 
example, Cashin, Olekalns and Sahay (1998) apply Barro’s tax smoothing model to India data 
spanning from 1951-1997. They find evidence of tax smoothing behaviour in the central 
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government, but the tax behaviour of state government is inconsistent with the tax smoothing 
hypothesis.  
Cashin, Haque and Olekalns (1999) test for tax smoothing in Pakistan and Sri Lanka from 1956-
1997 respectively. They find that tax smoothing hypothesis holds for Pakistan but does not hold 
for Sri Lanka. As such, the deficit behaviour of Pakistan is consistent with the tax smoothing 
hypothesis while Sri Lanka deficit behaviour is inconsistent with the hypothesis. Cashin, Haque 
and Olekalns (2003) then test for optimal taxation in Pakistan for the period 1956-1995. Their 
results suggest that Pakistan’s fiscal policy is optimal and consistent with tax smoothing behaviour, 
but the stock of public liabilities is on an unsustainable trajectory. Rocha (2001) investigates 
whether Brazil smoothed tax for the period 1970-1994. The results reject the tax smoothing 
hypothesis. Rocha (2001) suggests that the performance of public debt may be explained from the 
standpoint of political economy rather than the idea of tax smoothing. 
Using Chilean data spanning from 1972-2003, Pasten and Cover (2011) find strong evidence for 
the tax smoothing hypothesis when royalties from the copper industry were not under government 
regulations. On the other hand, weak evidence of tax smoothing hypothesis exists when royalties 
from the copper industry were regulated by government. Kurniawan (2011) uses Indonesia data 
spanning from 1970-2010. He tests for tax smoothing behaviour in the context of Barro’s (1981) 
model and finds evidence of optimal fiscal policy, which means that Indonesia fiscal policy is 
consistent with tax smoothing hypothesis.  Ashworth and Evans (1998) examine the existence of 
seigniorage and tax smoothing in a sample of 32 developing countries. They find that tax 
smoothing has not been significant elements in determining the behaviour of seigniorage. Talvi 
and Vegh (2000) examine the fiscal behaviour of 56 countries using annual data spanning from 
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1970-1994. They find that the fiscal policies in G-7 follow tax smoothing behaviour while 
developing countries are highly pro-cyclical.  
The empirical literature on tax smoothing theory has been characterised with mixed findings. 
These differences could be due to the methodology applied, theoretical predictions and the choice 
of variables. I conclude this section by providing a brief summary on the empirical literature on 
tax smoothing theory in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Some Empirical Evidence on the Tax Smoothing Hypothesis 
Author(s) and 
Date 
Data 
Frequency 
Period and 
Country 
Major 
Variables 
Tests Does Tax 
Smoothing 
Hypothesis 
Hold? 
Barro (1979) Annual 
 
 
1922-1976 
US 
Debt to Income 
Ratio, Inflation, 
Government 
Expenditure 
 
OLS Yes 
Barro (1981) Annual 1879-1979 
US 
Government 
expenditure, 
Aggregate 
output (GNP), 
Total Taxes 
OLS Yes 
Barro (1986) Annual 1916-1982 
US 
GNP, CPI and 
Government 
Spending 
Maximum 
Likelihood, 
Unit root tests 
Yes 
Sahasakul 
(1986) 
Annual 1837-1982 
US 
Permanent 
government 
spending, Initial 
OLS No 
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public debt, 
Defence 
purchase, 
Marginal tax 
rate 
Horrigan 
(1986) 
Quarterly 1953:2-
1978:4 
US 
Inflation, GNP, 
Federal 
expenditures, 
Public debt 
OLS Yes 
Trehan and 
Walsh (1988) 
Annual 1890-1982 
US 
Government 
expenditures, 
Total taxes 
Unit root tests  
      
No 
Bohn (1990) Quarterly 1954-1987 
US 
GNP, Inflation, 
M1, Military 
spending, Stock 
returns 
Bivariate 
Vector 
Autoregression 
Yes 
Haung and 
Lin (1993) 
Annual 1929-1988 
1947:1988 
US 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance, 
Aggregate 
output 
Unit root tests, 
Vector 
autoregression 
Yes after 
1947 and 
No for full 
sample 
Ghosh (1995) Annual 1961-1988 
US and 
Canada 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes, for 
both 
countries 
Strazicich 
(1996) 
Annual 1963-1989 Tax rate, 
Government 
Panel Unit root 
tests 
No for state 
government 
and Yes for 
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1961-1989 
Canadian 
Provinces 
spending rate, 
output 
provincial 
government  
Olekalns 
(1997) 
Annual 1964-1995 
Australia 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance, Interest 
rate 
 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
No 
Ashworth and 
Evans (1998) 
Annual 1951-1994 
32 
Developing 
Countries 
Tax rate, 
Inflation rate, 
Velocity of 
money 
Unit root tests, 
Cointegration 
No 
Roubuni 
(1998) 
Annual 1960-1985 
18 OECD 
countries 
Net debt, 
Investment rate, 
Budget deficits, 
Current 
account-GDP 
ratio, Saving-
GDP ratio 
OLS No for tax 
and 
revenue-
smoothing  
Cashin, 
Olekalns and 
Sahay (1998)  
Annual 1951-1997 
India 
Central and 
state 
government  
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes, for 
central 
government 
and No, for 
state 
government 
Scott (1999) Annual 1913-1989 
US 
Marginal tax 
rate, Average 
hours worked 
Unit root tests No 
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Serletis and 
Schorn (1999) 
Quarterly  1950-1994 
Canada, 
France, 
U.K, US 
Tax rate, 
Inflation rate 
Unit root tests, 
VAR, 
Cointegration 
Yes 
Cashin, Haque 
and Olekalns 
(1999) 
Annual 1956-1995 
1964-1997 
Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance 
 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes, for 
Pakistan 
and No, for 
Sri Lanka 
Talvi and 
Vegh (2000) 
Annual  1970-1994 
56 countries 
Real output, 
Real private and 
government 
consumption, 
Real total 
revenue 
Correlation, 
OLS 
Yes, for G-
7 and No, 
for 
developing 
countries 
Malley and 
Philippopoulos 
(2000) 
Annual 1960-1996 
U.S, West 
Germany, 
Japan, U. K 
Private and 
Government 
consumption, 
Private capital 
and 
Expenditure-to-
output ratio 
FIML 
estimator, 
Wald test 
No for all 
countries 
Rocha (2001) Annual 1970-1994 
Brazil 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
No 
Ricciuti (2001) Annual 1861-1998 
1950-1998 
Italy 
Government 
revenue-to-GDP 
ratio, Total 
Unit root tests, 
Granger-
Causality 
Yes 
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budget outlay-
to-GDP ratio, 
Seigniorage  
Alder (2002) Annual 1952-1999 
1970-1996  
Sweden 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes 
Fisher and 
Kingston 
(2002) 
Quarterly 1953-2001 
U. S 
Permanent 
income, Total 
revenues, 
Government 
Outlays 
VAR, 
Granger-
causality, 
Wald test 
Yes 
Strazicich 
(2002) 
Annual 1955-1998 
19 Industrial 
countries 
Tax rate, 
Government 
Expenditure-
Output ratio, 
Growth rate of 
real GDP, 
Political 
variable 
Panel Unit root 
tests 
Yes, for 
National 
government  
Cashin, Haque 
and Olekalns 
(2003) 
 
Annual  1956-1995 
Pakistan 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure rate 
and Budget 
balance 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes 
Chen (2003) Annual  1972-1992 
Panel of 87 
countries 
Per capita real 
GDP, Per capita 
government 
expenditure, 
Fixed effects 
panel 
regression 
Yes for 
developed 
countries 
and No, 
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Debt-to-GDP 
ratio 
developing 
countries 
Ricciuti (2003) Annual 1861-1998 
Italy 
Government 
revenue-to-GDP 
ratio, Total 
budget outlay-
to-GDP ratio 
 
Unit root tests, 
Granger-
causality 
Yes 
Alder (2006) Annual 1952-199 
1970-1996 
Sweden 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Budget 
balance 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes, from 
1952-1999 
and No, for 
1970-1996 
Kurniawan 
(2011) 
Annual 1970-2010 
Indonesia 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, Growth 
rate of real GDP 
Unit root tests, 
VAR 
Yes 
Abeysinghe 
and 
Jayawickrama 
(2013) 
Annual 1954-2004 
Australia, 
Canada, 
Italy, 
Holland, 
U.K, U.S 
Tax rate, 
Government 
expenditure 
rate, M1, CPI, 
unemployment 
rate 
Unit root tests, 
Error 
correction 
Yes, for all 
countries 
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4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
Data on tax revenue is sourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the National 
Revenue Authority, Sierra Leone. Total government spending is the sum of government 
consumption expenditure and government investment, transfers and interest on public debt. This 
data was sourced from the World Development Indicators of World Bank together with growth 
rate of real GDP. Tax rate and government spending rate are arrived at dividing tax revenue and 
government spending by GDP. All variables are converted to real from their nominal values by 
using the GDP deflator.  
4.3.2 Methodology 
The methodology employed in this study to examine whether the tax smoothing hypothesis holds 
for Sierra Leone is the Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing approach. The first empirical procedure tests 
whether tax rate follows a random walk as this is the necessary condition for tax smoothing. 
Second, we examine whether tax rate changes are unpredictable, i.e. if changes in tax rate can be 
predicted by its own lagged values or lagged values of other variables. This approach is better 
suited to test for the tax smoothing hypothesis in developing countries like Sierra Leone for two 
main reasons. First, unlike the methodology in Ghosh (1995) and others that require interest rate 
on government debt that is unavailable for Sierra Leone and many other countries, this approach 
utilises the total government spending for which data is available for longer period. Second, the 
empirical procedure that is used in construction of the interest rate on government borrowing in 
Olekalns (1997) as well as other studies may not give the true value of the interest rate on 
government debt, which is likely to affect the empirical results.  
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To carry out the empirical analyses on tax smoothing theory, I test for both random walk in tax 
rate and the predictability of changes in Tax rate. To examine the random walk implication of tax 
smoothing this chapter employ battery of tests to the tax rate 𝜏𝑡. If the null hypothesis of random 
walk is rejected, then tax smoothing is rejected.  
Second, a univariate autoregression is adapted to test whether changes in tax rate can be predicted 
by its own lagged values. Tax smoothing theory suggest that changes in tax rate should be 
unpredictable by its past value. This hypothesis is tested by regressing tax rate by its own lagged 
and if the coefficients of the lagged values of tax rate are significant it implies that changes in tax 
rate is predictable which implies tax smoothing theory is not observed.  
Finally, a tri-variate VAR model is employed to examine if changes in tax rate can be predicted 
by changes in government spending rate and growth rate of real GDP. Tax smoothing theory also 
suggest that changes in tax rate should be unpredictable even upon the arrival of new information. 
This means that tax rates should be unpredictable by its own lagged values, lagged values of 
government spending, and lagged values of growth rate of GDP.  
In a system of equations to test whether lagged values of a particular variables together with lagged 
values of other variables are better conducted in the context of VAR framework. The empirical 
literature has tested this hypothesis differently. While earlier studies employ OLS such as Barro 
(1981), Sahasakul (1986), Horrigan (1986) etc, more recent studies have tested this hypothesis in 
the context of VAR for example Olekalns (1997), Kurniawan (2011) and Karakas, Taner and 
Yanikkaya (2014) etc. I adopted the VAR framework to examine the tax smoothing theory in 
Sierra Leone as it is better suited for such an analysis.  
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I test for tax smoothing theory by first examining the random walk behaviour of tax rate. Battery 
of unit root tests are employed and are summarised as follows: 
4.3.2.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Following the pioneering work by Dickey and Fuller (1979) many studies have employed these 
tools in empirical macroeconomics after it was popularised by Nelson and Plosser (1982). The 
standard ADF test is specified as: 
∆Yt =α0 +α1t1 + 𝛿Yt−1 + ∑𝛽𝑖∆
L
j=1
Yt−1 + ϵt                                                         (4.20) 
Where 𝛼0 is the constant,  𝛼1 is the coefficient on the trend term t, ∆Yt−1 is the first difference 
operator to control for serial correlation in the error term, and from the estimation of δ the ‘tau’ 
statistic is obtained and compared to relevant critical values. The null hypothesis is that δ is zero, 
i.e. there is a unit root. We reject this hypothesis when the computed statistic is more than the 
conventional critical values. The assumption for the validity of the original Dickey-Fuller test is 
that the residuals in the regression are not serially correlated. If they are, the aim of the ADF is to 
add lags to the dependent variable in the above equation until the serial correlation is overcome. 
 
4.3.2.2 Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square Test 
DF-GLS proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) is akin to the ADF test, except that the 
series is transformed via a GLS detrending regression before performing the test. The detrended 
data is defined as: 
∆𝑌𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑌𝑡 − ?̂??̂?
′D𝑡                                                                                      (4.21) 
where ?̂??̂?
′ =  (𝐷?̂?
′D𝜑)
−1𝐷?̂?
′y𝜑.   
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Using the GLS detrended data, estimates by least square for the ADF test regression without the 
deterministic term is given by: 
          ∆𝑌𝑡
𝑑 = 𝜋𝑌𝑡−1
𝑑 + ∑𝜑𝑗∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑑
L
j=1
+ ϵt                                                   (4.22)   
The null hypothesis is that 𝞹 is zero. Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) have shown that this test 
has significantly greater ability than the previous versions of the ADF test. Just as the standard 
Dickey-Fuller test may be run with or without a trend term, there are two forms of DF-GLS: GLS 
detrending and GLS demeaning. With GLS detrending, the series is regressed on a constant and 
linear trend, and the residual series is used in a standard Dickey-Fuller regression. With GLS 
demeaning, only a constant appears in the first stage regression; the residual series is then used as 
the regressand in a Dickey-Fuller regression.  
4.3.2.3 Phillips and Perron Test 
To correct for the possible serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the Dickey-
Fuller test, Phillips and Peron (1998) proposed an alternative unit root test. These authors use the 
Newey-West (Newey and West, 1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix estimator, a non-parametric correction of the Dickey-Fuller test in which 
allowance is made for possible heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. The 
asymptotic distribution and the critical values for the PP test statistic are the same as in the ADF 
test. The PP test has a null hypothesis that the series is I(1). However, the PP test was shown to 
exhibit an inferior small sample performance relative to the ADF test, and therefore should be used 
only as a complement to other approaches (see, for example, Schwert (1989), Campbell and Perron 
(1991), Agiakloglou and Newbold (1992), DeJong et al. (1992) and Liu and Praschnik (1993). 
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 The test equation is specified as: 
∆Yt =β0 +β1t +ρYt−1 + ϵt                                                                                  (4.23) 
where 𝛽0 is the constant,  𝛽1 is the coefficient on the trend term t, and from the estimation of 𝞺 the 
‘tau’ statistic is obtained and compared to relevant critical values. The null hypothesis is that 𝞺 is 
zero, i.e. there is a unit root. The rejection criteria of the PP test are the same as the ADF and DF-
GLS. 
4.3.2.4 Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin Test 
In small samples, both ADF and PP tests suffer from low power when the coefficient of the trend 
term 𝞫 is close to one.  Moreover, misspecification vis-à-vis a trend or the numbers of lags that 
ensure that the test captures any short-term dynamics may affect the size of the test, which may 
result in the through null being rejected. As an alternative test, we perform the KPSS test to the 
fiscal series for robustness check. Unlike the ADF, DF-GLS and PP, this test has the opposite null 
hypothesis: that the series being tested have no unit root (stationary).  Doing both ADF, DF-GLS 
and PP and KPSS tests guarantee robustness when the findings are not inconsistent at a given level 
of significance. The KPSS uses a similar autocorrelation correction to the PP test but in a 
parametric sense. The KPSS assumes that the observed time series is disintegrated into a 
deterministic trend, random walk and stationary error term.  
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The KPSS statistic is a LM statistic and is based on the residuals from the OLS regression of a 
time series in question on exogenous variable 𝑦𝑡: 
𝜏𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 ̂
′ 𝞭 +ϵ𝑡 
The associated KPSS LM test statistic is specified thus: 
KPSS =  ∑
𝑆𝑡
2
𝑇2𝑓0
T
=1
                                                         (4.24)       
where  
𝑆𝑡 = ∑ϵ̂𝑠
𝑇
s=1
 
is a cumulative function based on the residuals,  𝑓0 is an estimator of the residual spectrum at 
frequency zero, and T is the sample size.   
4.3.2.5 Zivot-Andrews unit root test 
As noted by Perron (1989, 1990), the standard unit root tests such as the ADF, DF-GSL, PP and 
KPSS tests fail to account for any possibility of structural breaks in time series data.  Perron (1989, 
1990) argues that the standard unit root tests could fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity because the power to reject non-stationarity decreases when the stationary alternative 
is true, and a structural break is ignored. To overcome such problem, Perron (1990) recommends 
allowing for structural breaks at a known date based on knowledge of the data.  
However, it has been argued by Zivot and Andrews (1992) that by exogenously determining the 
break date could lead to an over rejection of the hypothesis of unit root in the series. Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) develop an alternative model that allows for an endogenous break in time series 
data, known as the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) unit root test.  
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There are at least two advantages when a researcher accounts for structural breaks in testing for 
unit root in the data (Glynn et al., 2007). First, it prevents obtaining results that are biased towards 
non-rejection of the hypothesis of unit root. Second, by endogenously determining when the break 
occurred, useful information may be obtained for analysing whether the break in the data 
corresponds to a government policy, political events, regime shifts, wars etc.  
The conventional form of the ZA unit root test is called the model C, which accounts for a one-
time change in both intercept and slope of a series. The model C of the ZA unit root test is given 
as: 
∆𝜏𝑡 = c + 𝛼𝜏𝑡−1 +βt + 𝛾𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝜃𝐷𝑇𝑡 + ∑𝑑𝑗∆𝜏𝑡−𝑗
k
j=1
+ ϵt                     (4.25) 
where DU=1 and DT=t-TB if t > TB and zero otherwise.   
This model tests the null hypothesis of unit root against the alternative hypothesis of trend 
stationary with a one-time break in both the intercept and slope of the trend function at an unknown 
date. Models A and B of the ZA unit root test allow for break in intercept only and slope only 
respectively.  
Following Perron (1997), many studies in the literature have reported estimates for either model 
A or C, or both. However, Sen (2003) argues that the loss in test power is substantial when only 
model A is estimated in a situation where model C is correct. Similarly, the loss of power is 
minimal when model C is estimated in a scenario in which model A should have been the correct 
one. This study therefore reports estimates from both models. 
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4.3.3 Predictability of Tax Rate Changes 
Another predictor for tax smoothing hypothesis to be valid is that tax rate 𝜏𝑡 is unpredictable. In 
other words, changes in the tax rate 𝜏𝑡 cannot be explained by its own lagged values or by lagged 
values of any other variable in the model. As in the empirical literature, we check for 
unpredictability of tax rate in a three-variable VAR model by incorporating government spending 
rate 𝑔𝑡  and real output growth rate 𝜃𝑡 (as a proxy for productivity). Government expenditure and 
productivity are key determinant variables that influence the tax rate. We can also predictability 
of changes in government spending rate ∆𝑔𝑡 and changes in output ∆𝑦𝑡 in the VAR model. 
4.3.3.1 Univariate Autoregression  
We start with the tests for whether changes in the tax ∆𝜏𝑡, is predictable by its own lagged values 
by estimating the following autoregression (AR) model: 
          ∆𝜏𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑗∆𝜏𝑡−1
k
j=1
+ ϵt                                    (4.26) 
Based on the results from equation (4.22), we employ the F test under the null hypothesis that 𝛽1 =
𝛽2 = ⋯𝛽𝑘 = 0.  This means that ∆𝜏𝑡 is unpredictable by its own lagged values. We reject the null 
hypothesis if the F-statistic is less than the critical values and conclude that changes in tax rate are 
not influence by its own lagged value and hence tax rate is unpredictable.  
4.3.3.2 Vector Autoregression  
We proceed further to test for whether changes in the tax rate 𝜏𝑡 can be explained not only by its 
own lagged values but by lagged values of changes in government spending rate and output growth 
rate. As argued by Barro (1981), tests for the unpredictability of changes in tax rate are most 
thought-provoking in situation where some future changes in relevant variables are predictable. In 
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this regard, we perform a VAR and check for the predictability of all the variables in the tri-variate 
VAR by employing the F-test and block exogeneity Wald test.   
Consider a VAR model with lag order 𝞺 as follows: 
Zt =α+ ϕ1𝑧𝑡−1 + ϕ2𝑧𝑡−2 + ⋯ϕ𝑝𝑧𝑡−𝑝 + ϵt                                                (4.27) 
where Zt = [△ 𝜏𝑡 ,△ 𝑔𝑡,△ 𝑦𝑡]′ is a vector of endogenous variables in the system, 𝞪 is a vector of 
constants, ϕ𝑡 (i= 1, 2…, p) are k-dimensional coefficients matrices, and ϵt , is the k - dimensional 
vector of residuals.  
If the lag length is 2, the VAR model in equation 4.24 can be written as: 
[
𝛥𝜏𝑡
𝛥𝑔𝑡
𝛥𝑦𝑡
] = [
𝛼10
𝛼20
𝛼30
] + [
𝛽11 𝛽12 𝛽13
𝛽21 𝛽22 𝛽23
𝛽31 𝛽32 𝛽33
] [
𝛥𝜏𝑡−1
𝛥𝑔𝑡−1
𝛥𝑦𝑡−1
] + [
𝑐11 𝑐12 𝑐13
𝑐21 𝑐22 𝑐23
𝑐31 𝑐32 𝑐33
] [
𝛥𝜏𝑡−2
𝛥𝑔𝑡−2
𝛥𝑦𝑡−2
] + [
𝜀1
𝜀2
𝜀3
]          (4.28) 
The tax rate changes, 𝛥𝜏𝑡 equation can be written as: 
  𝛥𝜏𝑡 =α10 +α1𝛥𝜏𝑡−1 +α2𝛥𝜏𝑡−2 +β1𝛥𝑔𝑡−1+β2𝛥𝑔𝑡−2 +φ1𝛥𝑦𝑡−1 +φ2𝛥𝑦𝑡−2 +  ϵt       (4.29) 
For simplicity, the coefficients of lags of 𝛥𝜏𝑡, 𝛥𝑔𝑡, and 𝛥𝑦𝑡 have been represented as 𝞪, 𝞫 and 𝞿 
respectively.  
After estimating the VAR model, we apply the F-test and block exogeneity Wald test to examine 
the predictability of the variables in the system. The F-test, otherwise known as the joint 
significance test, is used to test the null hypothesis that in a VAR model the lagged explanatory 
variables have no significant influence on the dependent variable, meaning that all the coefficients 
are instantaneously zero (Greene, 2011; Wooldridge, 2008). 
Consider the following tax rate changes 𝛥𝜏𝑡, equation with lag order 𝞺: 
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   𝛥𝜏𝑡 =  𝞭 + ∑𝛼𝑗∆𝜏𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝛽𝑗∆𝑔𝑡−𝑗 + ∑𝜑𝑗∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗 +
ρ
j=1
ϵt                                                               (4.30) 
ρ
j=1
ρ
j=1
 
The null hypothesis to be tested is:  
𝐻0:∑𝛼𝑗 = ∑𝛽𝑗 = ∑𝜑𝑗 = 0
ρ
j=1
ρ
j=1
ρ
j=1
                                                                                                  (4.31)  
If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, we conclude that there is no evidence that the lagged 
explanatory variables have significant influence on 𝛥𝜏𝑡 which means that tax rate change is 
unpredictable.  
Additionally, the block exogeneity Wald test is employed with the aim to ascertain whether each 
block of lagged variables in each equation in the VAR model can, either individually or jointly, 
significantly influence each of the dependent variables. To do so, we restrict all coefficients in 
each block of lagged variables to zero. For example, the null hypothesis for individual block 
exogeneity test in 𝛥𝜏𝑡 equation can be written as: 
𝐻0:∑𝛽𝑗 = 0 or ∑𝜑𝑗 = 0        
ρ
j=1
                                                                               (4.32)
ρ
j=1
 
The block coefficients of lagged 𝛥𝑔𝑡  and the block coefficients of lagged 𝛥𝑦𝑡 are respectively:  
∑𝛽𝑗      and    
ρ
j=1
∑𝜑𝑗   .     
ρ
j=1
 
Meanwhile, the joint block exogeneity test is expressed as: 
𝐻0:∑𝛽𝑗 = ∑𝜑𝑗 = 0        
ρ
j=1
                                                                               (4.33)
ρ
j=1
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We use the Wald test of coefficient restriction to test the joint significance of each block of the 
lagged endogenous variable in each equation in the VAR system and similarly for joint 
significance of all blocks of lagged endogenous variables in each equation of the model. The Wald 
test, which is based on the likelihood test statistic, is: 
(𝑇 − 𝑐)(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∣ ∑𝑟 ∣  −𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∣ ∑𝑢 ∣)                                                         (4.34) 
where T is the number of observations and c is the number of parameters estimated in each 
equation of the unrestricted VAR model. ∑𝑟 and ∑𝑢 are the variance/covariance matrices of the 
restricted and unrestricted VAR system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
This section presents the empirical results regarding whether the tax smoothing hypothesis holds 
in Sierra Leone. Both random walk and predictability test are applied, and the results are presented 
below. 
4.4.1 Unit Root Tests 
We start with examining the existence of unit root in tax rate, a necessary condition for the tax 
smoothing hypothesis. To do so, we employ a battery of unit root tests. The results are presented 
in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Results of Unit Root Tests for Tax Rate 
 ADF  Test PP Test   DF-
GLS  
Test   KPSS  Test 
 With 
Trend  
No 
Trend 
With 
Trend 
No 
Trend 
With 
Trend 
No 
Trend 
With 
Trend 
No Trend 
Test Stats. -3.402 -2.793 -3.587 -2.817 -2.597 -2.022 0.102 0.284 
Critical 
Values 
        
1% -4.235 -3.627 -4.235 -3.627 -3.770 -2.631 0.216 0.739 
5% -3.640 -2.946 -3.640 -2.946 -3.190 -2.150 0.146 0.463 
10% -3.502 -2.612 -3.502* -2.612* -2.890 -1.950* 0.119 0.347 
ADF and DF-GLS-Lags selections were based on the Schwarz Information Criterion, where * represent statistical significance of 
10%.  
PP and KPSS Lag selections were based on the Newey-West Bandwidth using Bartlett Kernel Criterion, where ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
ADF, DF-GLS and PP has the null hypothesis that there is unit root 
KPSS has the null hypothesis that the series is stationary 
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The unit root tests are performed for both the inclusion of the trend term and without trend. The 
null hypothesis of unit root in tax rate  𝜏𝑡 is not rejected at 5% significance level for the ADF, DF-
GLS and PP tests. For the ADF test, the test statistics with and without trend are -3.402 and -2.973 
respectively, which are less than the 5% critical values of -3.640 and -2.946 in absolute term. With 
regards to the PP test, the test statistics with and without trend are -3.587 and -2.817 respectively, 
which are less than the 5% critical values of -3.640 and -2.946 in absolute term. The test statistics 
with and without trend for the DF-GLS are -2.597 and -2.022 respectively, which are less than the 
5% critical values of -3.190 and -2.150. The results for the ADF, DF-GLS and PP indicate that the 
null hypothesis of unit root in tax rate cannot be rejected at the 5% conventional level. Finally, for 
robustness, we perform the KPSS test on tax rate with the null hypothesis that the tax rate is 
stationary. The test statistics with and without trend for the KPSS test are 0.102 and 0.284 
respectively, which are less than the 5% critical values of 0.146 and 0.463 respectively. As such, 
the null hypothesis of stationarity in tax rate is rejected. The KPSS results support the findings 
from previous unit root tests that tax rate is non-stationary. As in Barro (1986), Trehan and Walsh 
(1988), Ashworth and Evans (1998) etc, these findings support the random walk behaviour of tax 
rate which is consistent with tax smoothing theory.  
To complement the standard unit root tests discussed above, we perform ZA unit root test for tax 
rate. The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3. Results of ZA Unit Root Tests 
Test Model Lags Test 
Statistic 
Break 
Year 
 Critical 
1%             
Values 
5% 
 
 
    
10% 
 
Model A  2 -3.78 2000  -5.45 -4.93 -4.58  
Model C 2 -4.46 2000  -5.57 -5.08 -4.82  
 
The null hypothesis of unit root in tax rate series cannot be rejected even in the presence of 
structural breaks. Both model A and model C fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root at 5% 
significance levels. Moreover, the ZA endogenously identifies a significant break in tax rate series. 
Both models show that the break occurs in the year 2000, which is close to the year 2002 when the 
tax systems in Sierra Leone was reformed, resulting in the establishment of the National Revenue 
Authority as the body responsible for administering tax laws and collection of central government 
revenues.  
In summary, based on results obtained from the various unit root tests, we find evidence that tax 
rate is non-stationary. Tax rate thus follows a random walk – a result that is consistent with the tax 
smoothing hypothesis.  
4.4.2 Predictability of Changes in Tax Rate 
This section presents whether tax rate changes are predictable by either its own lag or lag values 
of another variables. We employ both the univariate and vector autoregression and the results are 
presented below. 
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4.4.2.1 Results of Univariate Autoregression 
Another requirement for tax smoothing to hold is that tax rate should be unpredictable, i.e. the tax 
rate should not be predicted by its own lagged values. Based on the lag selection criteria, the AIC 
suggest that the model should be estimated with two lags. However, to have richer information on 
the predictability of changes in the tax rate, the model is estimated with the lag order of 1, 2, 3 and 
4. The results are presented in Table 4.4 
Table 4.4. Univariate Autoregression Results 
  Number of  
 
of Lags in 
 
Autoregression 
Coefficients Lag 4 Lag 3 Lag 2 Lag 1 
𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭  𝜶𝟎  0.078 
(0.268) 
0.080 
(0.254) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
-0.133 
(-0.392) 
𝜶𝟏 -0.183 
(-0.976) 
-0.104 
(-0.609) 
-0.010 
(-0.056) 
-0.044 
(-0.245) 
𝜶𝟐 0.101 
(0.581) 
0.116 
(0.733) 
0.102 
(0.614) 
 
𝜶𝟑 -0.212 
(-1.320) 
-0.220 
(-1.388) 
  
𝜶𝟒 -0.189 
(-1.146) 
   
F-stat 
Prob. (F-stat) 
1.059 
(0.396) 
1.048 
(0.386) 
0.192 
(0.827) 
0.064 
(0.802) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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From Table 4.4, the coefficient for tax rate at lag 1 is -0.044. The F-stat is 0.064 with corresponding 
probability value of 0.802. One lag value of tax rate cannot predict changes in tax rate as the 
probability value is insignificant.  At lag 2, the coefficient for tax rate is 0.102. The F-stat is 0.192 
with corresponding probability value of 0.827. At lag 2, the value of tax rate cannot predict changes 
in tax rate as the probability value is insignificant. For lag 3, the coefficient for tax rate is -0.220. 
The F-stat is 1.048 with corresponding probability value of 0.386. At lag 3, the value of tax rate 
cannot predict changes in tax rate as the probability value is insignificant. At lag 4, the coefficient 
for tax rate is -0.189. The F-stat is 1.059 with corresponding probability value of 0.396. At lag 4, 
the value of tax rate cannot predict changes in tax rate as the probability value is insignificant. The 
F-tests obtained from the different lag lengths from the univariate autoregression are not significant 
at the 5% level. These results imply that the null hypothesis of zero coefficients for the lagged 
values of changes in the tax rate cannot be rejected. Therefore, we conclude that during the sample 
period under investigation, tax rate changes cannot be predicted by its own lagged values, 
suggesting evidence of tax smoothing theory hold in Sierra Leone. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Kurniawan (2011) for Indonesia, Karakas, Taner and Yanikkaya (2014) for Turkey etc. 
4.4.2.2 VAR Results 
We proceed to test for whether tax rate changes △𝝉𝒕, can be predicted not only by its own lagged 
values, but also by the lagged values of changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 and GDP growth 
rate △𝒚𝒕,. Additionally, we provide evidence of the predictability of changes in government 
spending rate △𝒈𝒕 and growth rate of output △𝒚𝒕. To do this, we estimate a tri-variate VAR and 
start with by determining the optimal lag length. We estimate a VAR with lag length of 4.  The 
result of lag selection is presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -302.1122 NA*  38404.92  19.06951   19.20692   19.11506 
1 -292.9614  16.01378  38192.80  19.06009  19.60974  19.24228 
2 -283.4360  14.88356   37615.61*   19.02725*  19.98914*  19.34609 
3 -277.4610  8.215539  47456.31  19.21631  20.59044  19.67180* 
4 -272.6601  5.701109  67123.90  19.47876  21.26512  20.07089 
       
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
The results from the lag length criteria show that optimal lag chosen by FPE, SC and AIC are 2 
lags and, as such, the model should be estimated with 2 lags. 
Having established the optimal lag length, I proceed next to test for the stability of the VAR model. 
If a VAR model is unstable, the results from forecasting with will unreliable. Also, the shocks to 
variable in the system will explode and will not die out.  
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Figure 4.1 VAR Stability Graph 
Figure 3.1 above shows the results of the root polynomial graph for the VAR model. The model is 
stable if no root lies outside or on the circle. As shown in Figure 3.1, no roots lie outside or on the 
circle. This means that the VAR model satisfy the stability condition. Next, I test for 
autocorrelation in the VAR residual and the result is presented in Table 4.6 
Table 4.6 VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
    
    
Lag LM stat df Prob. 
    
    
1  4.19  9  0.898 
2  7.35  9  0.600 
3  4.01  9  0.910 
4  3.18  9  0.956 
    
    
Null hypothesis: No serial correlation at lag 1-4 
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The Langrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic shows that the model does not suffers from 
autorrelation from lag 1 to lag 4. At lag 1, the LM test statistic is 4.19 with corresponding p-value 
of 0.898. I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Similarly, for lag 2, 3, and 4, the 
LM statistics are 7.35, 4.01 and 3.18 with corresponding p-values of 0.600, 0.910 and 0.956. Also, 
I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residual. The VAR model does not 
suffer from serial correlation. The autocorrelation test gives credence to the optimal lag length 
criterion test obtained earlier. The optimal lag length chosen was 2 and the autocorrelation test 
shows that at lag 2, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
Finally, I test for heteroscedasticity in the VAR residual and the results is presented in Table 4.7 
 
Table 4.7 VAR Residual Heteroskedasticity Tests (Levels and Squares) Joint Test 
    
    
Chi-sq df Prob.  
    
    
 59.24 72  0.86  
    
    
Null hypothesis: No heteroscedasticity in the residual 
Under the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity, or (no misspecification), the non-constant 
regressor should not be jointly significant. From Table 4.7, the Chi-sq is 59.24 with probability 
value of 0.86. I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis of heteroscedasticity in the residual. 
VAR satisfy the heteroscedasticity condition.  I proceed to show the estimates from the VAR 
results for tax rate, government spending rate and growth rate of output. This is shown in Table 
4.8. However, for consistency with the autoregression results of tax rate changes and to have more 
insight and richer results about the predictability of the variables, we present the estimates from 
lag 1 to 4. The result from the VAR with four lags is presented in in Table 4.8 
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Table 4.8. VAR Results 
Dependent Variables Lag order in 
VAR 
𝑹𝟐 F-stat Prob. (F-
stat) 
DW 
△𝝉𝒕 1 0.062 0.680 0.571 1.787 
 2 0.092 0.456 0.834 2.125 
 3 0.227 0.751 0.660 2.105 
 4 0.250 0.528 0.871 2.079 
△𝒈𝒕 1 0.085 0.962 0.423 2.015 
 2 0.256 1.551 0.199 2.244 
 3 0.461 2.189* 0.063 1.901 
 4 0.494 1.546 0.190 1.795 
△𝒚𝒕 1 0.015 0.512 0.928 1.997 
 2 0.136 0.709 0.644 2.111 
 3 0.241 0.812 0.610 2.160 
 4 0.437 1.227 0.334 1.675 
Note * indicate significance at 10% level 
The VAR results above show that for the tax rate changes △𝝉𝒕 equation, that is where △𝝉𝒕 is the 
dependent variable, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficient restriction for all 
lagged variables in the equation. The F-statistics of 0.680, 0.456, 0,751 and 0.528 for the VAR 
with lag orders 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively are not significant at any conventional significance level. 
We conclude that tax rate changes are not predictable by all the lagged variables during the period 
under review.  
When change in government sending △𝒈𝒕 is the dependent variable, the result shows that changes 
in government spending can be predicted by its own lag but only in the third year. The F-statistics 
of 0.962 and 1.551 for lag order 1 and 2 respectively are not significant. However, the F-statistic 
of 2.189 is significant at 10% level. For growth rate of real GDP equation, the results indicate that 
for a period up to four lags, real GDP growth rate is not predictable by its own lagged values. The 
F-statistics of 0.512, 0.709, 0.812 and 1.227 for lag orders 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all insignificant at each 
of the conventional levels.  
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4.4.2.3 Block Exogeneity Test 
In Table 4.9 below, we present the block exogeneity Wald test of coefficient restriction based on 
the VAR with two lags are chosen by the AIC to be optimal. The results are presented in three 
categories: the first part shows whether we can exclude separately or jointly the blocks of lags of 
changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 and changes in growth rate of real GDP 𝒚𝒕 from changes 
in tax rate △𝝉𝒕 equation. In the same vein, the next rows test for the same hypotheses.  
Table 4.9. Block Exogeneity Wald Test Results 
Dependent Variable Excluded 
Variables 
Chi-sq df P-value 
△𝝉𝒕 △𝑔𝑡 1.090 2 0.580 
 △𝑦𝑡 1.617 2 0.445 
 All 2.374 4 0.667 
△𝒈𝒕 △𝜏𝑡 5.586* 2 0.061 
 △𝑦𝑡 1.797 2 0.407 
 All 7.137 4 0.129 
△𝒚𝒕 △𝜏𝑡 0.435 2 0.805 
 △𝑔𝑡 2.414 2 0.299 
 All 4.046 4 0.399 
Note * indicate significance at 10% level. The term ‘All’ refers to the exclusion of lags of all variables other than the 
lags of the dependent variables. 
The results above show that when tax rate changes △𝝉𝒕 is the dependent variable, the null 
hypothesis of excluding lags of changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 and changes in growth 
rate of real GDP △𝒚𝒕 cannot be separately or jointly rejected. The chi-square value of 1.090 (with 
p-value = 0.580) and 1.617 (with p-value = 0.445) for △𝒈𝒕 and △𝒚𝒕 are insignificant, implying 
that the block of lags of the two variables can be excluded from the tax rate changes △𝝉𝒕 equation 
separately. Moreover, the chi-square value of 2.374 (with p-value = 0.667) for the exclusion of all 
variables is also insignificant.  This implies that tax rate changes are unpredictable by the arrival 
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of new information which is consistent with tax smoothing theory. Our result is in line with 
Kurniawan (2011) and Karakas, Taner and Yanikkaya (2014) among other studies.  
The blocks lags of changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 and changes in growth rate of real 
GDP △𝒚𝒕 can thus be jointly excluded from changes in tax rate △𝝉𝒕 equation.  Based on these 
results, we can therefore conclude that tax rate changes △𝝉𝒕 are not predicted by changes in 
government spending △𝒈𝒕 and changes in growth rate of real GDP △𝒚𝒕, either individually or 
jointly. When changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 is the dependent variable, the results 
show that the blocks of lags of tax rate changes △𝝉𝒕 and growth rate of real GDP △𝒚𝒕 can jointly 
be excluded from changes in the government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 equation. The chi-square value of 
7.137 (with p-value = 0.129) is insignificant at 5% or lower. △𝒈𝒕 thus cannot be jointly predicted 
by △𝝉𝒕 and △𝒚𝒕. However, separately, the result shows that the blocks of lags of tax rate changes 
△𝝉𝒕 have significant power in predicting △𝒈𝒕. The chi-square of 5.586 (with p-value =0.061) is 
significant at the 10% level.  
Finally, the results show that when changes in GDP growth rate △𝒚𝒕 is the dependent variable, the 
null hypothesis of excluding lags of changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 and changes in tax 
rate △𝞽𝒕 cannot be separately or jointly rejected. The chi-square value of 0.435 (with p-value = 
0.805) and 2.414 (with p-value = 0.299) for △𝞽𝒕 and △𝒈𝒕 are insignificant, which implies that the 
block of lags of the two variables can be excluded from changes in real GDP growth △𝒚𝒕 equation 
separately. Moreover, the chi-square value of 4.046 (with p-value = 0.399) for the exclusion of all 
variables is also insignificant. Thus, the block lags of changes in government spending rate △𝒈𝒕 
and changes in tax rate △𝞽𝒕 can be jointly excluded from the changes growth rate △𝒚𝒕 equation.   
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we empirically investigated whether the tax policies that has been carried out 
between 1980-2016 are consistent with tax smoothing hypothesis. To achieve this aim, three 
different empirical approaches were performed. First, we utilised four different unit root tests to 
examine the random walk property of tax rate. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity of tax rate 
could not be rejected, which implies tax rate follows random walk and hence is consistent with the 
tax smoothing hypothesis. Second, we examined whether changes in tax rate is predictable by 
regressing changes in tax rate by its own lagged values. The result shows that tax rate is 
unpredictable as changes in tax cannot be determined by its lagged values. This finding also 
supports the existence of the tax smoothing hypothesis. Finally, a VAR model was employed to 
examine whether tax rate can be predicted by its own lagged values together with changes in 
government spending rate and growth rate of real GDP. Our results indicate that all the variables 
employed were found not be significant is predicating tax rate. Overall, the empirical estimation 
supports the existence of tax smoothing over the sample period.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter One, the use of fiscal policy as a stabilisation tool has been a subject of great 
controversy among macroeconomists and policy makers. Prior to the great recession of 2008, 
economists and creditors were more concerned about the sustainability of fiscal policy in 
developing and emerging countries. In both developing and emerging economies, the reduction of 
fiscal deficits is one key short-term macro-stabilisation goal. 
The sharp deterioration in primary balance following the 2008 financial crises in advanced 
economies, particularly the United States and European Union, has led to macroeconomists and 
fiscal policy makers reassessing the impacts of fiscal policy on economic activity. The IMF for the 
first time have become advocates for fiscal expansion, an apparent departure from the long-held 
agreement among economists that monetary policy rather than fiscal policy was the appropriate 
response to fluctuation in economic activity.   
Recently, economists and policy makers have become interested in how the economy responds to 
fiscal surprises – particularly the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks. In most 
developing countries, revenue from taxation as a share of GDP is less than twenty percent. Various 
tax tools have been designed by fiscal policy makers to raise tax revenue to reduce fiscal deficits. 
However, raising taxes comes with a distortionary cost. Optimal tax policy requires that the 
government smooths tax to reduce the welfare cost. Based on these observations, the aim of this 
thesis was to assess these three key areas of fiscal policy; fiscal sustainability, fiscal policy shocks 
and the tax smoothing hypothesis in Sierra Leone. The summary and major conclusions are 
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presented in section 5.2, which also outlines the original contribution to the literature made by this 
study. Section 5.3 focusses on policy implications and 5.4 offers suggestions for future studies.  
5.2 Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis comprised three empirical chapters of related themes on fiscal policy in Sierra Leone. 
In Chapter Two, we performed three different analyses to examine the sustainability of fiscal 
policy. The first analysis was based on the government’s IBC. This approach implies that an 
existing fiscal policy is sustainable if the primary deficits ratio (primary deficits-to-GDP ratio) is 
stationary, or alternatively, if there exist a cointegration relationship between government revenues 
and expenditures. After performing battery of tests, the results show that primary deficit ratio is 
stationary, a necessary condition for sustainable fiscal policy. Moreover, the unit root tests show 
that both government revenue and expenditure are non-stationary in levels but are stationary at 
first difference. We proceeded to test for cointegration between these fiscal variables by employing 
both the DOLS and the Johansen system approach. Both approaches confirmed the existence of 
cointegration relationship between government revenue and expenditure. The estimated 
cointegration coefficients show that fiscal policy during the sample period was weakly sustainable. 
We further proceeded to endogenously account for structural breaks in the cointegration 
relationship, which is relevant for Sierra Leone, a country that has witnessed significant changes 
over the years, including SAP in the 1980s, tax reforms in the 1990s and 2000s etc.  We found 
evidence of structural break occurring in 1984 and the sustainability became weaker after the break 
date.  There also exists uni-directional causality running from government revenue to expenditure. 
This causality result is in line with the tax-and-spend hypothesis as proposed by Friedman (1978). 
Finally, we further examined sustainability of fiscal policy by estimating an augmented Bohn 
(1998) fiscal reaction function for Sierra Leone. The results show a significant positive reaction of 
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primary balance ratio to variation in debt ratio, again leading to the conclusions that fiscal policy 
during the review period was sustainable. The results also revealed that the fiscal policy in Sierra 
Leone during the review period was procyclical. In other words, during the period of bad times the 
government found it difficult to borrow and therefore reduced spending and increased taxes and 
did the opposite during boom or good times – a behaviour that is counter intuitive to some 
macroeconomists.    
In Chapter Three, we examined how the economy responds to macroeconomic fiscal shocks within 
the framework of SVAR. Two different approaches were used to identify the fiscal shocks. First, 
the recursive approach was used, and the variables were ordered in line with Fatás and Mihov 
(2001), Favero (2002) and Perotti (2005). The second identification strategy was adopted from 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The empirical results from the two approaches yielded identical 
impulse response function with respect to the fiscal shocks. Overall, the results show that 
government spending shocks strongly stimulate the economy by increasing output and its 
components (private consumption and investment). Both government spending and tax shocks are 
inflationary.  
Chapter Four investigated whether fiscal policy in Sierra Leone has been optimal based on Barro’s 
(1979) tax smoothing framework. First, after performing battery of unit root tests, we found that 
tax rate followed a random walk during the sample period. Additionally, both AR and VAR 
confirmed that changes in tax rate cannot be predicted by its own lagged values or lagged values 
of other variables in the model. These findings led us to conclude that during the sample period, 
the fiscal policy is Sierra Leone was optimal.  
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5.2.1 Contributions to the Literature 
The results of this study have shown that fiscal policy in Sierra Leone has been sustainable and 
there is evidence that the tax smoothing hypothesis holds. The contribution of this thesis to the 
literature are as follows: 
• Provides recent analysis on fiscal sustainability, fiscal policy shocks and the tax smoothing 
hypothesis; 
• Accounts for structural shift in the deficits process using endogenous structural breaks test; 
• Estimates the relationship between primary deficit ratio and debt ratio (fiscal reaction 
function); and 
• Estimates the dynamic response of fiscal policy shocks on key macroeconomic variables 
using SVAR. 
The second chapter highlighted that little work has been done in Sierra Leone on fiscal 
sustainability. Compared to the existing literature on Sierra Leone, this chapter made three distinct 
contributions: (i) the analysis uses the most recent data set available; (ii) we estimated a policy 
rule also known as a fiscal reaction function for Sierra Leone; and (iii) we accounted for 
endogenous structural breaks in the cointegration relationship between government revenue and 
expenditure. 
Chapter Three examined the impact of exogenous fiscal policy shocks on output, private 
consumption, private investment, inflation and interest rate using the SVAR. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are not aware of no other work that does so on Sierra Leone. 
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Chapter Four investigated whether the tax soothing hypothesis holds for Sierra Leone. Two 
different approaches were used. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of no other similar 
work on Sierra Leone. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
The empirical results from this research have significant policy implications in terms of dealing 
with the fiscal problems effectively. First, it was observed in Chapter Two that the fiscal policy in 
Sierra Leone during the sample period is weakly sustainable and, government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is growing faster than government revenue as a percentage of GDP. Also, it 
was observed in Chapter Two that expenditure adjustments tend to work faster compared to 
revenue adjustments is reducing the size of the deficits.  It is therefore recommended that the 
government of Sierra Leone should introduce the following measures:  
(i) enhance tax collection  
(ii)  (ii) introduce reforms aimed at widening the tax base;  
(iii)  (iii) reduce tax loopholes, tax avoidance and evasion.  
(iv)  cut down expenditures not geared towards achieving economic growth 
These measures will go a long way towards increasing the amount of revenue received from taxes, 
reducing the size of the deficits, and achieving strong form of fiscal sustainability.  
 
 
 
193 
 
It was also observed in Chapter Three that government spending strongly stimulates the economy 
by increasing output and its components (private consumption and investment). However, when 
we disaggregate government spending into its components- government consumption and 
government investment, the empirical results show that government investment is more effective 
in increasing output compared to government consumption expenditure. Therefore, it is 
recommended the government of Sierra Leone should concentrate its spending on investments. 
Such investment includes but not limited to infrastructural development such as electricity, roads, 
hospitals, information, communication and technology and so forth, and irrelevant spending such 
as those white elephant projects should be abandoned.  
The findings from Chapter Four indicates that the fiscal policy in Sierra Leone over the sample 
period has been consistent with optimal tax theory. It is therefore recommended that the 
government of Sierra Leone should continue to smooth taxes to minimise the distortionary effects 
as tax smoothing is a precondition for sustainable fiscal policy.  
5.4 Suggestion for Further Studies 
Owing to the data span, Chapter Two included only a single structural break. It is thus 
recommended that future studies with extended data set should test for multiple break dates. 
Because of the non-existence of interest rate on public debt data, this thesis ignores testing for 
fiscal sustainability by using the debt sustainability approach. Future studies can test for fiscal 
sustainability using this approach when data is available. Also, due to the unavailability of interest 
rates on public debt data, this thesis does not take into account testing for tax smoothing by using 
the relationship between primary balance and government expenditure.  
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